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Abstract 
The impetus behind the writing of this dissertation came 
out of informal interviews held with teachers about their 
actual practice of teaching. What these interviews 
revealed was that teachers teach in a kind of 
"muddledness" and confusion. Mainly this dissertation 
aims to define a way of being in teaching that gives 
teaching shape and direction. 
The theoretical understanding underlying the research of 
the dissertation is based in metaphysics and existential 
thought. Specifically, the content is focussed on the 
concept of authenticity. Authenticity has particular 
meaning in philosophical thought. For an understanding of 
the existential meaning of authenticity I have turned to 
European philosophy and the thinking of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre. For an understanding of how 
authenticity in its existential sense relates to the 
profession of teaching and being a teacher I explore the 
thinking of six contemporary Anglo-American educational 
theorists: William Pinar, Mary Warnock, Nel Noddings, Max 
van Manen, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner. Through a 
form of hermeneutics and reflective critical analysis I 
explore how authenticity is valued in the thinking of 
each of these six educational theorists. Drawing on the 
thoughts and insights offered by these selected authors I 
construct my own model of authenticity in teaching in the 
conclusion of the dissertation in an approach that I call 
"the multifacetted Janus face of authenticity." 
The dissertation is framed in the language of literature, 
which supports the methodology. Specifically it is the 
writings of Virginia Woolf that are used to formulate 
this investigation into the meaningfulness of teaching. 
IV 
Preface 
Some technical details should be noted in the 
reading of this dissertation. 
I have attempted to represent both genders equally 
in the language of the dissertation. However, there is 
some inconsistency. The philosophical discourses of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre use the masculine 
gender in the texts referred to, as does the 
educationalist and philosopher Mary Warnock. For the most 
part, in referencing and quoting these texts, I have 
retained their language. To do otherwise, I feel, would 
misrepresent their thoughts and intended meanings. The 
use of the masculine gender in these sections is not 
intended to mean that I embrace this tradition. 
There are differences between North America and the 
United Kingdom in the spelling of certain English words. 
In this dissertation I quote substantially from American 
texts and in the quoted sections I have used the North 
American spelling. Everywhere else, however, I have used 
the Oxford form. 
Quotation marks around a single word or phrase are 
used to indicate to the reader that I acknowledge the 
multiple meanings that the word or phrase could have. 
The use of italics for a single word or phrase is to 
show that the named author has given a particular meaning 
to that word or phrase. 
v 
Introduction 
The Search for Meaningful Teaching 
Of course, she said to herself, coming into the room, 
she had to come here to get something she wanted. 
First she wanted to sit down in a particular chair 
under a particular lamp. But she wanted something 
more, though she did not know, could not think what it 
was she wanted. (Virginia Woolf: To the Lighthouse) 
What does it mean to teach? What does it mean to be a 
teacher? This dissertation seeks to answer these questions. 
The content of what follows is a result of identified 
personal feelings of confusion and uncertainty in my own 
teaching practice and a perceived sense of confusion and 
muddledness in which other teachers operate, and a desire to 
come to terms with the profession of teaching. It is also an 
acknowledgement of a gap existing between teachers and what 
they teach. 
A number of years ago I turned away from teaching. I had 
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begun a teaching career in the mainstream elementary school 
system, in Southern Ontario, Canada. It still remains an 
uneasy memory, that time as a beginning teacher. Even though 
I tried to teach with intelligence and sensitivity, I 
suffered much internal conflict and anguish. I enjoyed being 
with the children; their innocence and spontaneity sustained 
me through my brief career as an elementary teacher. But 
those moments of pleasure eventually were outweighed by 
growing internal conflicts. Thoughts of doubt and 
uncertainty entered my teaching practice: thoughts about the 
value of curriculum content, doubts about my approaches to 
teaching, and uncertainty about the demands and expectations 
placed on both teachers and students by the established 
educational systems. Deep feelings of isolation further 
exacerbated these conflicts associated with teaching and the 
lack balance between the demands of teaching and my personal 
life. Eventually the internal turmoil forced me to 
acknowledge that a deep rift lay between myself and 
teaching. At that time I was ill equipped to come to terms 
with these conflicts. Instead, I believed there to be an 
irreconcilable gap. So I left teaching for a while and left 
the conflicts unresolved. Even though I acted with what I 
thought were sincere and good intentions during those early 
teaching experiences it was not until many years later when 
I was forced to think more critically about teaching that I 
started to see myself and the practice of teaching 
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differently. It was this emptiness felt inwardly that was 
the impetus for the research and the yearning to give 
substance to a void that carried the research forward. This 
dissertation is an attempt at identifying what were the 
barriers that existed between myself and institutionalised 
schooling. At the same time, it is an attempt at bridging 
the distance between teaching and myself. 
Through the years I have listened to other teachers talk 
about their teaching. I have often wondered how these 
teachers perceive teaching and how they have come to terms 
with their profession. Could it be that they have an 
understanding of what it means to teach that I lacked? I 
recently had the opportunity to explore the inner thoughts 
of teachers and their understanding of their teaching 
through a research project in which I was involved related 
to the implementation of the National Curriculum in England. 
In 1998 I interviewed twelve Primary School teachers in the 
Coventry area, who had been teaching for a number of years. 
Mainly the interviews focussed on their remembered 
experiences of teaching during the implementation of the 
National Curriculum in the schools in which they taught. The 
National Curriculum, which was designed and mandated in 1988 
by the then ruling Conservative government, became a 
standard curriculum for all schools in England. Although the 
National Curriculum had been somewhat modified in the ten 
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years preceding the time I carried out the interviews, those 
modifications had been government-determined. The teachers' 
ability to recall in detail the changes to the National 
Curriculum in their classrooms was very apparent in these 
interviews. Their awareness not only evidenced that the 
transition to teaching the National Curriculum was a 
significant event in their teaching histories but also that 
it was an event that caused them to reflect critically on 
their profession. What began to surface from my 
conversations with these teachers and their expressed 
recollections was that the conflicts and confusion I held 
about teaching were also present in the thinking of other 
practising teachers. But the difference was that these 
teachers worked within the conflicts and uncertainties that 
I had identified. They did not see it as essential to 
calling themselves teachers that such conflicts need be 
resolved. The following analysis of aspects of my 
conversations with the teachers in the Coventry area reveals 
the conflicting frame within which teachers operate. 
A common feeling held amongst the teachers whom I 
interviewed was that of resentment towards the government 
for interfering with what they felt was an aspect of their 
professionalism. "They [meaning the government] saw us as 
incompetent," one teacher said. "It was as if we were being 
told that we weren't doing our job properly," said another. 
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They resented the fact that they were not asked for input 
into what the curriculum should be. ~The government didn't 
listen to teachers," ~They didn't ever listen to teachers," 
were some of the opinions voiced. Teaching was seen as a 
polarised position: on one hand there was a government-
designed curriculum, and on the other hand there was a 
teacher-determined approach to education. One teacher put it 
this way: ~We know what is best for children because we are 
closer to them." 
But amongst these teachers there was a disparity of opinion 
as to the degree of involvement teachers and government 
should have in determining what was to be taught and how it 
was to be taught. All of the teachers whom I interviewed had 
implemented the National Curriculum in their classrooms. On 
one level teachers saw the National Curriculum as being very 
helpful to their practice. It had provided a foundation to 
their teaching. ~It gives staff something concrete on which 
to plan," one head teacher commented. "There is [sic] 
consistency and continuity there. Before [the National 
Curriculum] teachers were just swimming around." ~ It gave 
me a structure on which to base my teaching," more than one 
teacher voiced. On another level teachers saw implementing 
the government-designed curriculum as something to be taken 
in one's stride as teacher. "You just get on with it," was 
one teacher's view. "I think teachers are very good at 
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adapting to things, and making things fit. That's what they 
do," was the opinion expressed by one head teacher. Yet, 
others felt confused and overwhelmed by the demands for 
changes in their practice. Two of them spoke of how the 
National Curriculum had caused them great internal turmoil. 
"I remember the exact moment. I felt I couldn't cope any 
more. Someone came by my room and asked if I was all right. 
The National Curriculum ruined my life," she confessed. 
Another teacher related having a similar experience. "I lost 
confidence in my teaching," she said. 
Another very articulate teacher saw herself and her fellow 
teachers as now being disaffected in their teaching and the 
teaching profession becoming fragmented. "The number of 
teachers in every school now that would rather be doing 
something else," she said, "is phenomenal. Teachers began to 
shut their doors and package time to meet overwhelming 
targets. The amount of material we were asked to cover was 
massive. There was just too much. There is still too much 
that we are asked to do. Children are suffering under 
teachers who have been on overdrive for so long that they 
don't look backwards. We can't listen to children. No one 
has time to do that. I'm expected to do so many things which 
were never in my training. The government has made education 
a business with targets and 'value for money' rather than a 
love of working with children and enjoying learning. u 
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The conflicts and tensions that these teachers expressed in 
dialogue on their profession conveyed varied understandings 
of teaching. Although often critical of their profession, 
collectively the teachers held no clear or common answers to 
their criticisms. They evidenced a confusion as to what form 
teaching should take. My response to these interviews came 
in the form of more questions about teaching that went 
beyond those questions I had posed to myself about my own 
teaching experiences and beyond an acknowledgement of the 
disjunction between an inner sense of self and the 
profession of teaching. These questions were broader in 
nature revealing conflicts between the self as teacher and 
the position of teachers to the greater social order: What 
involvement should government have in education? Who should 
determine curriculum content? What part should teachers play 
in curriculum design? What position should teachers take to 
a curriculum designed by others? Can one call himself or 
herself a teacher when what is taught and the policies 
within which one teaches are prescribed by others? Listening 
closely to the comments of teachers on their profession and 
to my own inner voice resulted in an awareness that the 
profession of teaching is in a critical state. Fundamental 
questions about teaching and the connectedness of teachers 
to their profession continue to go unanswered by teachers in 
practice: What does it mean to be a teacher? What does it 
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mean to teach? Most importantly: How can teachers be "at 
home" in their profession? Since the time of the interviews 
I have continued to listen to teachers talk about their 
profession in both North America and England. From such 
conversations it has been continually reaffirmed that 
teachers lack an understanding of their profession and the 
morass of teaching appears to be growing, on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
More recently I have returned to teaching and education, 
initially as a student of education. This re-entry into 
teaching was driven by survival when my profession as an 
artist failed to produce sufficient income. With this return 
to teaching and education came the commitment not to let the 
internal emptiness overwhelm me as it had in the past. The 
commitment to teaching stayed but the reason for this 
commitment changed. 
In the academia of education I was drawn to the burgeoning 
field of qualitative forms of research and contemporary 
theories of teaching and teacher identity. There exists a 
body of scholarship concerning teachers' lives and 
experiences. Educationalists such as Ivor Goodson (Studying 
Teachers' Lives), Pat Sikes (Life History Research in 
Educational Settings), Jennifer Nias (Primary Teachers 
Talking), and others have attempted to bring the 
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orientations, values, and thoughts of teachers to the 
foreground. Through revealing the experiences of teachers 
important insights into teaching and being a teacher are 
better known. The articulation of aspects of teachers' lives 
was helpful in reflecting on my own experiences but for me 
they lacked a necessary overall orientation to teaching and 
a direction to teaching that I sought. How does one position 
oneself in teaching in a way that makes teaching personally 
satisfying? 
Some educational theorists named the reasons why teaching 
might result in feelings of emptiness and alienation. The 
field of critical educational theory has many facets and the 
scholarly discourse in this area has resulted in a now vast 
body of thought. Authors such as Paulo Friere (Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed), Michael Apple (Cultural Politics and 
Education), and Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punishment) 
figure prominently here. Critical theory helped in 
identifying the conflicts and putting a name to a face but 
did not give substance to filling the gap. Certainly 
feminist critical theories of education spoke to me as a 
female and as a mother who teaches. I explored feminist 
theory in its many and varied forms through reading such 
authors as Morweena Griffiths (Feminisms of the Self), Jane 
Miller (School for Women), Nel Noddings (Caring), and bell 
hooks (Teaching to Transgress). Initially, the argument that 
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education is constructed by men and that as men they 
repudiate female sensibilities had merit. To a point these 
arguments articulated by feminist theorists had resonance 
with some aspects of my experiences of teaching in practice. 
But in the end a feminist perspective on education and 
teaching proved problematic. It was mainly through a close 
reading of Madeleine Grumet's Bitter Milk that I realized 
the contradictions and limitations of a feminist orientation 
to teaching. I sought a more holistic and inclusive 
approach. 
As I continued my reading in contemporary educational theory 
I eventually discovered a number of educationalists who have 
attempted to give direction and form to teaching. Mainly the 
educationalists to whom I was most drawn looked to 
philosophy as a way of understanding the work of teaching. 
In addition to being critical of present-day education as we 
know it, they offered alternative approaches to teaching. 
Although there was no one fixed ideology held collectively 
amongst this particular group of educationalists, there were 
certain common themes that appeared in their discourses. It 
was these commonalities that resulted in the selection of 
the particular works examined here. Mainly, these theorists 
valued existentialist thought as the basis on which to build 
their ideas. Their writings reveal a common focus on past, 
present, and future, an emphasis on critical and reflective 
10 
thought, and a common desire to define teaching within such 
metaphysical concepts as freedom and growth. Also common to 
all was an existentialist call to an awakening and to act in 
conscious awareness. In addition, the discourses of this 
group of theorists were directed at practising teachers. 
They implied that changes to meaningful teaching needed to 
come from within the profession itself, that is, from 
teachers. It is as a teacher that I have responded to what 
they have written. 
This dissertation is a close reading of the writings of six 
contemporary educationalists each of whom offers a way for 
teachers to frame everyday actions and thoughts, while in 
the practice of teaching. By "close reading" I mean an 
inter~~~tive explication and an in-depth critical analysis 
of what was written. The selected educationalists are Nel 
Noddings, Max van Manen, William Pinar, Dwayne Huebner, 
Maxine Greene, and Mary Warnock. Within each of the 
educational projects offered by these theorists I found an 
insight into teaching that enabled me to come to terms with 
teaching in practice. These are not the only educational 
theorists who have attempted to bring existentialist thought 
into education and teaching. Peter Abbs (Autobiography in 
Education), Van Cleves Morris (Existentialism and 
Education), and Martin Buber (Between Man and Man) are other 
authors who have written on themes of the self and 
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education. But in the end two incidences colliding at the 
same time influenced the selection of authors. One was a 
gentle guiding hand placed firmly on my back by my 
supervisors who asked that I bring these varying 
perspectives on authentic teaching together into formulating 
my own approach to teaching, and the other was the wonder of 
an epiphany. Through reflection and a personally led desire 
to formulate a realisable vision of teaching I was able to 
name the theorists who aided in another all encompassing 
approach to teaching. 
The focus of this research is on alternative approaches to 
teaching that intend to give meaningfulness to the practice 
of teaching through understandings of personal, cultural, 
and social authenticity. This research offers the frame 
through which I was able to return to teaching, one that 
sees education as a place for transformation and redirection 
and teaching as a way for those of us who teach to be closer 
to our profession. 
Methodological and theoretical considerations 
The research of this dissertation is in the form of an 
inquiry. It is an exploration and analysis of six 
alternative approaches to teaching each of which is based in 
existential thought. The method for the research is 
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postmodern in nature in that it does not follow a 
conventional linear process of explication, analysis, and 
logical conclusion. Instead, this research turns to 
phenomenology as a frame for explication and critical 
analysis. In this phenomenological form of inquiry two 
separate disciplines, those of art and of education, are 
brought together and through comparison and contrast certain 
relevant and important themes related to my thesis are 
explicated and explored. 
Husserl was the father of phenomenology. Martin Heidegger 
was his dedicated student. Heidegger provides the 
justification of this research form. Phenomenology focusses 
on revealing and interpreting events and situations; 
"unconcealing" was the word Heidegger used. Specific to this 
research are the philosophical insights he offered on the 
value of art to phenomenological exploration. In his text 
Poetry, Language and Thought (1963) Heidegger sees the 
interpretation of works of art as a form of discourse of 
disclosure (PLT, p. 36). (Heidegger called this 
"unconcealing" process of a work of art, "setting the work 
to work" (PLT, p. 36).) In applying art in this way 
Heidegger sees that a kind of space is created. Heidegger 
calls such a space "a playing field, a clearing, a Lichtung" 
(p. 53). It is a space that becomes "opened up" through 
thoughtful dialogue, critical reflection, and exchange of 
ideas. The approach taken in this research is a form of 
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critical, reflective dialogue in a mode of exchange of 
ideas. I have engaged the writings of Virginia Woolf for 
such a purpose. Woolf's writing, her aesthetics, becomes a 
way to inquire into educational discourses and the projects 
of the six theorists. In placing Woolf's work alongside 
educational discourses an "unconcealing" quality transpires 
and a kind of space is created. Woolf's writing (her 
artistic work) provides a platform, "a clearing," for an 
exploration into the various discourses of the individual 
educational theorists. The ideas of these various theorists, 
through description and a kind of critical interpretation, 
become "opened up"; and through "setting the work to work" 
Woolf's writing provides a unifying frame to the writing of 
this dissertation, as well as a way of entering into the 
diverse projects of each of these contemporary 
educationalists with the intent of apprehending the content 
and meaning of the theories of teaching and education they 
present. The poetics of her text also set a certain tone for 
the language of the dissertation. 
It is not unusual to use aesthetic and artistic forms to 
serve as the basis for inquiring into educational theory. 
Engaging aesthetics in research has been done by such 
educationalists as Maxine Greene (1970, 1994, 1995), Elliot 
Eisner (1974, 1990, 1998), Elizabeth Vallance (1974), 
William Pinar (1976, 1988, 1992, 1994) and Madeleine Grumet 
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(1976, 1988), R. A. Smith (1970), and G. McCutcheon (1992), 
to name a few. Indeed, a number of such inquiries have 
turned to the work of Virginia Woolf, referencing her 
writing and her thoughts to give clarity or verification to 
theirs: William Pinar (1992, 1995, Madeleine Grumet (1988), 
Maxine Greene (1995, 1998), Sara Ruddick (1984), Mary Jane 
Martin (1970, 1985, 1994, 2000), Louise DeSalvo (1980, 
1982,1984, 1989), et ale The methodological structure of 
this inquiry lies within this existing body of inquiry into 
education. 
I have selected Virginia Woolf's writing rather than some 
other aesthetic form as the frame of the writing for a 
number of reasons. Aside from the fact that Woolf's writing 
has figured prominently in my own life story, her writing 
has a certain resonance with and relevance to the 
educational theorists of this inquiry. Her work is often 
referenced in their writing, specifically in the thinking of 
William Pinar and Maxine Greene. (We will see the importance 
her writing plays in the thinking of these theorists in the 
expositions of their projects.) But she also has a common 
affinity with the educational theorists selected here. Woolf 
writes from a strong phenomenological orientation. She 
writes as a self that sees the world from inside experience. 
Roger Poole's study of Virginia Woolf and her writing in his 
The Unknown Virginia Woolf (1983) recognises Woolf's strong 
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phenomenological orientation: 
[F]ew critics approach or dare to consider her 
[Virginia Woolf's] main achievement: the establishment 
of a new mode of discourse, a new mode of rationality, 
a new form of deduction and integration, in writing her 
novels. She is rarely, that is to say, considered as 
philosophically important, although she obviously 
follows a phenomenological course in her writing 
(Poole, p. 282). 
The six educationalists whose writings that we are about to 
explore construct their projects in phenomenology and the 
turn inwards. Strong phenomenological themes often found in 
Woolf's writing also exist in the discourses of the 
contemporary educational theorists; i.e., subjective (inner 
voices and personal perspectives), intersubjective 
narratives, transcendence of time and space and 
transcendence of bodies, a world view from the position of 
Self at the centre, as well as the interplay between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Throughout, Virginia Woolf's 
approach to writing is woven into the educational discourses 
of this dissertation. 
The research began by gathering together the educational 
theorists that I have named above. The word "gathered" is 
used here intentionally, to reflect Heidegger's 
phenomenological approach to reading. He contends, "That 
which is sustaining and directive in reading is gatheredness 
[Sammlung] ... Authentic reading is a gatheredness to that 
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which, unbeknown to us, has already claimed our essence" 
(Sallis, Intro., p. 2). It is a gathering of a body of 
theoretical discourses that had both individually and 
collectively called to me; they had at some point laid a 
claim on me as a teacher. The discourses of Nel Noddings, 
Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, Max van Manen, Mary Warnock, 
and Maxine Greene became the data for the research. Although 
each of these educationalists has written extensively on 
teaching and education, for this enquiry I have selected one 
text by each theorist for the explication and critical 
analysis of their thinking. It is in these selected texts 
that I found the theories of teaching and education that 
were most relevant to formulating my own approach to 
teaching. (The title of each of these texts is given below.) 
Certainly, these are not all the educational theorists who 
have attempted to give an alternative definition to 
teaching. But these particular authors were selected for a 
number of reasons. Each of these theorists has directed his 
or her projects at teachers who are active in the practice 
of teaching. Mainly the intended readers for their writings 
are teachers in schools, notably, but not solely, elementary 
and secondary schools. It is the kind of teaching of 
mainstream schooling which is where I have situated this 
inquiry and the search for meaningfulness in teaching. In 
addition, each of the theorists has founded his or her 
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thinking in existentialist thought. Themes of freedom, self-
actualisation, and positioning the self in relationship to 
the world are common in their discourses. But each has a 
different idea of what should be primary in teaching, the 
self, the students, society in general, or something broader 
still. Taken together their varying approaches to teaching 
and education offered a way for me to position myself as 
teacher in education that is personally satisfying. 
Authenticity and aspects of inwardness 
As I have stated above this exploration into educational 
theory is led mainly by a desire to understand what position 
teachers should hold in teaching. I will argue in the 
following inquiry that underlying the projects of the six 
theorists we are about to study is the existentialist view 
that holds a desire to move towards authenticity to be 
primary in teaching and in education. There is an 
established field of authenticity in education as noted by 
Joseph Petroglia in his brief chapter on the history of 
authenticity in education (pp. 14-32). There are also 
varying understanding of authenticity and varying 
orientations in approaching the topic of self and how the 
self relates to society. Charles Taylor founds his 
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definition of authenticity solely in understandings of the 
self. As it relates to teaching and education John Dewey 
focusses on authenticity in society and the role of 
education in bringing society and the individual closer. 
Along with philosophical understandings of authenticity 
cognitive psychologists also concern themselves with 
defining the self (Susan Harter). For this dissertation 
authenticity is defined in a kind of openness but it is an 
openness based in philosophical conversations of the self 
and authenticity, mainly that of existentialism. In 
existentialist thought authenticity has a particular 
definition. We will first come to an understanding of the 
term authenticity in its philosophical sense by exploring 
the thinking of those philosophers who are associated with 
defining its philosophical meaning: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
and Sartre. The constitutional elements of authentic 
existence are what collectively might be called "aspects of 
inwardness." These aspects of inwardness are highly 
integrated concepts related to notions of the self. Mainly 
inwardness is connected to and calls upon the ability of 
human beings to reflect, to hold varying perspectives, to 
imagine, to reason, and to operate in faith and belief. 
Later, in the exploration of the thinking of the various 
theorists, I explicate how authenticity and aspects of 
inwardness exist in each of the projects of the six selected 
educationalists as they formulate a way for teachers to be 
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in education. 
The structure of the writing 
The form of this dissertation has two distinct aspects. As 
stated above Chapter One is an explication of the term 
authenticity through the writings of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
and Sartre. Chapters Two through to Five explicate and 
critically discuss the theories of six existentialist 
educationalists. In the conclusion the theories of the six 
educationalists are brought together in another approach to 
teaching. 
The focus of the research throughout is on authenticity and 
teaching. It was Martin Heidegger who coined the term 
"authenticity." Heidegger shifted Kierkegaard's emphasis on 
stages of becoming through which one must pass in order to 
achieve selfhood, and his journey to God's eternal 
blessedness, to an emphasis on the essential aspects of 
being that move one from an inauthentic existence to 
authentic being. Authentic being was, for Heidegger, the 
conscious state of an individual who has been aroused 
through Angst by concerns about everyday existence and 
questions the meaning of existence. The individual then 
moves to take responsibility for his life and in doing so 
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"chooses" his own existence. Sartre furthered Heidegger's 
thinking in terms of the meaning of authenticity, while 
bringing a more distinctive moral aspect to authentic being. 
For Sartre authentic existence is defined against what he 
,calls practices of "Bad Faith." Basically, one who lives in 
"Bad Faith" is avoiding taking responsibility for oneself 
and one's existence. The authentic individual, through 
conscious thought, must rise above this form of existence. I 
will argue in Chapter One that there is a common narrative 
underlying the three philosophers' theories of authentic 
existence. It will be shown throughout the research proper 
that this existentialist narrative, originally defined by 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, threads its way through 
the theories of the educational theorists selected for 
exploration here. The research will reveal how each of the 
selected educationalists has built on and expanded the 
essential narrative of authenticity forged by the three 
philosophers. 
Chapter Two focusses on defining the Self as teacher. For 
this we will look closely at the educational theories of 
William Pinar and his method of writing of the self as 
teacher which he calls currere as described in his book 
Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality (1994). Critical 
debate is then brought to Pinar's method and his focus on 
the self by comparing his thinking about the self to the 
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theoretical ideas of Mary Warnock as described in her text 
Imagination and Time (1994) where the self is understood in 
broader and more universal terms. Mary Warnock's thinking is 
also challenged in this comparison as consideration is given 
to the theoretical strength of her ideas and as well as its 
pragmatic value in terms of teaching and education today. 
In Chapter Three the self as teacher is broadened to 
consider the teacher's relational experience with "the 
other" in teaching, "the other" here meaning the student. In 
this chapter Nel Noddings's concept of engrossment as 
described in her text entitled Caring: a Feminine Approach 
to Ethics & Moral Education (1986) and Max van Manen's 
notion of pedagogical tact as detailed in his Tact of 
Teaching (1991) are explicated. Although there are many 
commonalities held between Noddings and van Manen in their 
thinking of "the other," underlying this comparison and the 
differences in their thinking is a conflict in 
existentialist thought related to how the self is 
constructed. It is the philosophical debate over which is 
primary: essence or existence. The value of these two 
different existentialist positions in terms of meaningful 
teaching will be discussed and challenged in this chapter. 
Chapter Four looks closely at the thinking of Maxine Greene 
and her focus on self as teacher and the responsibility of 
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the self, the individual, has to society. In her book The 
Dialectic of Freedom (1988) she expresses a view that 
present day society accedes to the givens of life, leaving 
unchallenged and embedded limitations to free speech, while 
operating in a kind of mindlessness of mechanism and routine 
behaviours (Greene, p. 2). She desires to change the 
orientation of teachers to a focus on epistemological 
concerns as a way of ensuring that individuals (students) 
become informed, enlightened, and active contributors to 
what she calls an authentic public sphere. 
The final exploration into contemporary educational theories 
and understandings of authenticity in teaching is centred on 
universality and the thinking of educationalist and 
theologian Dwayne Huebner. In an article entitled "Education 
and Spirituality" (1993) Huebner argues that education, 
meaning mainly curriculum design and teaching, should focus 
on spiritual journeying. Critical thought is given to 
Huebner's project of education in spirituality by first 
comparing his thinking about teaching and education to that 
of Maxine Greene and her "education for freedom." Then 
critical thought is given to the notion of "spirituality" 
and questions are raised as to where and how spirituality 
has a place in contemporary society. In this section I am 
merely touching the broad and variegated hand of 
spirituality through connectedness with some of the main 
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tenets in existential spirituality. 
The Conclusion is a synthesis of the thinking of the six 
educational theorists we have been exploring in the 
research. This is also where I offer my own approach to 
teaching. It is an approach based on aspects of inwardness 
and authenticity and is built on the thoughts of the 
theorists we have explored. It is presented here in outline 
form. It is an outline of a way to be in teaching that is 
intended to address the shortcomings of each of the 
theorists' projects noted in the critical analysis of their 
thinking. The approach that I offer is one which calls upon 
the narrative structure of authentic existence that I noted 
in Chapter One and brings together thoughts of the self, the 
other, the individual's responsibility to society, and 
universal notions of the self in the construction of 
authentic teaching practices. It is an approach intended for 
teachers in practice and one which also addresses the 
conflict that exists between teachers' autonomy and the 
educational policies that govern mainstream teaching. How 
can teachers remain authentic when confronted with policies 
that contradict their own sense of self? What I offer here 
is an approach for teachers in mainstream teaching to effect 
policy change in teaching while remaining true to a certain 
definition of teaching, and at the same time move mainstream 
teaching in a direction that brings teaching, the teacher 
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and what is taught closer together. The Conclusion is a way 
for teachers to position themselves in their teaching that 
in some way resolves the confusion and uncertainty in which 
teachers function today. 
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Chapter One 
Theories of Authenticity ~n Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre 
Of authenticity Gill and Sherman (1963) write, "the concept 
of the authentic as opposed to the inauthentic life is one 
of the most original and important contributions of 
existentialism, precisely because it provides ethical norms 
genuinely rooted in human ontology" (p. 19). This chapter 
intends to give some understanding of the term "authentic 
being" in its philosophical sense. Doing so necessitates a 
turn to European philosophy and existentialist thought. Here 
we focus mainly on the thinking of three philosophers who 
are most closely identified with defining authentic 
existence: Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean 
Paul Sartre. 
Authenticity in its philosophical sense is fundamental to 
the thinking of the six educationalists whose theories are 
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explored in the following chapters. In defining authenticity 
we enter the world of metaphysics where what is discussed is 
of an abstract nature. Mainly metaphysics is concerned with 
the concepts of universality, personal identity, what 
constitutes human understanding, the nature of being, and 
the interrelatedness of these concepts. Authenticity in its 
existentialist meaning is actually a frame for defining the 
self. It is constituted in what might be called an inner 
sense of self and calls for engaged reflection, imagination, 
thoughtful response, and exchange, in its construction and 
realisation. 
I argue in the following explication of authenticity that 
the defining of authenticity in the thinking of the three 
philosophers follows a common narrative. Although the 
structure of the narrative varies with each philosopher, 
fundamental aspects of the narrative are the same. Authentic 
existence is presented by each of these philosophers as a 
possibility for everyone. The individual is called to awaken 
to a sense of self, of a self that comes to know that one is 
responsible for naming and defining one's own individuality. 
The awakened self follows a calling; it is a call to know 
and to name one's limitations while searching and striving 
for one's possibilities. Authentic existence as presented in 
these narratives aims to give definition and direction to 
one's existence as it calls for a transformation of being. 
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In a growing sense of self-awareness the self, the 
individual, aims to realise his or her highest sense of 
being; that is, knowing the self deeply and also knowing 
one's sense of place in the world. 
We begin with an exploration of how authenticity is defined 
in the thinking of Soren Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard and selfhood 
The crowd, in fact, is composed of individuals; it 
must therefore be in every man's power to become what 
he is, an individual. From becoming an individual no 
one, no one at all, is excluded, except he who 
excludes himself by becoming a crowd man (Kierkegaard, 
cited in Friedman, p. 113). 
The term "authentic being" is deeply rooted in the personal 
experiences of Kierkegaard. Born in 1813, he set the stage 
and provided the conceptual tools for the field of 
existentialism that was to follow a century later. 
Kierkegaard is known for having exalted the concept of the 
individual. Standing against the Christian doctrines of his 
time and the dominance of the bourgeois society into which 
he was born he desired to define what the individual was and 
at the same time recognise the power and ability of the 
individual in determining his own future and sense of 
existence. 
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His theory, presented as a series of stages, reflects 
Kierkegaard's own life struggle and self-determined path to 
authentic being. Through his own lived experiences and inner 
anguish Kierkegaard determined there to be three primary 
stages to ultimate selfhood: the aesthetic stage, the 
ethical stage, and finally the Christian stage. The truly 
authentic being needs to go through all of these three 
stages in order to achieve complete selfhood. What follows 
is a description of each of the stages. In Kierkegaard's 
writing each of these stages becomes increasingly more 
involved, demanding more of one's commitment to being 
authentic. 
The aesthetic stage 
The aesthetic stage is the stage of immediacy. The person 
lives solely for the moment in hedonistic pursuits bringing 
immediate satisfaction, and readily surrenders to sensuous 
desire. At this stage self-awareness and a consciousness of 
self have not yet found expression. The person simply moves 
from one momentary experience to another without thinking to 
establish understanding or any continuity among them. His 
activity is seen as mindless and without reflective intent. 
He lacks purpose and commitment to anything. He merely lives 
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for the moment in a ceaseless round of pleasure, 
superficiality, and what Kierkegaard calls absentmindedness. 
Although this immediacy stage does reflect the behaviour of 
a child, the aesthetic stage, according to Kierkegaard, can 
become fixed in the adult. In adult life a person can live 
his entire life not distinguishing himself from or as 
opposed to the social order of which he is a part. In this 
instance no true self-consciousness has emerged, and no 
genuine independent decisions are made. Kierkegaard calls a 
person in such a mode of existence, the Crowd Man. A good 
example of a Crowd Man type would be Anna's brother, 
Oblonsky, in Leo Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina. Oblonsky is 
totally absorbed in satisfying his own immediate desires. 
The meaning of life for Oblonsky is limited to achieving 
immediate self-satisfaction. Money, women, and social status 
drive and determine his actions and his relations with 
others around him. Other characters in the novel are 
conflicted by life and the societal roles that they are 
expected to follow, especially Anna. But Oblonsky remains a 
Crowd Man. That is, as a Crowd Man, he lives his whole life 
without ever becoming fully conscious of his own 
individuality, as being distinct from the social and natural 
environment of which he is a part. He has no sense of his 
inner self. According to Kierkegaard, the Crowd Man 
represents the average citizen. In bourgeois society he was 
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the established man, one who diligently follows'the rules 
laid down by society: 
He is a university man, husband and father, an 
uncommonly competent civil functionary even, a 
respectable father, very gentle to his wife and 
carefulness in itself with respect to his children. 
And a Christian? Well yes, he is that too, after a 
sort (From Sickness Unto Death, cited in Gill and 
Sherman, 1973, p. 19) 
Since he lacks a sense of self-determination, the Crowd Man 
constantly sees himself as being acted upon by forces over 
which he has little or no control. Although he may appear to 
act deliberately and freely, in fact the Crowd Man is 
constantly being determined by the world around him. The 
result is a person who is what Kierkegaard calls lost to 
himself. In this mode of existence one has not yet begun to 
move toward authentic selfhood. At the immediate pole of the 
aesthetic stage, life is concentrated in the passing moment, 
and has no intrinsic relation to, or interest in, past and 
future. Kierkegaard gives value to one's awareness of past 
and future, as an essential aspect of the inner being. 
Kierkegaard described the aesthetic mode this way: "For the 
sensual is the momentary. The sensual seeks momentary 
satisfaction. The more refined it is, the better it knows 
how to make the moment of enjoyment a little eternity" (from 
Either/Or, cited in Taylor, 1975, p. 153). 
The move to authentic selfhood begins while one is still in 
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the aesthetic stage. One's ability to reflect is also 
another essential element in naming the self. The individual 
must come to some conscious awareness of himself. Self-
reflection emerges with a deliberate decision to reflect. 
The development of this decision and the move to self-
reflection marks a significant step in the process of 
individualisation. At the moment of self-reflection a self 
begins to emerge, the emergence of a self through 
consciousness. The recognition of the self as a decision-
maker is another essential aspect of the inner sense. 
The ethical stage 
The most significant characteristic of the aesthetic stage 
is the absence of the exercise of one's freedom of decision-
making. In the aesthetic stage one does what society 
determines one is to do. The fundamental characteristic of 
the ethical stage is the emergence of decision. Decision-
making, according to Kierkegaard, is primary in constituting 
the individual. 
Kierkegaard determines two closely related levels of 
decision-making. The first level Kierkegaard calls choosing 
oneself. The self does not exist until one chooses oneself. 
When one chooses oneself, one is on the way to achieving 
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selfhood and authentic being. The second level, "for which 
the first is a necessary condition, is the deliberate 
resolution to strive to achieve a goal. Committing to a goal 
is the second aspect of achieving authentic being. Taken 
together these two aspects of conscious thought, decision-
making and making a deliberate commitment, are what 
determine individuality. 
Kierkegaard in his theoretical pursuit never gave up his 
Christian faith. But while he acknowledged God as the 
creator of the individual, he also acknowledged that the 
creation of the concrete self is always inextricably tied to 
a social and natural environment. The immediate environment 
contributes to constituting the self with the self being 
moulded and shaped by the immediate environment. Moreover, 
Kierkegaard determined that the effect of the environment on 
the self is always outside the control of the self. Who 
one's parents are, other people related to the self, and the 
historical development of humanity are formative of the 
self's being but are not determined by the self. However, 
they are part of the self's actuality. Kierkegaard concluded 
that for one to choose oneself is to begin to acknowledge 
those formative aspects, to acknowledge that one has a past, 
a social and cultural history. Kierkegaard felt that before 
any further development of the self beyond the environmental 
can take place, it is necessary to apprehend a sense of 
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oneself in terms of one's past. The process of choosing 
one's own self then is to accept the actualities of oneself. 
This acceptance of oneself must be in Kierkegaard's 
structure of selfhood a total acceptance, meaning one has to 
acknowledge one's weaknesses and shortcomings. Kierkegaard 
describes the process this way: "The individual thus becomes 
conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these 
talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these 
passions, influenced by these definite surroundings, as this 
definite product of a definite environment. By being 
conscious of himself in this way, he assumes responsibility 
for all of this: "Thus at the instant of choosing he is in 
the most complete isolation, for he withdraws from the 
surroundings; yet, at the same moment he is in absolute 
continuity, for he chooses himself as product of his 
environment and his past. So when he chooses himself as 
product he can be said to be creating himself" (from 
Either/Or, cited in Taylor, p. 190). 
It is in the ethical stage that one chooses oneself and in 
doing so accepts responsibility for oneself. Kierkegaard 
contends that it is only on the basis of such self-knowledge 
and such self-acceptance that responsible decisions can be 
carried out. In the choice of oneself, one accepts one's 
"givenness," one's actuality, and it is that upon which one 
builds. As Kierkegaard writes further in Either/Or, "the 
34 
choice itself is decisive for the content of the 
personality, through the choice the personality immerses 
itself in the thing chosen" (Gill and Sherman, p. 32). 
Kierkegaard maintained that only when the self understands 
itself and accepts itself can one proceed to what he names 
as the second level of decision-making. 
The second level of selfhood can be reached while in the 
ethical stage. It is the deliberate resolve to attempt to 
realise one's possibilities or to strive to achieve some 
goal. It is more a commitment manifest in action. It is 
one's free decision to try to actualise one's own 
potentialities. Kierkegaard believed that one's 
possibilities are actualised through the individual's 
capacity to exercise free will in making decisions. The 
actualisation of possibilities through decision-making is 
also the move to developing a self. (This insight is 
fundamental to authentic being and is repeated in the 
thinking of both Heidegger and Sartre.) Furthermore, the 
decisions made condition future possibilities in so far as 
choice irrevocably closes some possibilities and opens 
others. In this second stage of ethical being the individual 
recognises that he is free to define his own historical 
actuality through his own decisions. Kierkegaard wrote of 
this stage: "So the ethic's task is to develop out of his 
concealment and reveal himself in the universal" (from 
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Either/Or, cited in Taylor, p. 207). 
With an awareness of one's actualities it is possible to set 
goals toward which one strives. The goals which move one 
towards a fully actualised being, Kierkegaard believed, are 
set in the form of an image of an ideal self; the ideal self 
being a picture of perfection formed in one's imagination. 
By means of the imagination, an individual constructs an 
ideal self distinguished from his real and actual self. 
Having imagined an ideal self, one endeavours to actualise 
this image through a dialectical reflective exchange between 
the knowledge of one's actual self and the image of an ideal 
self. The dialectic nature of human existence is also an 
essential component of developing the inner self and the 
interplay between dialogue and reflection. 
As a consequence of one's decisions which are based in one's 
actuality and a self-directedness towards one's possibility, 
one achieves a kind of unity of the self. One's will imparts 
continuity to the self's being. Continuity is achieved when 
the multiplicity of the self's desires can be brought 
together by the individual's will, the centre of the inner 
self. For the ethical, the unity of the person is the ideal 
self for which he sets his will and strives to realise. 
The ethical ideal is enacted at the moment of decision. At 
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that moment the present, the past, and the future are 
joined. One's actualities and one's possibilities are 
engaged and the unity of the self is conferred upon the self 
by the self. 
The element of dread 
The move towards self actualisation in the ethical stage is 
the place where the dark side of the inner self shows itself 
and reveals the limits of existence as an ethical being. 
When one gives in to one's dark side one suffers what 
Kierkegaard calls dread. Dread is most commonly associated 
with the self's freedom and it is experienced when one is 
confronted with one's own freedom of decisions. The self is 
confronted with his future which he sees as comprised of 
infinite possibilities and at the realisation of the 
immensity of the burden of responsibility that is connected 
with this thought he experiences dread. Dread for 
Kierkegaard defines man's sinfulness as it is the result of 
man's refusal to take responsibility for his decisions. In 
the ethical stage the self continues to experience dread 
throughout life as one moves from the past into the future 
through decisions made in the present. 
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The collapse of the ethical 
Kierkegaard determines that the ethical stage is necessary 
in the achievement of selfhood. One cannot skip this stage. 
He also recognizes its shortcomings and inevitable collapse. 
For the ethical person the primary focus is on the self, 
one's ability to make decisions and one's will to act on 
decisions. The self is the goal towards which he strives. 
But Kierkegaard sees that this image of an ideal self based 
on one's past and one's possibilities is not enough. He 
turns to the concept of God and universal humanity to 
further one's self-actualisation. God is the means by which 
the ethical person secures his vows to remain loyal to the 
ideal self image, although achieving his own self 
actualisation is his primary goal. The ethical person has 
the capacity to fulfil the obligation which he has 
undertaken, but in practice the achievement of the ideal 
proves to be very difficult. In practice the ethical stage 
of existence begins to break down. It breaks down because 
the ethical self places an ill-founded emphasis on the 
ideal. The ethical ideal points to ideality as a task and 
assumes that man is in possession of the conditions required 
for achieving it, which, as Kierkegaard had previously 
determined, man is not. The social and environmental 
consequences are beyond one's control. The standards ethics 
sets are too ideal for man to fulfil. The result is the 
collapse of the ethical. The requirements that ethics places 
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upon the individual are, as Kierkegaard says, "so infinite 
that the individual always goes bankrupt" (Kierkegaard, from 
Either/Or, cited in Taylor, p. 236). 
The ethical individual comes to recognise his inability to 
achieve his goals and as an ethical person he assumes 
responsibility for his future. Man's inherent weaknesses 
make the ideality, the goals for which the ethical strives 
and upon which the self depends, impossible for the ethical 
person to accomplish. It is in this bankrupt state that the 
ethical individual can move towards what Kierkegaard calls 
the Christian stage and in doing so he also moves towards a 
realisation of authentic selfhood. The answer to achieving 
self actualisation, Kierkegaard determines, is in the tenets 
of Christianity. Also, with the Christian stage, Kierkegaard 
moves self actualisation away from an insular perspective to 
one with universal significance. 
The Christian stage 
For Kierkegaard it is the incarnation of God in Christ that 
is the focus of achieving authentic selfhood. In 
Kierkegaard's orientation to Christianity he positions 
Christ as representing an essential double dimension. The 
double aspect of Christ is necessary in achieving self 
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actualisation of the highest order. The Christ figure 
represents man's sinfulness as well as God's eternal 
blessedness. 
Sin is better understood as a description of the mental 
state of the individual prior to his own act of sin. This 
mental state is described by Kierkegaard as dread. 
Kierkegaard has already defined dread as the dread of being 
responsible for oneself. It is the feeling one has in the 
face of the self's possible freedom, one's infinite 
possibilities. "Dread is the psychological state which 
precedes sin" (Friedman, 1964, p. 370). Sin is a kind of 
faintness of heart to take responsibility for the self. 
Dread defines man's sins, as it is the result of man's 
refusal to take responsibility for his decisions. 
Kierkegaard defines sinfulness as taking two forms: 
inherited and actual. In inherited sin Kierkegaard 
determines that sin as dread has a history in the 
development of humanity. Other human beings influence the 
actual self coming to form in and through the individual. 
The self defines his history through his decisions. 
Therefore if the self's history is affected by others and if 
humanity is made up of individual selves, then humanity must 
likewise have a history. The history of humanity is made up 
of the histories of individuals. Kierkegaard thus argues 
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that persons are a synthesis of their own individuality, and 
of humanity as a whole. It is in this way that sin is 
inherited. Social and cultural traditions have been 
inherited and have not been thoughtfully challenged in terms 
of stifling one's possibilities. 
Actual sin is related to the particular individual. 
Kierkegaard sees actual sin as closer to what he terms 
despair. Despair is the failure (or the refusal) of the self 
to be a self. Kierkegaard defines two forms of despair. The 
first form is weakness. This form of despair Kierkegaard 
sees as occurring when one is not willing to acknowledge a 
sense of self. Kierkegaard says one suffers despair "at not 
willing to be oneself; or still lower, despair at willing to 
be another than himself, wishing for a new self" 
(Kierkegaard, from Sickness unto Death, cited in Friedman, 
p. 371). According to Kierkegaard's structure of selfhood, 
given the self's actualities, the self can, through free 
decision, strive to realise the possibilities available to 
it. Decision further defines one's actuality while 
conditioning one's possibilities. Kierkegaard contends that 
one must accept this formal structure of the self, and the 
particular actualities and possibilities of one's own 
individual self. He regards the failure to do this as 
weakness. The second form of despair occurs when one 
desperately wills to be oneself. Kierkegaard calls this form 
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of despair defiance. Despair in the form of defiance refers 
to the second essential aspect of selfhood which is 
acceptance of one's ontological beginning, that of being 
created by God. If the self is to accept itself, it must 
acknowledge its ontological dependence on God. We saw in the 
ethical stage that the self is placed at the centre which 
inevitably leads to a loss of self. When one sees oneself as 
created by oneself and not by God Kierkegaard calls this 
defiance. Kierkegaard writes of this form of despair, "The 
loss of a possibility signifies ... that everything has become 
necessary to man ... The determinist or the fatalist is in 
despair, and in despair he has lost his self, because for 
him everything is necessary .... " (from Sickness unto Death, 
cited in Olson, 1962, p. 142). God, for Kierkegaard, is a 
place between determinism and fatalism, a place where the 
words "faith" and "hope" rest. The goal for the self now 
becomes, in Kierkegaard's structure of selfhood, for the 
self to achieve a proper equilibrium between oneself and 
God, between the self's actualities and the self's 
possibilities, and a view of oneself that unifies one's 
existence in the present to one's past and one's future. The 
failure to achieve such equilibrium is a self in despair. 
According to Kierkegaard, although one's decisions and one's 
will can move one towards self actualisation, one also needs 
to acknowledge and accept that one lives one's life before 
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God, that one has universal connectedness. When one is aware 
of one's existence before God one recognises both the 
importance of one's decisions and the consequences of one's 
decisions. Defining oneself through decisions is defining 
the self before God. Kierkegaard argues that once one's 
dependence on and responsibility to God become clear, his 
despair and sinfulness then become potential for selfhood. 
Sin becomes a way to God and a way to self actualisation. 
The solution of man's dilemma must involve coming to terms 
with sinfulness. Kierkegaard determines that the possibility 
of a connectedness to a concept of God is opened up by man's 
relationship to the incarnate, to Christ, whom Kierkegaard 
calls God-Man. 
Kierkegaard speaks of the eternal blessedness of God to 
state a fundamental aspect of what God is. God in essence 
remains unwavering in his love of humanity and willingness 
to forgive sin through grace. Because God's will is 
unwavering, possibilities are open to sinful persons that 
would otherwise be closed. Most important, through the human 
capacity of forgiveness of sins the self has access to God's 
eternal blessedness, which I understand as a kind of 
acceptance of one's limitations that are defined by factors 
that are outside of one's control. For the self to gain 
eternal blessedness, and therefore a proper relation to God, 
one must be sustained by the self's constant willing to be 
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itself. After having sinned the self is offered the 
possibility of realising one's possibilities through the 
concept of God's eternal blessedness. Only by faithfully 
responding to God's act of forgiveness, manifest in the 
human form of Christ, can one go beyond what one can 
determine for oneself. One believes in the God-Man not 
because of discernible evidence or ascertainable reasons, 
but by the sheer strength of one's own willing to believe 
that which cannot be understood. 
The moment of incarnation 
The historical moment of the incarnation of God in man, of 
God in Christ, Kierkegaard calls the moment of Absolute 
Paradox. Jesus Christ as God-man is both representative of 
man's sinfulness and temporality and God's eternal 
blessedness, something beyond the temporal and the actual, 
something that exists in the form of goodness. The 
incarnation of God in Christ establishes the possibility of 
atonement for the self. Kierkegaard understands that 
atonement to be the forgiveness of the individual's sins. 
Although the incarnation took place at a particular moment 
in time, it represents God's eternal resolve to love man. 
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The necessity of faith 
The event of God's incarnation in Christ does not by itself 
accomplish the forgiving of a sinner. Kierkegaard believed 
that forgiveness can be achieved only through one's faith. 
"Faith," Kierkegaard deemed, "is the highest passion in man" 
(from Fear and Trembling, cited in Friedman, p. 288). Faith 
is the expression of a personal relationship with God. Faith 
is the positive response to God's act of forgiveness in 
Christ. Faith is a juncture between God's grace and man's 
wilful activity. The moment of faith is the leap of 
necessity to believe in the absurd, in the Absolute Paradox. 
Faith is an act of one's own will which is motivated by the 
self's interest in its eternal blessedness. Kierkegaard 
says, "Faith is essentially this--to hold fast to 
possibility" (from Either/Or, cited in Taylor, p. 324). 
Faith entails living in a state of constant internal 
conflict as one attempts to realise one's possibilities 
based in one's actualities. In the Christian stage the self 
reaches the highest degree.of individuality and the deepest 
awareness of the significance of its life through faith. It 
is in the Christian stage that an equilibrium among the 
essential components of life can be struck. Such an 
equilibrium Kierkegaard considered the most authentic form 
of existence that a person can actualise. 
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But, alas, the final stage in Kierkegaard's journey to 
selfhood is not one of bliss. Since one's eternal 
blessedness is contingent upon one's decisions, Kierkegaard 
believed that self actualisation cannot be fully realised 
during one's life. Kierkegaard describes it this way: "When 
eternity and becoming are put together the result is not 
rest, but coming into being .... [S]ince one's eternal 
blessedness is contingent upon one's decision, it cannot be 
fully actualised during the self's lifetime. It is always 
something in the future. As future, it is the possibility 
that the self's entire existence seeks to actualise. Through 
the self's decisions, hope is chosen" (from Either/Or, cited 
in Taylor, p. 328). The state of hope is the final stage of 
one's self-actuality. 
A synopsis of the narrative of authenticity in Kierkegaard's 
way to selfhood 
The linear progression of Kierkegaard's stages to selfhood 
readily lends itself to the narrative structure. 
Kierkegaard's narrative of authenticity begins inwardly with 
the individual's deliberate decision to reflect on his sense 
of being. In the act of self reflection the individual 
awakens to himself and begins to construct a sense of an 
46 
inner self. Before this awakening to oneself one is in the 
aesthetic stage, existing without self-awareness. In this 
initial stage the individual exists as part of a crowd. 
Caught up in the codes and practices of society, he has no 
identity of his own and he makes no genuine decisions. In 
the awakened stage the self, led by a growing inner self, 
moves from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. The 
individual begins by identifying and accepting his own 
actualities: his past, his history, and the environment in 
which he grew up; those aspects of himself which he cannot 
change. In grasping one's own self in this way the 
individual has chosen himself. In grasping himself he can 
now realise his possibilities, based on his actualities. The 
inner self then chooses a goal for himself, an image of an 
ideal self, and resolves to achieve that goal. In choosing 
himself in this way the individual is at the same time 
confronted with the fact that he is now responsible for his 
own existence. At the thought that one is responsible for 
oneself the individual experiences a sense of dread. The 
inner self recoils in dread when the core of one's being is 
confronted with one's freedom in decision-making and the 
infinite possibilities of his future. In order to continue 
on the journey to selfhood and authentic being the inner 
self has to accept the dread that accompanies taking 
responsibility for oneself and one's decision-making power. 
The journey to selfhood has one more hurdle to overcome. The 
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individual is confronted with his limitations in realising 
his desired ideal self. The realisation that he cannot 
achieve his ideal state results in a kind of loss of faith 
in himself and his ability to make fully genuine decisions. 
In order to move beyond this point one needs to find 
direction in another source that is outside the self. 
Kierkegaard saw in Christian belief the answer to this need. 
The individual must look to Christ to achieve selfhood. 
Christ, as the duality of God and Man (God-Man), represents 
an essential double-dimension necessary to achieving self-
actualisation of the highest order. In this stage the inner 
self acknowledges and accepts the weaknesses and limitations 
of the self in taking responsibility for himself and also 
acknowledges that he must give over to a higher being if 
full self-actualisation is to be realised. That higher being 
is God whose fundamental attribute of eternal blessedness 
provides access to full self-actualisation. When one is 
aware of one's existence before God one recognises both the 
importance of one's decisions and the consequences of one's 
decisions in a universal dimension. Once one's dependence on 
and responsibility to God become clear, one's despair and 
sinfulness become the potential for selfhood. Sin becomes a 
way to God and a way to self-actualisation. Through 
acknowledging and accepting God's eternal blessedness as 
manifest in Christ one is able to reach the highest point of 
self-actualisation. Acknowledgement and acceptance come in 
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the form of faith, a faith that is enacted through one's own 
willed commitment to believe. Since one's eternal 
blessedness, a kind of universal forgiveness of all the sins 
of mankind, is contingent upon one's decision, complete 
selfhood cannot be fully actualised during the self's 
lifetime. Faith, along with hope, places the self in a 
constant struggle between one's actualities and one's 
possibilities. This is where Kierkegaard's journey to 
selfhood ends and begins. 
Heideqqer and authenticity 
Heidegger is more pragmatic in defining authentic existence 
than Kierkegaard is. Whereas Kierkegaard determined 
authentic selfhood within the frame of ethics and 
Christianity, the frame for Heidegger's definition of 
authenticity is not so clearly distinguished. Moral and 
spiritual implications can be interpreted in Heidegger's 
thinking on existence and authenticity but perhaps 
Heidegger's writing is best understood as an intellectual, 
rather than personal, response to the human condition. We 
will see that themes in Kierkegaard's thinking on selfhood 
recur in Heidegger's definition of authenticity. For 
Kierkegaard being authentic is a way of life, while 
Heidegger defines authenticity as a mode of consciousness. 
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What follows has been based on Heidegger's explication of 
authenticity given in the text for which he is best known, 
Being and Time. In Being and Time Heidegger's complex, and 
not always easily understood, theory of authentic being is 
presented and defined through an integrated system of 
concepts. I have approached the following interpretation of 
Heidegger's thinking on authenticity by focussing on the 
fundamental concepts of Heidegger's phenomenology of being 
as they relate to aspects of inwardness and have defined his 
theory of authenticity through these concepts. 
There is a primary and essential concept defined and named 
by Heidegger that is instrumental in understanding what 
Heidegger means by authenticity. That concept is Dasein. 
Here I equate Dasein with inwardness. Translated from 
German, da means "there" or "here," and sein means "to be." 
However, as it relates to Heidegger's thinking Dasein has 
most often been translated as "there-being," "to be there," 
or "being there." 
Dasein has no particular determinant meaning. There is no 
pre-ordained essential nature to Dasein. But through Dasein 
we can think about ourselves. Dasein reveals the uniqueness 
of our existence to us. Without Dasein one would not know 
that one exists, or know of one's existence as being 
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separate from other people and other things. Understanding 
of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein. 
Heidegger's theory of existence and human consciousness is 
built around the concept of Dasein. The following is an 
outline of the function and form of Dasein, how Dasein is 
constructed, and how it works. 
One essential aspect of Dasein is that it recognises that 
every human being is perpetually oriented towards his own 
possibilities: something in the future, something that is 
not yet. Our present actions are always directed towards our 
possibilities. We will see that, according to Heidegger, 
acting on our possibilities can take one of two possible 
directions: inauthentic existence or authentic existence. 
Inauthentic existence 
Heidegger describes the ontology of consciousness as "being 
thrown into the world." For Heidegger, the world already 
exists before one enters it. In one's "being thrown" into 
the already existing world one is first lost in its 
everydayness; in the day-to-day experience of living one 
does not see oneself as separate from everyone else. He 
follows the routine paths set out before him; he does what 
is expected of him. His frame of mind is pre-reflective and 
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his life is determined by others. Heidegger used the term 
das Man to describe such an existence. Das Man is not unlike 
Kierkegaard's "Crowd man"; he is the embodiment of the 
anonymous impersonal pUblic. He is caught up in the 
turbulence of daily chores and assumes the roles that have 
been predefined for him: the goals, opinions, and desires of 
prevailing social custom and expectations. Das Man 
represents the general public, but he is one and the public 
together. Das Man for Heidegger is inauthentic existence. 
Olson (1962), writing on Heidegger's theory of authenticity, 
sees Heidegger's inauthentic being as representative of the 
public world which he defines as "the world which groups of 
human beings share in cornmon" (p. 136). 
Characteristic of the inauthentic, Heidegger determines, is 
a life of superficiality, consisting largely of idle talk, 
idle curiosity, and ambiguity. In inauthentic existence the 
emphasis is on the present; all time is primarily present. 
In Heidegger's inauthentic existence can be seen vestiges of 
Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage. In this inauthentic existence 
one's true being, his oneness, his uniqueness, is concealed. 
As inauthentic, one has not yet begun to strive to attain 
self-awareness or attempted to realise his own sense of 
being. He has not yet separated himself from "being-amongst-
other-beings," nor started determining "being-for-itself." 
(These are Heidegger's descriptive phrases.) He has not yet 
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begun to develop and acknowledge an inner sense'of self. 
Verfallenheit 
An inauthentic existence is a state that Heidegger calls 
Verfallenheit (fallenness). (Fallenness is similar to 
Kierkegaard's sinfulness.) In this state Dasein is seen as 
being at a low ebb. According to Heidegger the state of 
fallenness has two forms: subject fallenness (wherein one 
sees oneself as fated), and object fallenness (wherein 
people and things become objects of manipulation). Subject 
fallenness is more clearly related to the concept of das 
Man. One who is in a state of subject fallenness is someone 
who constantly obeys the commands and expectations of the 
general public and never thinks to question the source of 
the commands or why he is doing what he is doing. He does 
not act on his decisions. When he does act, he does so in 
concert with the general public. Olson describes Heidegger's 
fallenness this way: "Fallenness is a state in which the 
individual constantly obeys commands and prohibitions whose 
source is unknown and unidentifiable and whose justification 
he does not bother to inquire into" (p. 136). 
Object-fallenness, the second kind of fallenness, is a state 
of existence in which one sees the world in a superficial 
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way. It is an alienating world of objects and things to be 
manipulated, and one's self is an object or instrument of 
manipulation. It is a world that is indifferent to human 
existence, a world that is defined within the concepts of 
precision, efficiency, and standardisation. 
In both states of Verfallenheit, Heidegger determines, there 
is an ambiguity to one's sense of self and the way one 
relates to the world. There is no depth of feeling. One 
participates in the world with little serious engagement. 
One's behaviour is determined by habit, society, and a vague 
sense of what is required. One partly knows what things are 
but partly does not because he is so caught up in the way 
other people see him and the way he sees others that he 
cannot think beyond his immediate perception of the world. 
He cannot form opinions of his own making and his statements 
are partly his own and partly those of people in general. 
Death 
Heidegger determined that it is because one is avoiding the 
realisation of one's temporal existence that one continues 
to stay in an inauthentic state. He is avoiding his 
inevitable end, which is death. When one does come to 
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contemplate his non-existence, his death, one experiences 
anxiety (Angst). The thought of the temporality of one's 
existence is too much for him to comprehend so he returns to 
the safety and security of the world of the public. In not 
acknowledging his temporality, he wishes to avoid taking 
responsibility for his life. According to Heidegger, one can 
remain in an inauthentic frame of mind for one's entire 
life, avoiding the reality of forthcoming death. 
Whereas Kierkegaard saw the emergence of reflection as the 
first step in moving towards selfhood, Heidegger saw the 
acceptance of one's future non-existence as the first step 
towards an authentic way of life. In acknowledging his non-
existence the individual also realises his possibilities. 
Heidegger described it this way: "In our existential 
projection of an authentic Being-towards-death ... we must set 
forth those items in such a Being which are constitutive for 
it as an understanding of death--and as such an 
understanding in the sense of Being towards this possibility 
without either fleeing it or covering it up. We must 
characterise Being-towards-death as a Being towards a 
possibility--indeed, towards a distinctive possibility of 
Dasein itself" (Being and Time, 1993, p. 305). 
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Anxiety (Angst) 
According to Heidegger one feels anxiety at the thought of 
the unsupported isolated condition in which he finds himself 
in the world. As in Kierkegaard's emerging ethical being the 
growing inner self recoils from its own reflection. He 
starts to doubt the reality of the world. When one confronts 
his temporality, his death, he realizes that he is the 
source of his reality. In the state of anxiety the inner 
self goes one of two ways. He can escape his feelings of 
vulnerability and uncertainty, the insecurity of existence, 
by becoming even more deeply engaged in the ordinary, the 
everyday, the practical, frantically pursuing his 
inauthentic goals; or he can respond to the calling to 
authentic being and he can begin to take responsibility for 
his own existence. This latter direction is the beginning of 
an engaged Dasein. As with Kierkegaard, recognizing one's 
propensity for anxiety in the face of responsibility is an 
essential aspect of an inner self. 
Sorgen 
Sorgen is translated from the German as "care" but in 
Heidegger's use of the term it is generally translated as 
"concern." Sorgen is the concern one has for his existence. 
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It gives significance to one's life as well as connecting 
oneself to the world. Concern with the world rests with the 
thought that "There is something to be done," and such a 
thought entails thinking about the future. When one accepts 
that he is responsible for his own life he becomes concerned 
for his future. His actions are a result of his concern. 
This is acting out of concern for the self. Concern brings 
future, past, and present together. Just as Kierkegaard saw 
will as the unifying factor for human existence, Heidegger 
sees one's response to one's existence, the expression of 
concern, as that which unifies existence. It is what unifies 
one's self and gives coherence to one's life. One's concern 
in the world is founded on the fact that one is led forward 
as an essential part of our being. One moves forward from 
one's condition at any given moment to another condition in 
the future. Authentic being is defined through the nature of 
our concern. Concern brings Dasein into existence. 
Recognising this calling inside of the self (aroused 
concern) to respond to the world in some way is another 
aspect of the inner self. Heidegger introduces the thought 
that one cannot move towards authentic being unless one 
recognises that one is called to respond to the world. This 
calling is part of one's individuality, one's uniqueness. 
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Reflection 
Reflection, another aspect of developing an inner self, is 
the method that brings one's attention to the actuality of 
the world, and opens one's eyes to one's position in the 
world, which is first and foremost a position of 
responsibility for one's own self. Heidegger felt that when 
one realises the uniqueness of one's position in the world, 
he will see the force of his own reflective capacity; 
namely, that he and he alone is responsible for the world 
having significance. He determines what is valuable in the 
world. When one sees the truth about oneself, he will 
realise that people in general, the public, cannot really be 
the source of that significance. He is alone, and he alone 
attaches what value he chooses to things. Reflection is 
engaged Dasein. 
Transformation 
A transformation occurs when one moves from inauthentic to 
authentic existence. By facing one's death one now sees the 
insignificance and meaninglessness of one's life of 
everydayness, of inauthentic existence. One can see that 
significance and meaningfulness are really one's own 
responsibility. Instead of a vague, ambiguous, and 
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superficial engagement with the world one's relation to the 
world is self-determined, self-directed, and self-defined, 
thus giving a true meaningfulness to one's existence. 
Authentic being 
In inauthentic existence one accepts in one's day-to-day 
life all the standards and beliefs of the general public in 
which one finds oneself. His own unique possibilities remain 
unrealised. Only when one confronts "being-towards-death" 
(Heidegger's phrase) can he begin to realise his true nature 
and his true potentialities. Authentic being begins by 
accepting the freedom one has to choose and to act on one's 
choices. This acceptance appears as if by chance. It is a 
response to a calling experienced in anxiety, when one 
confronts the temporality of his existence. It is in 
response to this calling that one moves to reorient oneself 
to the world. One becomes open to the world. A sense of 
openness to the world and to one's possibilities is another 
element of an inner self. One's existence is as a "clearing" 
(Heidegger's word) in which being can manifest itself. 
Heidegger states that "Only for an entity which is 
existentially cleared in this way does that which is 
present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in 
the dark" (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 171). In authentic 
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existence Dasein becomes unconcealed. It is a process of 
revealing itself to itself. 
Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger maintained that an essential 
aspect of authentic existence is understanding oneself. One 
begins to claim his authentic existence when one moves to 
apprehend his past. Through understanding oneself, how one 
was in the past, one can determine his future possibilities. 
From knowing himself in the past he knows what he is capable 
of realising in the future. The future exists as 
possibilities, things which are not yet. 
In authentic existence things in the world must lose their 
solidity and their attraction and apparent importance and 
one must feel deep alarm at the emptiness which surrounds 
him. In this state of mind, Heidegger deems, one has to act 
in faith. But this is not the religious faith of 
Kierkegaard, a faith in God, in universal grace and 
goodness. It is faith in knowing that one can realise one's 
possibilities. It is through faith that one can resolve to 
realise one's possibilities. 
Revealing our uniqueness 
The concept of authenticity calls for the necessity for each 
individual to realise his uniqueness. The following are 
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three ways, as determined by Heidegger, in which'the self 
reveals itself and its uniqueness of being. Basically, one 
comes to define oneself through understanding, moods, and 
critical self-reflecting dialogue. Heidegger sees that the 
way one thinks in inauthentic existence is rather muddled 
and confused. Heidegger attempts to give some clarity and 
meaningfulness to inner reflective thoughts. 
Through deep understanding of our existential selves, our 
past and realisable possibilities, we act in knowing. Our 
actions in the present reflect this deep knowing. We can 
discover the meaning of our situation only by considering 
the way in which we are attuned to the situation, that is, 
engaged in being. Our attitudes and moods reflect this 
engagement. Heidegger recognized that we have control over 
and can affect the frames in which we position our thinking, 
the moods in which we function. For one not to acknowledge 
this aspect of the self means one exists in thoughtless 
action. Part of the human exposure to the world is shown in 
the characteristic moods that one adopts. Heidegger suggests 
that by recognising that we are in a certain frame of mind 
we thereby feel it in a certain way. By considering how we 
are in the world through our moods and attitudes we can 
better understand ourselves, see ourselves as unique beings, 
and affect our existence. Along with moods and attitudes we 
can think critically about the way we are in the world. With 
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each action we ask ourselves, "Am I following the crowd or 
am I doing this because I am in touch with some form of 
authentic being?" It is a form of critical introspective 
dialogue about oneself and one's relation to the world. 
A synopsis of Heidegger's narrative of authenticity 
Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger's narrative on the journey to 
authenticity is really a story of the emergence and the 
development of an inner sense of self. This inner sense of 
self Heidegger calls Dasein. The individual begins as if 
suddenly "thrown into the world" and exists in a 
pre-reflective state where his thinking and actions are only 
of the present. The awakening to a sense of inner self 
through consciousness happens when one is confronted with 
one's non-existence, one's death. At this point one sees his 
possibilities and begins to doubt the reality of the world 
in which he has existed. Seeing life as contingent and 
temporal one begins to suffer a sense of anxiety. When this 
state of anxiety occurs a decision needs to be made: either 
one decides to escape his feelings of vulnerability and 
uncertainty by becoming more deeply engaged in the ordinary, 
the everyday, the practical, frantically pursuing his 
inauthentic goals; or he can respond to the calling to 
authentic being in him and begin to take responsibility for 
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his own existence. If one chooses the latter he 'is on the 
path to authentic existence. With the acceptance of his 
temporal existence one needs to recognise his concern for 
himself and his future. Concern manifests itself in one's 
reflections and actions. In such a mode of existence one is 
taking responsibility for his temporal existence while at 
the same time reaching forward to realise his possibilities. 
One realises that he and he alone gives to life its 
meaningfulness and significance. The future exists as 
possibility, as things which are not yet, and through faith, 
through the realisation that one can be responsible for his 
existence, the individual resolves to realise and reveal his 
possibilities. Authenticity for Heidegger rests in a mode of 
critical self-reflection, on-going dialogue, and unfolding 
understanding and insight. For Heidegger authenticity is 
living every moment with a kind of intensity, whereby each 
act is committed in the full awareness of that which 
constitutes Dasein. In authentic being one is engaged in 
one's sense of knowing and one's actions are poised to 
reflect the truth of one's being. 
Sartre, Bad Faith, and authentic being 
Heidegger's definition of authentic being underlies Sartre's 
orientation to the world and theory of consciousness. We 
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will see that, like Heidegger, Sartre distinguishes between 
two worlds: an everyday world of instrumental complexes and 
a world which lies beyond it, a world of possibilities. Like 
Heidegger, Sartre distinguishes between two levels of 
consciousness: one which is lost in the everyday and another 
(higher) level of consciousness which is experienced as a 
kind of an awakening to one's existence. (These two themes 
are also part of Kierkegaard's thinking about selfhood.) 
Sartre, like Heidegger, defined consciousness within a 
highly complex integration of concepts. Here, as in the 
section on Heidegger and his definition of authenticity, I 
define Sartre's theory of consciousness and his meaning of 
"Bad Faith" by defining the essential aspects of Bad Faith 
and authentic being which are also essential aspects of the 
inner being. The interrelatedness and fusion of these 
concepts leads to problems in defining each concept as a 
separate entity. 
In order to understand more clearly Sartre's concept of Bad 
Faith and authentic being it is necessary to understand to 
some extent Sartre's thinking about consciousness. 
Consciousness for Sartre rests within a duality of concepts 
which are interdependent and mutually contradictory. It is 
the dualities of nothingness and possibilities, and 
subjectivity and objectivity that form the basis of his 
philosophy. 
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Nothingness is how Sartre describes the distance between 
one's being and the immediate world, between thought and the 
objects of thought. According to Sartre one's consciousness 
of the world exists as an emptiness. Even though 
consciousness is a gap, a nothingness, it does have 
attributes, according to Sartre. Consciousness is aware of 
the distance, the gap, between oneself and the objects that 
constitute one's world and at the same time one's 
consciousness is always acting to fill the gap; it is always 
acting in reference to something in the future. The future 
is, for Sartre (as it was for Kierkegaard and for 
Heidegger), one's possibilities. The individual is always 
acting on his possibilities. It is from this emptiness that 
the inner self emerges. 
When one acts to realise one's possibilities one engages 
one's consciousness. This acting to realise one's 
potentialities Sartre called being-far-itself. Being-for-
itself is an aspect of consciousness that can be seen as the 
inner self emerging as it searches for self-identity in its 
quest for completeness. It does this through the 
possibilities which are presented to it. 
Because consciousness exists in nothingness it has no fixed 
essence. Conscious beings create themselves as they go 
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along. Sartre believed in the controversial notion that for 
human beings, existence precedes essence; there is no 
essential human nature given in advance. One becomes in 
consciousness whatever one chooses to become by doing and 
feeling what one chooses to do and feel. 
Freedom, according to Sartre, is the key to authentic being. 
Sartre determined that conscious beings are essentially 
free. They are free not only to act as they choose, but they 
are free to see the world under the headings and categories 
that they choose. They are even free to imagine things which 
do not exist. This freedom constitutes the gap between 
thought and object. 
Nothingness describes our existence in the present. Although 
our conscious existence begins as a nothingness it, 
facilitated through our capacity to make choices, is also 
freedom and possibilities. Project (both as a verb and as a 
noun) refers to the for-itself's choice of its way of being 
and is expressed by action in the light of a future end. 
Bad Faith 
Bad Faith is the term Sartre uses to describe one's attempt 
to escape from the anguish which one suffers when one is 
66 
brought face to face with one's own unbounded freedom. The 
effect on human beings when they contemplate the 
implementation of this freedom is, according to Sartre, a 
feeling of anguish. Anguish occurs when one acknowledges the 
gap between oneself now and one's possibilities. It is a gap 
for which the individual is responsible. He is the one who 
chooses his possibilities. But because they are his 
possibilities he suddenly realises the implications and 
accompanying responsibility of his choices. It is in this 
realisation that the individual suffers anguish. (We can see 
commonalities and a similar line of thinking existing 
between Sartre's anguish, Heidegger's angst, and 
Kierkegaard's dread.) 
Sartre thinks that the burden of this responsibility is more 
than one can bear. Consequently, one develops tricks and 
devices for evading it. It is these tricks and devices that 
Sartre calls acting in Bad Faith. Most of one's actions that 
are related to external demands such are getting up in the 
morning to go to work, being polite, putting clothes on, 
Sartre would consider acts of Bad Faith. 
Sartre determined two main patterns of behaviour when one 
acts in Bad Faith. One way in which people avoid 
responsibility is by pretending to themselves and others 
that things could not be otherwise--that they are bound to a 
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way of life, and they could not escape it even If they 
wanted to. They feel as if they are fated to their 
existence. In this case the individual takes no 
responsibility for what happens to him. He sees himself as a 
thing which is acted on by others. Sartre called such action 
"Being-in-itself." Such a person acts in Bad Faith because 
he is pretending that things are inevitable, when they are 
not. One does not want to think about what is going to 
happen in the future. There is an acceptance of the 
situation as it is. One does not want to have to face the 
responsibility of making a decision to change things. 
Instead one pretends not to notice. One allows oneself to be 
treated as an object. In this way one is acting in Bad 
Fai tho 
The second way of acting in Bad Faith according to Sartre 
occurs when conscious beings pretend to be nothing except a 
"Being-for-others" (Sartre's term); that is, they act out 
the roles that people have assigned to them, and they see 
themselves as whatever it is that people want them to be. 
Sartre gives the example of a waiter who does not act like 
himself but acts the way he thinks others would expect a 
waiter to act. By acting in roles determined by others one 
protects oneself from having to face one's freedom and take 
responsibility for one's own existence. 
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The majority of our actions, Sartre argues, are actions of 
Bad Faith. Normally, we go about our day-to-day existence 
and one action leads to another. Most of the time we do not 
stop to think about what we are doing and our existence in 
relation to the world. It is much more comfortable to go 
with the flow of life, to think that what happens is 
inevitable, or to allow others to think for us, rather than 
face our possibilities. Sartre sees that acts of Bad Faith 
are really forms of a "degradation of consciousness." In his 
language Sartre is moralizing, seeing existence as having 
levels of goodness. This bears similarities to Kierkegaard's 
stages of existence with the Christian stage being the 
highest level one can reach. 
Authentic Being versus Bad Faith 
Sartre says, "In bad faith there is no cynical lie nor 
knowing preparation for deceitful concepts. But the first 
act of bad faith is to flee what it cannot flee, ,to flee 
what it is" (Being and Nothingness, p. 115). To be morally 
responsible for one's existence is, for Sartre, authentic 
existence. The move to acting authentically is not just a 
matter of thinking, "I will not allow this to happen to me"; 
but rather to be authentic one needs to undergo a radical 
conversion. To develop in selfhood one must undergo a 
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transformation. A certain kind of courage and a special act 
of reflection are necessary. It is a kind of reflection and 
courage that acknowledges and accepts the anguish of taking 
responsibility for one's existence while at the same time 
moving to grasp one's freedom. An altered perception of 
oneself in the world brings one to realise that it is I and 
I alone who am responsible for the things that constitute my 
existence. I recognise myself as the cause and the reason 
for my existence. 
In order to undergo this conversion, Sartre argues, the 
individual must negate his past and free himself from the 
past. This is somewhat different from the theories of 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger where to acknowledge and accept 
one's past are essential to authentic being. According to 
Sartre the individual needs to grasp his freedom and 
acknowledge the responsibility he has to authentic existence 
in the future. He must recognise his past for what it is, 
and see it as an external object. From the perspective of 
the individual the past is both me and not me. To be free of 
one's past it is necessary to transcend one's past. There is 
absolutely nothing that stands between my past and my 
present. This is the gap. This is where consciousness and 
the inner self become constituted. Consciousness is 
constituted in one's relation to the future. One must turn 
inwards and think, "I need always to look to the future to 
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define myself." Looking to the future requires an engagement 
of imagination. This is an important part of Sartre's 
thinking. For Sartre one's ability to imagine is an 
essential aspect of developing into a fully actualised human 
being. According to Sartre, in looking into the future I 
choose from among my imagined possibilities and whatever I 
choose makes me what I am. One's imagination affects one's 
future and one's freedom. In Sartre's thinking the inner 
self is constituted in imagination and the individual's 
unwavering commitment to self-fulfilment. The individual 
must recognise that at every moment he is called upon to 
transcend his past and make himself anew through his future 
and the imagined possibilities offered to him. Our future is 
absolutely open, absolutely undetermined, either by our past 
self, or by the external world. This is authentic existence: 
accepting one's unbounded freedom and continually striving 
toward a fullness of being. But authentic being remains in 
the position of unrelenting striving. Sartre sees "the world 
[as a] becoming, conceived as a synthesis of being and of 
non-being" (Being and Time, p. 171). Although the individual 
is always searching for and at the same time creating the 
Self he can never possess himself in any sense of totality. 
A fully actualised being always eludes him. The being-for-
itself seeks to find the Self but it can never in any 
finality possess itself. Rather the focus is on maintaining 
a heightened conscious awareness through engaged aspects of 
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an inner self. 
A synopsis of the narrative of Sartre's authenticity 
Sartre's way to authenticity is constructed within dualisms. 
The awakening of an inner self happens when one is 
confronted with the fact that he and he alone is responsible 
for his choices. In confronting this reality one is brought 
face to face with one's unbounded freedom. At this point one 
suffers anguish. The inner self cannot accept the 
responsibility of his choices so he develops ways of evading 
it. A schism presents itself: Does he act in Bad Faith; that 
is, does he allow himself to be treated as an object, or 
does he accede to a world that others have defined for him? 
Both are acts of Bad Faith. Or does he move to take 
responsibility for himself and his existence? The decision 
to take responsibility is made through a combination of 
courage and reflection, the mainstays of the inner being. 
Courage is needed to accept the anguish of responsibility 
and to move towards grasping one's freedom. When the 
individual accepts that it is he and he alone who is 
responsible for the things that constitute his existence he 
begins to move to self-fulfilment. In the acceptance of this 
idea a radical transformation occurs. The individual frees 
himself from his past and acknowledges that he is 
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constituting himself in the future. The commitment to 
acknowledge and accept one's freedom as being constituted in 
one's future possibilities must be unwavering if one is to 
be truly responsible for his existence. The future is 
absolutely open. Authentic existence is accepting one's 
unbounded freedom and continually striving toward a fullness 
of being within one's actualities. Although one is always 
reaching forward to realise one's possibilities, one can 
never possess a sense of oneself in any form of totality; a 
fully actualised self also eludes him. He exists within his 
limitations and the realisation that there is always more 
that could be. 
Summary of the three philosophies of authenticity 
Amongst these three narratives of authentic existence is a 
common narrative. It is a narrative that aims to give 
definition and direction to one's existence as it calls for 
a transformation of being. The common narrative of authentic 
existence begins with a call to awaken to sense of an inner 
self, to remain committed to an awakened state of 
consciousness and a higher sense of being. There is also a 
call for a commitment to defining, creating and expressing a 
sense of one's own uniqueness, which is achieved through a 
heightened sense of awareness of oneself and one's place in 
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the world. In these narratives of authenticity there is a 
common desire to unify the self and the world. In this 
endeavour, consideration is given to one's past, present, 
and future. Authenticity is realised by an inner self 
mediating between the self and the outside world through 
reflection, inquiry, imagination, and reasoned thought which 
in turn are used to understand, interpret, direct, and shape 
one's existence; that is, one's relation with the self and 
the world. 
Narratives of Authenticity and Educational Theory 
In the chapters following, I describe and explore the 
projects of the six educationalists selected for this 
inquiry. It will be shown how authenticity in its 
philosophical sense and aspects of inwardness lie at the 
heart of the projects of these theorists. The strong 
influence of the three existentialists on contemporary 
educational thought will become apparent in the explication 
of the thinking of Maxine Greene, Dwayne Huebner, Mary 
Warnock, William Pinar, Max van Manen, and Nel Noddings. My 
enquiry will show how these six theorists build on, expand, 
and challenge the definitions and narratives of authenticity 
given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre as they (the 
educational theorists) attempt to script their own 
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definition of authenticity as it relates to education and 
teaching. The implications of their projects as well as the 
moral and political concerns that they raise will be 
revealed and challenged in the following chapters. The 
concluding chapter will present another approach to teaching 
in outline form which I have constructed out of the thinking 
of the educationalists explored here. The narrative of 
authenticity given above, presented through the philosophies 
of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, as it relates to 
being a good teacher, provides the frame to the approach 
that I offer. 
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Chapter Two 
William Pinar and Mary Warnock: 
autobiography and authenticity 
The self in Virginia Woolf's writing takes on a kinetic and 
oscillating dimension where the past is in constant play 
with the present and interior monologues contrast and blend 
with outer conversations and dialogues. Through her dynamic 
aesthetic literary style, through the use of recalled 
experiences and inner reflections, and through a play 
between inner and outer perspectives, Woolf succeeds in 
representing a self that is present but remains slightly 
outside the grasp of wholeness. It is these aesthetic 
aspects found in Woolf's writing of the self that have 
connectedness to the themes and theoretical approaches of 
the projects of educationalists William Pinar (American) and 
Mary Warnock (British) and their emphasis on autobiography. 
For each of these educationalists, autobiographical writing, 
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that is, forms of scripting the self, are central to their 
projects. 
The focus of this chapter is on autobiographical text and 
the value of autobiographical writing in the praxis of 
teaching and education. Here we explore the self as an 
essential component in defining teaching as a profession. We 
will do this through a close reading of a significant text 
by William Pinar, Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality 
(1994). Pinar's thinking about the self in teaching will be 
given critical consideration by comparing and contrasting 
his notion of self to Mary Warnock's broader understanding 
of self as defined in her text Imagination and Time (1994). 
The meaning and significance that each gives to inwardness 
and existential authenticity as it relates to teaching will 
be drawn out in the explication of their alternative 
approaches to education and teaching. We will see that both 
Warnock and Pinar have closer ties to the thinking of 
Kierkegaard and Sartre than to Heidegger in formulating an 
understanding of authenticity. Woolf's writings will also be 
woven into this explication to serve as exemplar to aspects 
of Pinar's and Warnock's theoretical discourse on modes of 
autobiography. In the critical analysis of Pinar's and 
Warnock's thinking the shortcomings in each of their 
projects in terms of their theoretical bases, the 
practicability of their projects, and the realisability of 
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their intentions in the practice of teaching will be offered 
along with a valuing of both of their approaches to 
authentic education. 
William Pinar: Autobiography and education 
In the following analysis of Pinar's approach to teaching I 
have focussed on how Pinar traces Kierkegaard's narrative of 
authenticity. I argue that Kierkegaard's ethical stage forms 
the basis for Pinar's thinking about the self and teaching. 
I shall also show that literature plays an important part in 
Pinar's approach to teaching. 
As is apparent in reading William Pinar's book 
Autobiography: Politics and Sexuality (1994) the self, the 
author, is positioned subjectively to the writing. Through 
his selection of essays, which span a twenty-year-period, 
Pinar presents varying understandings of and reflections on 
his relationship with educational practices from a 
perspective of his own personal experience. The point of 
view taken in the writing is a form of distancing, of the 
author looking outwards, passing his gaze over his past 
experiences in education. In this orientation Pinar is 
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similar to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard wrote his life and his 
life was an example of the self searching for meaningful 
existence. Reflecting the dialogical nature of Kierkegaard's 
authorship, Pinar scripts his own life in his writing. In 
each chapter of his book he cites when and where outside 
structures and tensions have caused him to reflect on his 
life in education and through a phenomenological explication 
and engaged reflective mode of writing he attempts to 
negotiate the self as educator through experiences and 
situations of personal conflict. Pinar's autobiographical 
essays draw on literature, personal experience, and inner 
personal reflections which in turn reveal his own internal 
struggles as he tries to bridge the gap between dominant 
practices of education (meaning mainly institutionalised 
practices of education) and the self. 
In formulating his approach to education Pinar stands 
against what he sees as happening in present practices in 
education, mainly teaching. He believes the dominant 
practices of education to be dehumanising, engendering in 
teachers a sense of alienation, a sense of loss of the self, 
and fragmented understandings of self. Pinar believes that 
in order to address what he calls the "psychic 
deterioration" that presently exists amongst teachers in 
institutionalised education there is a need to focus on a 
recovery of self, and he sees an existential orientation to 
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the world as fundamental in reclaiming the self. 
With his concerns regarding alienation and dehumanisation in 
mind Pinar developed a method that was mainly intended to 
help practitioners and researchers working in education to 
move towards a sense of personal identity, self-
actualisation, and a sense of self-worth, essential elements 
of authentic existence. He called the method currere. In the 
chapter in his text "The Method of Currere" (first published 
in 1975) he outlines the content and structure of his 
method. Pinar sees the foundational parameters of his 
approach as being rooted in existentialism, phenomenology, 
and psychoanalysis. He names specific individuals, mainly 
intellectuals and literary artists, who have played a 
significant part in influencing his approach to teaching and 
his own realised sense of se1fhood: writers such as Joyce, 
Proust, Faulkner; existentialists Sartre, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Buber; and psychoanalysts Freud, Jung, and Laing 
(Pinar, p. 17). He names Virginia Woolf, specifically, as 
having a particularly significant effect in shaping his 
orientation to the world. He makes numerous references to 
Woolf's thoughts and writings throughout his book. For 
instance, the title of his chapter "Mr Bennett and Mrs 
Brown," (Pinar, pp 14-17) is the title that Woolf gave to an 
essay she wrote in which she laid out her manifesto for her 
modernist approach to writing character. (See Woolf, A 
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Woman's Essays, ed. Rachel Bowlby, 1992, pp. 69-87.) In this 
chapter Pinar reveals how Woolf's writing influenced his own 
orientation to education and his method. Another chapter in 
Pinar's text is entitled "The Voyage Out" (pp. 101-116). The 
topics of this chapter, which are the value of self-
reflection and a focus on inward growth, are also the themes 
of Woolf's novel by that name. Pinar's method of currere was 
designed to aid teachers and educational researchers in 
recovering and shaping a sense of self. At the heart of his 
method is an existentialist stress on relationality; that 
is, the relation between the self and the world, 
specifically the relation between the self and situation-
specific events. What follows is an overview of Pinar's 
currere method and how currere relates to authenticity. 
In Kierkegaard's ethical stage the individual begins to move 
towards selfhood. In the ethical stage one has grasped an 
understanding of oneself in the past, and then, building on 
this understanding of an essential self, moves towards 
authentic existence. Kierkegaard's initial steps to se1f-
actuality are reflected in Pinar's currere method. Pinar, 
like Kierkegaard, sees the path to self-actualisation as 
beginning with a sudden awareness of the self as a separate 
entity. The self seizes this moment of self-awareness and 
consciously chooses to move toward one's selfhood. Pinar 
maps out the steps that follow that moment of enlightenment 
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in his self-directed currere method. 
Pinar determines four steps to his method: the regressive, 
the progressive, the analytic, and the synthesis. In the 
regressive step, the first step of hls method, the teacher 
is asked to return to his or her past through bracketing 
past experiences of schooling in a form of immediate and 
free association. The remembered experiences of the past are 
to be captured and revealed in writing (recording them in 
print), with the intention of forming a kind of picture of 
the self. Through this regressing to the past and recording 
it in its immediacy, where the author is as observer to 
events, it is Pinar's belief that habitual and unconscious 
ways of thinking and acting will be exposed and brought to 
consciousness (pp 21-24). The regressive stage of Pinar's 
method is an attempt to grasp an understanding of how the 
self is constituted as an individual. Kierkegaard believed 
that one could claim one's self through self-reflection and 
a deep penetration into one's concrete actuality. The 
regressive stage of Pinar's method follows Kierkegaard's 
thinking in this regard; to reflect upon one's own existence 
is the initial step for a better understanding of one's true 
relation to the outside world. 
For the second step in Pinar's currere method, the 
progressive step, the teacher turns his or her mind to a 
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form of engaged and directed imagining. In an unrestricted 
mode of free association of thoughts and images, the author 
is to envision the self in the future, specifically 
focussing on one's future intellectual interests or career. 
It is this image of the self that one constantly holds 
before oneself. This image is to be the guiding principle 
underlying one's everyday actions and reflective thought. 
This image of the self in the future is also to be recorded 
(Pinar, pp. 24-25). It is an image of oneself determined 
through one's knowledge of oneself in the past. Here again 
Pinar reflects Kierkegaard's thinking. Kierkegaard 
determined that in order to move from the aesthetic stage to 
the ethical stage one needs to articulate an ethical ideal, 
an image of an ideal self in the future based on the 
actualities of one's past. 
The third step of Pinar's method is the analytical. At this 
stage one is to consider and give attention to the present--
the ideas, interests, people, and settings that constitute 
one's present situation. This is to be done with a certain 
sense of detachment; one is to scrutinise objectively the 
bracketed experiences for "potentially focussed 
interpretations" (Pinar, p. 26). At this point one starts to 
compare the "pictures" yielded from engaging in thoughts of 
the self in the past, the future, and the present by looking 
for similarities, differences, and common themes. Here one 
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calls upon one's conscious ability to reason and think 
things through. One's thinking about the self is further 
refined in the fourth stage. 
The fourth and final stage, the synthesis, focusses on what 
Pinar calls concreteness (p. 27). In this stage the author 
is asked to go through a process of introspective 
questioning: what is the contribution of my private life to 
my public life; where are the private and the public 
complementary; where do they conflict; does one stifle the 
other? The process of moving through the steps with these 
questions in mind is to give consideration to areas and 
times of intellectual growth and feelings of self-
fulfilment. These are to be noted in written form as one 
attempts to embody the self-knowledge that has been 
gathered. Pinar deems that in this step, mind and body, 
emotions and behaviour become integrated into a more 
meaningful whole. He maintains that through the intellectual 
process, through thinking, reflecting, imagining, and 
reasoning, the self becomes as "a medium, like the body, 
through which the Self and the world are accessible to 
oneself" (Pinar, p. 27). 
Just as Kierkegaard attempted to give a unity to existence 
through an exploration of one's identity in terms of past, 
present, and future, Pinar attempts to give unity to the 
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self as teacher through similar exploration of the past, 
present, and future of the self as teacher, which are 
brought together through a mode of self-conscious writing. 
Whereas Kierkegaard developed the notion of selfhood 
realised in Christian spirituality, with Pinar and his 
currere method, self-actualisation is realised in what is 
known and what is actual. 
In the chapter of his book entitled "The TriAl" (pp. 29-63) 
Pinar presents the theoretical underpinnings of his project 
and his strong existential orientation. In this chapter 
Pinar turns to Kafka's The Trial and the character K, whom 
Pinar sees as epitomising the inauthentic educational 
practitioner, the practitioner who has not awakened in self-
consciousness. K, the protagonist of Kafka's story, is 
arrested, not in the normal sense, by the authorities, but 
rather he is arrested morally, psychologically, and 
intellectually in his relation to the world. He is a 
thoughtless performer of actions, and has become conditioned 
by economic and cultural forces not to think or "to reclaim 
his lost subjectivity" (Pinar, p. 41). Pinar sees the story 
of K as reflective of the rationale behind his (Pinar's) 
educational project. K can be seen as symbolically 
reflecting the educational practitioner who is unable to 
step outside of his unawakened situation. These are teachers 
who exist in a haze of thinking and acting that reflects a 
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lack of direction, and for Pinar, exist in a psychically 
damaged state. Pinar desires individuals in education to 
move beyond the K state of mind, beyond the unreflective 
self. Through his method of currere he offers a way to do 
this. It is a method intended to enable an aspect of the 
self to act as mediator between the self and outside events 
and at the same time move towards a reclaiming of self. 
Whereas K was an unthinking, uncritical conformist, Pinar, 
through his mode of writing the self, wishes teachers to 
grasp and value their uniqueness. He wishes teachers "to 
portray singularity, subjectivity, and the process of self-
knowing" (Pinar, p. 45). Pinar believes that through his 
autobiographical form of writing, which he sees as "a form 
of self-consciousness," teachers can "capture the texture 
and rhythm of the subjectively existing individual" (p. 44-
45). It is a form of self-consciousness that gives to the 
self an autonomous striving for wholeness, where the past, 
present, and future are brought together through the self's 
inner voice and engaged consciousness. Pinar sees teachers 
who have not reoriented themselves to education and taken on 
a subjective perspective as being like the character K. In 
Pinar's thinking the individual needs to direct himself or 
herself to the determining of his or her own future. This is 
done by the individual taking responsibility for his or her 
own life as teacher. In doing this Pinar moves the focus on 
teaching away from the classroom to a focus on the self. It 
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is in this way that one formulates a praxis of teaching. 
Whereas Pinar has revealed the theory behind his project by 
comparing the content of Kafka's novel The Trial to his 
educational intention, the method of Pinar's project of 
authentic teaching, that is, its form of articulation, is 
reflected in Virginia Woolf's approach to writing. How 
Woolf's writing ties most closely to Pinar's thinking is in 
the explication of internal thoughts and conflicts held in 
the minds of Woolf's characters. The writing of the inner 
thoughts of characters in situations of conflict frequently 
occurs in Woolf's narratives. An example of such writing is 
the monologue in the short story "The Lady in the Looking 
Glass: A Reflection." Here a woman in mid-life is suddenly 
confronted by her reflection in a mirror and her thoughts 
express her feelings of valuelessness: "Who am I," "What 
have I done to give meaning to my life," "What value is my 
life now" are the questions that an inner self struggles to 
answer, presented by Woolf in a kind of "stream of 
consciousness." This same theme is also the focus of 
Clarissa's thoughts in Mrs Dalloway. While walking up Bond 
Street to pick out flowers for her party Clarissa suddenly 
catches her own reflection in a shop window. Her unexpected 
encounter with her own image causes her to reflect: 
... [T]his body, with all its capacities, seemed 
nothing,--nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of 
being herself invisible; unknown; there being no 
marrying, no more having children now, but only this 
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astonishing and rather solemn progress with the rest 
of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; not 
even Clarissa any more: this being Mrs. Dalloway 
(Woolf, 1987, p. 25). 
What is conveyed through this reflective internal monologue 
is Clarissa's sense of despair and loss at the person 
mirrored back to her, as she struggles to value herself when 
all that society has deemed valuable in a woman's life is 
now behind her. Woolf's expansive and insightful writing 
about the self reflects an individual in conflict with the 
outside world and is written in a mode of self-consciousness 
that attempts to connect the self with the outside world. 
Pinar sees this same subjective orientation and form of 
explication as essential in defining the self as teacher. 
Pinar maintains the value of his fluid autobiographical 
writing is its potential to go beyond the immediate and the 
individual. He believes that through an exchange of 
autobiographical experiences with other teachers, commonly 
held experiences might surface. Through teachers corning 
together and sharing stories certain benefits may be 
realised, common existing conflicts might become revealed, 
and ways in which various individuals resolve such conflicts 
might be offered that would aid others experiencing similar 
conflicts. Pinar calls these exchanges "a trans-biographical 
process" (p. 25). He believes that these exchanges could 
lead to a "heightened consciousness process" which will 
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result in individual, and ultimately social, transformation 
(p. 25). 
Underlying Pinar's method is the narrative of authenticity 
as described in the previous chapter on philosophical 
thought and theories of authenticity, one which follows 
closely Kierkegaard's ethical stage. There is an 
existentialist awakening of the self to the self as one 
takes responsibility for one's own being as one moves to 
define and determine one's life as teacher while at the same 
time constructing one's own individuality. Aspects of 
inwardness, reflection as one recalls one's life in the 
past, imagination as one imagines an ideal self in the 
future, and inquiry and reasoned response as one engages in 
the decision-making process, are as essential to the 
realisation of Pinar's authentic teacher as they were to 
Kierkegaard's ethical being. 
Before giving critical consideration of Pinar's approach to 
education and his use of autobiographical writing I would 
like to examine the educational project of Mary Warnock and 
her approach to and value of autobiography and its relation 
to self identity and education as presented in her text, 
Imagination & Time. Warnock's approach to authenticity in 
education, which differs significantly from Pinar's, 
provides a means to think critically about the value of 
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Pinar's form of autobiography. 
Mary Warnock and autobiographical writing 
Warnock and Pinar hold certain elements in common on which 
they each build their projects. Warnock shares Pinar's 
interest in existentialism and literature. She also shares 
Pinar's desire to apply insights from these disciplines to 
the field of education. In the following I focus on how 
Warnock draws on the narrative of authenticity given in 
existential thought, mainly that of Sartre, and expands on 
it in her educational project. 
In her text Mary Warnock writes with clarity and 
accessibility. Whereas Pinar was personable in his tone and 
brought personal experience into his discourse, Warnock 
maintains an intellectual distance throughout her writing. 
She, like Pinar, calls on philosophers and novelists to 
inform the theoretical foundation of her project. Mainly she 
focusses on the concept of imagination as it has been 
defined and valued in the philosophical thinking of Jean 
Paul Sartre. 
In defining and valuing imagination Warnock calls on the 
revelations of the philosophers Kant, Hume, and Locke and 
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their insights into imagination and subjectivity, and the 
writings and insights of the Romantics, mainly Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, Goethe, and Proust, and their interest in 
individuality, feelings, and imagination. Mainly, however, 
it is Sartre's writings on the value of imagination to 
authentic being that Warnock calls on to found her project 
for authentic education and teaching. Sartre's 
existentialist thinking underpins much of her thinking. We 
will see in this exploration of Warnock's thinking that 
Warnock takes authenticity beyond the individual and the 
immediacy of existential thinking to the eternal and 
universal. Warnock wants society as a whole to awaken to the 
knowledge that existence is not predetermined, but rather is 
constructed through the imagination of the self. In this 
enterprise she holds teachers as central in realising this 
shift in thinking about the focus of education. 
Warnock presents the idea that through human imagination an 
inner and outer world are created. The inner world is the 
world of the individual, of thoughts, and of imagination. 
The outer world is the world of objects, ideas, and others, 
with which we engage. Imagination is presented as a function 
of consciousness which straddles the outer and inner worlds. 
Our knowledge and understanding of the world are constructed 
through the self, through our mind and body, as we evolve 
and move through time and space, as the mind and body travel 
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in relation to the world. The evolving inner seif mediates 
its existence through imagination and feelings as it engages 
with the outside world. It is through the individual's 
imagination that we know we have a past, a history. It is 
through imagination that we conceive of a future. Warnock 
(1994, p. 2) states that it is through creative imagination 
that we respond to the world, and seek to understand and to 
grasp general truths about the world. This imaginative 
knowing is explicated in the form of· descriptive 
interpretations of experiences, through a kind of writing 
which is normally found in poetry and novels. This kind of 
writing Warnock calls "imaginative literature." 
("Imaginative literature" is discussed and defined in 
Warnock's chapter called "Imaginative Interpretations" (pp. 
48-63). In this chapter she explains imaginative literature 
through the history of phenomenology in philosophy.) Warnock 
describes this kind of writing as having both clarity and 
depth in the telling and as having the ability to move one 
to become engaged in the reading. Warnock sees storytelling 
as giving form to imagination. Telling stories, she 
determines, is an attempt by each one of us to make sense of 
our lives and the lives of others. It is a way of framing 
and unifying our world view. It is through stories, she 
contends, that we, each of us, know our place in the world. 
Stories are central to our ability to manage and understand 
the world. 
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Warnock links imaginative writing with truth claims. It is 
the kind of writing, Warnock believes, that embodies the 
notion of truth. Truth, as Warnock defines it, is a form of 
writing that is accessible to all and transferable to others 
in the sense that others can identify with the experience as 
it is explicated. This is where the authentic is located in 
Warnock's thinking. Warnock believes that through this form 
of engaged writing, through "imaginative literature," we 
corne to understand the other, through our ability to imagine 
how things would look when viewed through the eyes of the 
other. Warnock goes on to say that it is through a deep 
engagement in the stories of others that eternal truths 
about human existence are realised. The process of realised 
personal and universal truths is enabled through what 
Warnock calls the human capacity of sympathy (p. 17). She 
states, "Sympathy, then, is a function of imagination. It 
functions because we recognize others as members of the 
species of which we are members .... There is, then, a strong 
philosophical tradition which gives to imagination the task 
of allowing access not only to the natural, external world 
as a whole, but also the minds and thoughts and feelings of 
other people" (p. 19-21). 
Warnock argues that our ability to have sympathy through 
human imagination has significance beyond the individual and 
93 
the immediate. Importantly, she contends, it also speaks to 
the notion of immortality and continuity of all human 
existence. Through a form of common language and through 
sympathy with other humans the personal and the momentary 
can be transformed into the universal and timeless. In this 
way human beingness has an immortal quality. 
It is also through sympathy, Warnock contends, that we can 
grasp commonly held values. Values, she determines, are 
those things in life held amongst humans as being meaningful 
and significant to human existence, to sustaining and 
continuing existence. This includes objects and other 
animals. Warnock states further that, "[i]f, by the exercise 
of imagination, we may reach a common understanding of the 
values we can claim to share with other humans, then the 
handing on of these values to a new generation must be 
something of central importance" (p. 173). 
Warnock sees the act of writing about the self as an innate 
human activity which serves man's [Warnock's usage] desire 
to assert his own personal continuity with the past. From 
this conclusion she postulates that literature (novels and 
poetry) can be used to explore experiences of the self and 
of others. She contends that autobiographical writing and 
forms of imaginative literature are a way of defining human 
immortality (p. 128). Remembered and written experiences of 
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the past become valuable, not in their factual accuracy, but 
in their ability to present themselves as lived and as true. 
She states that "to claim to remember something is to claim 
to know what it was like, because I was physically and 
geographically there and have not forgotten. This is a kind 
of timeless truth claim" (p.129). Universal connectedness is 
found here, in a kind of fluid understanding of self that 
persists through time and space. Autobiographical writings 
of the kind Warnock intends are attempts to write the lived 
experiences not only of the author but of others as well. 
Individuals can sympathise with the described experience, 
either through having had that experience themselves, or 
because of the artistic ability of the author in writing the 
experience. It is a form of what Warnock calls "utterances 
in a common language" which, in turn, relies on a sympathy 
with other humans for its apprehended meaningfulness and 
significance (p. 129). 
Virginia Woolf's form of writing about lived experiences is 
in the style that Warnock describes, that of giving to the 
reader moments of timelessness and truth. I felt a sense of 
intimate truth when, in To The Lighthouse, the narrator 
(Lily Briscoe/Woolf) describes her somewhat critical 
perspective of Mr Ramsey (Woolf's father) as I have felt 
similar feelings towards my own father. Also I experience 
the kind of sympathy of which Warnock speaks in the 
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description Woolf renders of Mrs Ramsey with her son and the 
tender protectiveness that she shows towards him as I too 
have had such feelings surge in myself towards my own son. 
These expressed experiences speak to me personally; I know 
them deeply through transference of mutual feelings, through 
sympathy. But I also experienced the internal conflict of 
Clarissa in Mrs Dalloway who seemed often to be on the verge 
of some kind of madness or suicide. Yet, I myself have never 
felt such despair at life. The kind of sympathy where I, as 
reader, understand such despair, even though I personally 
have not felt that way, is reached through the aesthetic 
writing of the author. Woolf's writing, its depth, clarity, 
and honesty, coming from a kind of personal knowing, is of 
the type that Warnock sees as capable of evoking sympathy_ 
For Warnock, the success of writing autobiographical 
accounts is found in the ability of the writer to evoke "the 
search for truth, through the self and memory and the 
interpreting imagination" (p. 144). Warnock believes 
exploring the forms of autobiographical writing that she 
espouses for the truth value they offer is of the utmost 
importance. She states, "truths about oneself could 
transform into truths about the world at large, the 
individual becoming the medium through which the whole 
common intelligible world must be explored" (p. 130). 
Warnock places the self in a fluid universe by reifying the 
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connectedness of fragments of inner aspects of the self to 
others in the world. 
Thinking further about the notion of universal truths found 
in imagination and written memories of the past, Warnock 
turns to thoughts of the future and wonders if there are 
ways of interpreting the world that have a permanent and 
lasting validity, and if there are some values that are 
eternal (p. 151). For Warnock, the future is not a given but 
is something that we need to ensure. She equates personal 
identity (autobiography) with universal responsibility in 
the sense that the individual is connected to the universal 
in "a one/many relationship" (p. 152). If the self, the 
individual, is able, through imagination, to determine that 
things can be eternal and universal, then it seems to 
follow, Warnock maintains, that individuals, personally, can 
and should become actively involved in caring for those 
things they see as valuable and essential in ensuring 
immortality. She states, "We ought to think about what we do 
now for the sake of future people" (p. 152). It is from this 
orientation that Warnock introduces the term stewardship (p. 
166). It is stewardship, meaning social responsibility, that 
Warnock believes should be the focus of education. Hers is 
an education for stewardship. Warnock contends that a 
reorientation to education is what is necessary in bringing 
to the consciousness of the individual the necessity for his 
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or her involvement in the world and the direction that this 
engagement should take. She says, ~The more we are aware of 
ourselves as individuals with a limited life-span, members 
of a species of animal, though with unique powers to 
conceive of the grandeurs of nature of which we are a part, 
the more highly we may sense it to be our duty not knowingly 
to despoil it. It is in recognising that what we do now, how 
we behave, makes a difference to how things will be in the 
world to come" (p. 186). The intent of Warnock's education 
is a strongly moral one, that of educating individuals to 
take responsibility for the future of human existence and 
the enhancement of the quality of future existence. She sees 
the realisation of her project to be the work of education 
and of teachers. She suggests a way to move education away 
from the kind of fatalistic mentality that pervades it now 
and towards recognising and utilising the power of human 
conscious thought to effect social evolution. 
Immortality, morality, and education in Warnock's thinking 
Given the significance and importance that Warnock attaches 
to imagination and forms of autobiography it is not 
surprising that she would hold imagination and creative 
expression to be the most important aspects of education and 
that she should advance these aspects as central to 
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curriculum content. Engaging children's imagination and 
encouraging creative expression are essential to her 
educational project of awakening moral responsibility. She 
states, "It is only through imagination that things are 
valued and made important. If we can educate a child's 
imagination we will give him a place in time. We will allow 
him to stretch his sense of the present back into the past, 
both his own individual past, and the past of the world as a 
whole. But we shall also free him to contemplate the future, 
his own, and that of the world" (p. 189). 
She sees the teaching of history as the most important 
subject of study in her moral project. Histories, she 
contends, are concerned with actions and actions are the 
outcome of human thought and intentions (p. 174). Warnock 
sees that those past lived experiences which effected change 
and brought us to where we are today need to be known. 
History should, she maintains, be the study of the past 
lived experiences of individuals. Approaching history in 
this way, she believes, would "make children conscious of 
their own powers and capacities, raising questions about 
their freedom to make decisions, and the consequences these 
decisions have" (p. 174). In Warnock's curriculum for 
schools children would be encouraged to see that the 
structures of one's life are not predetermined, but that 
they (the children) can and do have a part to play in 
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determining human existence and our future mode 'of 
existence. Through explicated narratives from our personal 
and social histories, Warnock believes, children can learn 
about human existence and learn to understand the place of 
human existence in the world, and in doing so become 
contributing members of the social order, rather than mere 
ineffectual observers or perceived objects of manipulation. 
Warnock believes that out of this focus on and approach to 
history it will be inevitable that concepts of moral value 
will (and should) be a part of the curriculum, that 
historical events should be discussed in a form of open 
dialogue as to their moral and ethical consequences. She 
states, "Through a kind of dialogue, pupils will learn both 
that moral views sometimes differ, but that it is 
nevertheless possible to conceive of and uphold ideals which 
may be understood and shared" (p. 175). Warnock believes 
that it is through this kind of what she calls "articulated 
value-system" (p. 175) that humans can come to think 
critically about the significance and meaning of their lives 
and to seek to determine what is significant and meaningful 
in human existence. It is open discussion and dialogue on 
shared and common experiences that, she contends, "will make 
possible a kind of convergence or consensus of values 
outside the classroom without which a society will be 
ungovernable" (p. 175). Through an articulated valuing 
exchange with others, individuals will come to see their 
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influence and effect. Warnock contends that it is a function 
of education to explicate and discuss what values are 
important, what aspects of the self are worth preserving. 
Warnock extends her approach to history to other subjects 
forming a part of traditional curricula. She sees the 
traditionalists' orientation to curriculum construction as 
having contributed to individuals seeing the world as 
immutable and fixed. Warnock believes that education needs 
to present an historical understanding of areas of study 
that normally have been taken for granted, such as science, 
mathematics, literature, music, the visual arts and history 
itself (p. l74). "It is only through the recognition of how 
the concepts we now take for granted have arisen out of what 
went before," Warnock contends, "that we can become able to 
delineate the framework of thought within which we operate, 
to examine critically our dogmatic assumptions" (p.174). 
Also important to her course of study for education is the 
tradition of storytelling. Warnock specifically mentions the 
traditional stories of religion (meaning biblical stories) 
because "they stand as metaphors of values that the child 
may thereby come to understand and share" (p. l89). Another 
aspect of storytelling, Warnock mentions, is that the child 
should learn to tell himself the story of his own life: "He 
must learn to give his life a shape, as all story-tellers 
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do, not live it unreflectingly" (p. 189). Warnock proposes 
an approach to teaching and knowing that places students and 
learners in the position of ensuring and moulding a fut~re 
while scripting their own autobiographies. 
Teachers in Warnock's educational project 
In order to effect moral action and the realisation of her 
project Warnock looks to the position of teachers. She 
argues that "there is no part of a teacher's duty that is 
more important than the teaching of morals" (p. 187). She 
sees teachers as having two tasks in teaching morality. One 
is to speak out against any acts or instances of immoral 
behaviour (p. 188). The other is to focus on building 
confidence, and enacting creativity, intellectual 
excitement, curiosity, "and the wish for truth" in their 
students (p. 189). It is through the imaginative and 
creative work of teachers that Warnock sees her project as 
being realised. Teachers need to facilitate and foster the 
practice of authenticity in others if they are to be 
authentic practitioners themselves. 
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Similarities and Differences in Pinar's and Warnock's 
discourses and projects 
I now return to William Pinar's thinking about the self and 
teaching and give critical consideration to his project 
through Mary Warnock's thoughts on autobiography and 
education. First I compare Pinar's project with Warnock's 
and then reflect critically on each of their projects in 
terms of their theoretical bases, the practicability of 
their proposals, and the possibility of their projects being 
realised, while focussing on the concepts of authenticity 
and aspects of inwardness. The intention here is to show 
both the value and the shortcomings of Pinar's and Warnock's 
forms of authentic teaching and selfhood. 
For both Pinar and Warnock there is a sense of trying to get 
beneath the surface, of going deeper into understanding the 
individual and the individual's place in the world. For 
Pinar this is apparent in his desire to get behind the 
unthinking self, the self in the taken-for-granted world of 
everyday educational practices. His existentialist project 
attempts to define self through aspects of consciousness, 
that is, of self reflection and imagination. Warnock probes 
beneath the surface on a grander scale. In her moral 
educational project she aims to get behind the 
thoughtlessness of human action, that is, action done 
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without consideration of the consequences and effects on the 
human condition in its totality. Warnock wishes the 
individual to achieve a deeper understanding of human 
existence and to develop a more meaningful understanding of 
the significance of the individual in constructing the 
world. In realising each of their projects Pinar and Warnock 
both demand a heightened sense of self through an awakened 
sense of inner thinking. 
The concepts of measured time and past, present, and future 
have significance in understanding aspects of inwardness. 
Pinar suggests that the individual turn to his or her 
personal past to reclaim a sense of self and then, through 
imagination, project an image of oneself into the future in 
order to direct one's thinking and actions in the present. 
Pinar's sense of past, present, and future, although not 
static, presents a linearly constructed sense of time. It is 
a sense of time that limits his project to the concrete and 
the actual. For Warnock, on the other hand, the past is not 
a given dimension but rather something one constructs 
subjectively. According to Warnock, individuals create a 
sense of the past through their imagination (memory being an 
aspect of imagination). The same is true of the future. 
One's knowing of a future exists only through one's 
imagination. Warnock also conceives of another dimension of 
-time. She presents the idea of a sense of timelessness, 
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found in phenomenological storying. Such stories, stories 
that provoke a sense of what she calls sympathy, speak to a 
sense of human beingness as existing outside of what might 
be called "clock time." Warnock perceives time as being more 
fluid and multi-dimensional than does Pinar, and in turn, 
enabling her to consider eternal aspects of human beingness 
as well as human immortality. Warnock's approach to the 
future is not to reconcile the past and future with the 
present, as Pinar attempts to do, but rather to take on the 
responsibility for constructing, determining, and ensuring a 
future through the role of stewardship. The past, for 
Warnock, is to be excavated in order to understand how we 
are in the present and to effect how we best can be in the 
future. Although Pinar does attempt to give broader 
implications to his project with the idea that teachers who 
come together in open dialogue on common experiences might 
bring about societal change, his form of subjective writing 
tends towards solipsism and narcissism. Warnock, on the 
other hand, looks at autobiographical writings, although 
established in the personal and particular, as being of 
prime importance in establishing universal value. 
Both Pinar and Warnock see the position of the inner self as 
a mediating one. Through a grasp of an inner sense of being 
the inner self aims to condition the outer world while all 
the time moving towards an authenticity of existence. 
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Pinar's project aims to move human consciousness into a 
position of working in-between and in doing so bridging the 
outside world with the world of the inner self. It is a 
position of negotiation and mediation realised through inner 
dialogue with the self. If and when others move to 
reconceptualising the world in this way, Pinar believes, the 
outcome will be to subversively erode the dominant 
oppressive structures of education. Warnock, on the other 
hand, wishes to effect changes in established traditions of 
education by calling for a total restructuring of education 
where the focus of the curriculum and of teaching would 
reflect both the significance of human imagination (as she 
defines imagination) and her moral intent. Both Pinar and 
Warnock see the position of the inner self as a mediating 
one, a self reflecting on itself with an eye also on the 
future. 
Shortcomings of Pinar's thinking 
There are some fundamental weaknesses in Pinar's currere 
method. Mainly the problems lie in the intention of his 
method of empowering the self to move towards self-
actuality. In Pinar's regressive step he suggests going back 
into one's past in a form of "stream of consciousness" 
writing in order to grasp an understanding of oneself. When 
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considered closely this approach to knowing oneself has the 
potential of a misreading of who one is. It is also a method 
that limits understandings of what constitutes a self. 
Certain biases and prejudices felt on one day might lead to 
a certain reading of oneself. When done at a different time 
and in a different mood a completely different understanding 
of oneself might be determined. Also, the myriad of 
experiences that constitute one's life seems too voluminous 
to refine into an essence of self. Can anyone really come to 
an understanding of who one is? It seems that one most be 
open to a broader understanding of self. Certainly the 
individual can offer understandings and insights into 
oneself, but the perceptions of others can also aid in this 
enterprise. In order for the individual to gain a fuller 
understanding of the self one could and should involve the 
perceptions of others. Pinar's individual defining himself 
or herself without taking into account the perspectives of 
others will lack a sense of connectedness of the self to a 
world inhabited by others. 
Pinar also seems to overlook the fact that individuals are 
not equally perceptive and articulate. As Warnock points 
out, literary writers, through their ability as artists, 
have the ability to provide insights and understandings into 
lived experiences that the ordinary person, or the less 
articulate individual, cannot. Literary texts such as 
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novels, biographies and autobiographies, and poetry are also 
sources for the kind of language which can best articulate 
what constitutes one's identity. In order for the self to 
achieve a fuller understanding of oneself Pinar needs to 
present a method which allows for the voices of others in 
determining the self as teacher and at the same time 
acknowledges the multifariousness of what constitutes a 
self. 
Another shortcoming in Pinar's thinking is related to 
teaching and the lack of thought that he gives in his 
reconceptualisation of education to alleviating the physical 
and psychological burdens of teaching, which have been 
escalating in recent years. By "burdens" I mean the constant 
demands being put on teachers from the outside, from 
administration, from parents and community, and from the 
government. This is very apparent in England at present with 
the implementation of the National Curriculum and the 
resulting new, continual demands on teachers to maintain 
standards of teaching and of what is prescribed by the 
National Curriculum. The headline of a recent front-page 
article in The Guardian reads: "Teacher crisis--half plan to 
quit in 10 years time." This mass exit of teachers from the 
profession is expected "because they cannot stand the heavy 
workload, stress and bureaucracy that now accompanies a job 
in the classroom" (February 29, 2000, p. 1). Although Pinar 
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offers a way of lessening the stress experienced in teaching 
through a reconceptualising of one's relation to teaching 
and to education, his approach has little effect on the 
actual outside world. A teacher might be able to work 
through conflicts with the support of an engaged and 
enlightened consciousness, but in order to continue to teach 
he or she must be able both physically and mentally to 
withstand the demands of the educational system. As teachers 
see themselves as losing more and more of their autonomy 
they are becoming more and more demoralized and burnt out. 
In this way I see Pinar's thinking to be not significantly 
effectual in helping teachers combat the stresses and 
strains of teaching in today's increasingly conflicting 
environment of education. 
My final criticism of Pinar's project comes out of the 
reading of Kierkegaard's journey to selfhood and his stages 
of authentic existence. As I have shown, Pinar's method 
follows closely Kierkegaard's stages to selfhood, but only 
as far as Kierkegaard's ethical stage. Kierkegaard's ethical 
stage is similar to pinar's regressive and progressive 
steps. In Pinar's progressive step one is to imagine oneself 
in the future in the form of an ideal self, the person one 
is striving to be. This is also the method that Kierkegaard 
suggests for ethical existence. But Kierkegaard noted the 
failings of this approach. He saw that having the aim of 
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working towards an image of oneself in the future holds the 
danger of ending in a kind of "moral bankruptcy." The future 
is deeply conditional, affected by social, political, and 
environmental forces over which the individual has no 
control. To aim for an ideal state, constructed in one's 
imagination, is to lay oneself open to the potential for 
demoralisation. Kierkegaard recognised that a higher level 
of existence needs to be constructed towards which one must 
strive, one that is more dependable and consistent than an 
image of oneself in the future, in order to realise complete 
self-actualisation. For Kierkegaard that goal was a 
commitment to Jesus Christ through faith in God's "eternal 
blessedness." Pinar however does not address this potential 
pitfall of his method. Kierkegaard believed that a truly 
authentic existence can only come about if and when we 
commit and act in faith and belief in God's presence and 
eternal goodness. 
Critical reflections on Mary Warnock's project 
The weaknesses of Warnock's approach to teaching and 
education lie in its idealistic nature and the totality of 
its intent. To realise Warnock's "education for stewardship" 
would require a complete transformation of existing social 
structures. This is not realisable. There is too much that 
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needs to be changed in order to ensure the moral state that 
Warnock sees as necessary for authentic existence. Also 
Warnock's autocratic concept of how the world should be 
constructed does not allow for other ways of valuing the 
world. We will see, in the chapters that follow, that the 
educational theories of Dwayne Huebner and Maxine Greene 
present other valid ways of thinking about education, 
teaching, and society which are inclusive of existing world 
views. 
Within Warnock's desired alternative approach to education 
there is an area of teaching and education that seems 
obviously underdeveloped, which is essential in the actual 
practice of teaching. Her project shows a lack of 
sensitivity to the relationship held between the teacher and 
the student. Her approach to teaching lacks an understanding 
of the workings of the mind of the child as it evolves and 
forms. Instead, the child is merely directed and led to a 
particular moral orientation. This is also a shortcoming in 
Pinar's thinking about teaching and what it means to be a 
teacher. Pinar does not focus on this essential aspect of 
being a teacher, one's relation to the other, the student. 
(A valuing of the relationship that the teacher has with his 
or her students in authentic teaching will be discussed in 
the explorations the thinking of Nel Noddings and Max van 
Manen. ) 
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Pinar and Warnock each present a challenge to conventional 
approaches to education in practice and each contributes to 
a movement towards bridging the gap between the self and 
teaching by offering a way to make teaching meaningful in 
praxis. Pinar provides a very practical approach to valuing 
the self, based mainly in Kierkegaard's steps to selfhood, 
and Warnock, who bases her thinking on Sartre's definition 
of imagination, adds to the construction of a meaningful 
praxis of teaching through the importance she gives to 
something above and beyond what we know, a sense of 
universal being. In these ways both Warnock and Pinar open 
up an understanding of inwardness and authenticity in their 
emphasis on and means of scripting the self. In the 
concluding chapter I give value to both Pinar's and 
Warnock's understanding of the self and education in my own 
approach to authentic teaching. 
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Chapter Three 
Nel Noddings and Max van Manen: 
Engrossment, Tact, and authenticity 
In her critical essay on literary writing in Edwardian 
society entitled "Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown" Virginia Woolf 
wrote of the profession of writing: 
The writer must get into touch with his [sic] reader 
by putting before him something which he recognizes, 
which therefore stimulates his imagination, and makes 
him willing to co-operate in the far more difficult 
business of intimacy. And it is of the highest 
importance that this common meeting place should be 
reached easily, almost instinctively, in the dark, 
with one's eyes shut. (Virginia Woolf (1991) A Woman's 
Essays, p. 81) 
The real skill of the writer, Woolf believes, lies in 
her/his ability to bring the reader, the writer, and the 
experiences of the characters about whom she/he writes, 
together on the page so that the reader is led into the 
world of her characters. Entering into the thoughts and 
experiences of "the other" and connecting the self with "the 
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other" are at the heart of Nel Noddings's and Max van 
Manen's educational projects. Both of these educationalists 
argue that in order for authentic teaching to take place the 
teacher needs to move into the world of the student. It is 
in this intimacy that the teacher works with the student, 
directing and shaping the child as he/she learns. 
It is the construct and intention of a position of intimacy 
that will be explored in this inquiry into the theories of 
Nel Noddings and Max van Manen. An understanding of the 
theoretical basis for Nel Noddings's form of authentic 
teaching is derived from a close reading of her Caring: a 
feminist approach to ethical teaching. Van Manen has 
presented his form of authentic teaching in his The Tact of 
Teaching. It is in these two texts that the details of the 
theoretical underpinnings of their orientation and approach 
to the position of teacher in authentic teaching are given. 
Noddings and van Manen each hold an existentialist 
orientation in defining and defending authentic teaching. In 
the following exploration into each of their theories I will 
discuss how both Noddings and van Manen build on and in turn 
expand on the existential narratives of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre given in Chapter One. 
Further on, this chapter takes a hermeneutic turn whereby 
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critical debate will be given to the theories of Noddings 
and van Manen by comparing each of their theories of 
teaching in terms of realisability and practicability. As 
the basis for this critical discussion I argue that the 
underlying difference between Noddings's and van Manen's 
thinking rests in a longstanding existential debate, one 
originating with Sartre and the importance he places on 
human existence. As was pointed out in the explication of 
Sartre's narrative of authenticity in Chapter One, Sartre 
argued against a predetermined individual essence. He 
maintained that because consciousness exists in nothingness 
it has no fixed essence. Conscious beings create themselves 
as they go along. Sartre believed that for human beings, 
existence precedes essence; there is no essential human 
nature given in advance. One becomes in consciousness 
whatever one chooses to become by doing and feeling what one 
chooses to do and feel. In the critical discussion I present 
the idea that van Manen's thinking is closer to Sartre in 
this regard and that Noddings's theoretical basis has closer 
ties to the way Kierkegaard defines the individual, 
particularly Kierkegaard's ethical stage. 
At the end of this chapter I draw out of van Manen's and 
Noddings's thinking the ways in which they each contribute 
to a definition of meaningful teaching. 
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Nel Noddings and ethical caring 
Noddings founds her ethic of care on the concrete experience 
of life in the everyday and the relation held between one 
person and another. She presents her ethical orientation as 
a critical response to what she sees as the dominant 
practice for determining ethics; that is, ethics defined by 
abstract principles and rules. She states that this 
traditional basis for ethical practice is "the language of 
the father" (p.l). Noddings holds that the relational 
experience between persons, that of human encounter and 
response found in innate feelings of care that one has 
towards the other, is fundamental to human existence and 
therefore should be the basis for ethical being (p.3). 
Specifically, she maintains, it is the relation between 
mother and child that provides the ontology for ethical 
thinking. It is the caring expressed and received in the 
mother-child relation that grounds what Noddings calls her 
"feminine approach to ethics." (This phrase is from the 
title of her text.) 
The way in which Noddings defines the position of the self 
to "the other" is to divide a definition of caring into two 
entities: the one-caring, the one cared-for. Noddings holds 
there to be two essential ethical questions which underlie 
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the asymmetrical relational experience of the one-caring to 
the one cared-for: How do I meet the other morally? How do 
we respond to the other in terms of "goodness" (p.5)? 
Noddings begins her ethic of care by defining two kinds of 
caring: natural caring and ethical caring. Natural caring, 
she contends, underlies the caring relation and is founded 
on the interlocking notions of maternity and love. Noddings 
describes the impetus of natural caring this way: "We love 
not because we are required to love but because our natural 
relatedness gives natural birth to love" (p. 6). Ethical 
caring, on the other hand, is defined as requiring a 
conscious effort that is not needed in natural caring. It is 
a caring response to the other that is in some way provoked 
internally; one feels impelled to respond to a demand to 
care. Noddings defines this initial calling that one feels 
toward the other as one being impelled and motivated by an 
innate desire to respond to a demand to care which has been 
placed on her by the other. Noddings sees ethical caring as 
a response to a situation heard internally as "I must," as 
in "I must do something here." It is in this call to care, 
heard and felt internally, that Noddings moves existential 
thought beyond the self and in the direction of alterity. 
Noddings determines that what sustains and directs one's 
actions in the authentic caring relation is the image of an 
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ethical ideal. Everything depends upon the nature and the 
strength of this ideal image (p. 105). The ethical and 
caring person needs first to acquire a deep knowing of the 
self, the one-caring, as well as a deep knowing of the 
other, the one cared-for. From this deep knowing of oneself 
and the other the caring person can then construct an image 
of the self in an ideal state. In authentic existence one's 
actions are motivated by the image of the ethical ideal. 
Noddings, in formulating authentic existence in terms of 
knowing oneself and moving towards an image of the self in 
an ideal state, reflects, as Pinar's method of currere does, 
Kierkegaard's initial stage of his path to selfhood. 
Kierkegaard believed that in order to move towards selfhood 
the individual needs to know himself. Knowing oneself is 
realised through a deep inquiring into one's past. With this 
knowledge of oneself one can then work towards determining 
one's own existence and selfhood as one moves into what 
Kierkegaard calls the ethical stage. For Noddings both the 
one-caring and the one cared-for are led and driven by the 
concept of the ethical ideal (p.S). The ethical ideal guides 
and shapes one's actions. Where Noddings expands on 
Kierkegaard's thinking is in her contention that the ethical 
existence depends not only on knowing oneself deeply, which 
is where Kierkegaard limits his thinking, but also on 
knowing the other, the one cared-for. 
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According to Noddings, the image of an ethical ideal has 
three essential aspects: it should be describable; it is 
realisable; and it is obtainable in the concrete world. It 
also has a dynamic aspect. Holding the ethical ideal as 
something yet to be achieved requires that the one-caring, 
the teacher, be always in an active relation between the 
actual self now and a vision of the self in the future. Two 
fundamental concepts essential to her ethic of care are 
engrossment and what she calls motivational displacement. 
These two aspects of ethical being are highly integrated. 
Motivational displacement is seen as a result of one's 
ethical orientation toward the other; one's motivation for 
ethical caring is derived from a feeling of care for the 
welfare, protection, and enhancement of the one cared-for 
(p. 23). In this frame of mind there is a displacement of 
interest from one's own reality to the reality of the other. 
Noddings describes motivational displacement this way: "To 
be touched, to have aroused in me something that will 
disturb my own ethical reality, I must see the other's 
reality as a possibility for my own" (p. 14). Engrossment, 
on the other hand, is when the one-caring accepts the other 
unconditionally and one's judgment of the other is suspended 
while being deeply engaged in the interest of the one cared-
for. Engrossment is a feeling of being connected to the 
other: I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel 
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with the other (p. 30). It is in engrossment that the one-
caring moves into intimate proximity to the one cared-for. 
This is the point of the greatest intimacy and the apex of 
authentic caring. 
It is while in the state of engrossment with the other, 
Noddings contends, that a split in one's thinking occurs. 
The teacher assumes a dual perspective as she sees things 
from both her own pole and that of the one cared-for. 
(Noddings uses the feminine gender for the one-caring, and 
the masculine gender for the one cared-for.) In her position 
of being ethically responsible, the one-caring aims to 
preserve and enhance caring in herself as well as in those 
with whom she comes into contact. She maintains two world 
views: her own, and that of the one-cared for. Both world 
views have an ethical ideal to strive towards, but the 
ethical ideal is different for each. 
Authentic caring is dynamic in its construction. One's 
connectedness to the other is defined as existing in a kind 
of "back and forth" movement by the teacher: a kind of 
subjective-objective altered positioning. The one-caring 
receives the student, and sees and feels with the other. 
When one apprehends the other in his or her world one is 
moved to an altered frame of perception. There occurs what 
Noddings calls a turning point (p. 26). This is a shift in 
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the mental state of the teacher, from that of non-rational, 
and non-judgmental being with the other, to that of rational 
and objective thought. In this state of mind the one-caring 
asks herself: what action is needed here that would move the 
child towards his ethical ideal? In an objective and 
rational frame of mind the one-caring looks for the "best 
self" in the other and works with him to actualise that 
"best self." But before the moment of action, and Noddings 
stresses this, a great deal of sensitive and informed 
judgment is required in order to know when to pull back from 
being with the other and when to act in the other's best 
interest. When the decision to act is made, it is made with 
commitment to the ethical ideal of the one cared-for. In 
ethical caring the one-caring remains committed to the one 
cared-for (Noddings, 1984, p.16). 
In Noddings's caring ethic the caring relation can only be 
complete when the one cared-for welcomes and responds to the 
caring intentions offered to him by the one-caring. Noddings 
describes it this way: "My caring must be somehow completed 
in the other if the relation is to be described as caring" 
(p.4). While in the caring relation the one-caring holds 
before the child an image of his best possible self; she 
frames him in that best self image. At the same time she 
leads the one cared-for to choose himself as an ethical 
being. But, Noddings maintains, the commitment and the 
121 
decision to embrace a particular possibility of the self, 
must be that of the child. The desire to respond, Noddings 
believes, is an innate aspect of a child and his feeling of 
vulnerability in the world. The child responds to the one-
caring out of trust, faith, and love for the adult and the 
desire to be with the parent (p.64). In the trust and love 
of a caring relation the one cared-for is free to be more 
fully himself. The freedom, creativity, and spontaneous 
disclosure of the one cared-for in this nurturing and caring 
environment can become manifest (p. 74). 
According to Noddings three essential and somewhat 
interrelated aspects are engaged by the one-caring, in 
nurturing the ethical ideal: dialogue, skill through 
practice, and confirmation through attribution (pp. 121-
122), with dialogue playing the most significant role in the 
caring relation. Noddings defines two forms of dialogue. 
There is the internal dialogue of the one-caring. This is a 
dialogue of inner reflection while the one-caring reflects 
on her relation with "the other." This form of internal 
dialogue produces revelations that might assist in realising 
the caring ideal, both for herself and the one cared-for. 
The other form of dialogue is external, the actual dialogue 
between the one-caring and the one-cared for. The one-caring 
encourages dialogue in the relation and the one cared-for 
reveals himself in the dialogue. His dialogue provides clues 
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as to the direction that the one-caring might take in moving 
the one cared-for towards his ethical ideal. 
Practice is also required in the ethical relationship; that 
is the practice of caring for the other. Noddings states 
that one must have encounters as well as legitimate 
opportunities to care, in order to go on caring effectively 
(p. 123). The one-caring encourages situations for ethical 
practices for both herself and the one cared-for. The 
intention of the practices of caring is that both the one-
caring and the one-cared for apply ethical caring practices 
to everyday life, so that the caring becomes a way of being 
in daily living. 
Confirmation, the third aspect of Noddings's ethical caring, 
involves actions that confirm a sense of one's being. What 
Noddings means by confirmation is the positive recognition 
of what one has accomplished in terms of achieving one's 
ethical ideal. The relation begins with the one-caring 
always meeting the other positively. She sees the other in 
the best possible light, so her positive vision of the child 
is also the image the child sees of himself. In this way the 
one-caring confirms the child in his ethical ideal. 
Confirmation is reinforced through celebration of the 
repetition of the events of life, the emerging and the 
passing away of things in life. Celebration of such events 
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provides opportunities to learn, to share, and to grow. 
It is these three aspects of dialogue, practice, and 
confirmation of life that form and shape the child in the 
relation and move him towards his ethical ideal. Encouraging 
and watching out for opportunities for dialogue, for 
practice, and for confirmation by the one-caring, Noddings 
contends, nurture and sustain the caring ethic. 
But the caring ethic is also enhanced and sustained by what 
Noddings calls JOY (p. 132). Joy, Noddings says, is not an 
emotion but rather it is an effect--a mode of consciousness 
(p. 134). According to Noddings, joy is the recognition of 
fulfilment of the relatedness. It is the feeling which 
accompanies the realisation of our relatedness to the other. 
Joy causes one to reflect on one's own basic reality; it is 
the reward for the one-caring. The individual's joy enhances 
both the ethical ideal held by the one-caring and her 
commitment to it. Joy has a certain resonance with 
Kierkegaard's moment of selfhood where connectedness and 
completeness are realised in the Eternal Blessedness of God 
but lacks the universality of Kierkegaard's Christian 
ethnicity. Joy in Noddings's thinking is instead an 
individual experience. 
124 
Limits in ethical caring 
Noddings says, "We cannot care for everyone" (p. 86). One 
way that we determine the limits of our obligation to care 
for others is by examining the possibility of realising the 
ethical ideal of the other and the self (p. 86). Limits are 
put on our caring by the proximity of the one-caring to the 
one cared-for when the one cared-for is not physically 
present to the one-caring. The one-caring cannot grasp the 
other's reality when the other is at a distance, and 
therefore, cannot determine an ethical ideal for that 
person. 
The one-caring as teacher 
Noddings transfers her ethical caring project to the 
practice of teaching. Teaching, Noddings maintains, involves 
a meeting of the one-caring and the one cared-for in the 
teacher and student relation. The ethical teacher is first 
and foremost one caring. She is prepared to put her 
"motivational energy" in the service of the student (p. 
113). Teaching for Noddings means that teaching the student 
is always more important than teaching the subject, but the 
teaching of subject material provides an opportunity for 
ethical caring. The main task of the teacher is to nurture 
the student's ethical ideal. It is the teacher who bears the 
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responsibility for the enhancement of the ethical ideal. In 
her own behaviour she is a model of the ethical 
practitioner, a model of one-caring. An ethical teacher, 
Noddings contends, has two major tasks: one is to stretch 
the student's world by presenting an effective selection of 
challenges and opportunities from the world in which she 
lives, the adult life-world; the other is to work co-
operatively with the student in his struggle towards 
competence in that world (p. 178). By placing an emphasis on 
the essential aspects needed to realise one's ethical ideal, 
aspects of dialogue, the provision of practice, confirmation 
of one's ethical self and modelling ethical being, the one-
caring as teacher nurtures the other's, the student's, 
ethical ideal and creates an environment that makes it 
possible for the one cared-for to recognise and embrace his 
own ethical ideal. The teacher continually encourages the 
child to become involved in caring and sharing enterprises. 
The experiences for caring and sharing are found in everyday 
life. The teacher continually confirms the student's 
existence and moves him toward his ethical ideal by offering 
encouraging comments when he shows through language and 
action a positive movement towards an ethical life. However, 
the teacher, in her caring mode does not abandon her own 
ethical ideal while in pursuit of the ethical ideal of the 
one cared-for. Noddings suggests that the teacher, in order 
to sustain her own ethical aim, also needs confirmation from 
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the larger world of teaching, confirmation in terms of 
praised work, cooperative enterprises with other teachers, 
and general encouragement from the everyday dialogue and 
collegiality among teachers. 
Schools that practise ethical caring 
Noddings (pp. 197-200) demands that a school be deliberately 
designed to support caring and caring individuals and she 
sketches out some essential aspects of a design for a caring 
school. In caring schools there needs to be an emphasis on 
talking, sharing, listening, and responding to each other 
not only within the school but also in participation with 
parents, the community, and other institutions. She also 
recommends that there be a move towards the dismantling of 
the professionalism of teaching and schools as they 
presently exist. Noddings thinks that in an ethical 
educational environment the position of teachers should be 
elevated. Teachers should become involved in administration 
so as to reduce the separation that now exists between 
teaching and administration. Teachers should be the ones who 
develop the rules and guidelines in controlling the conduct 
and movement of students in schools, and such rules and 
guidelines should be developed around what the teachers 
themselves see as being significant in maintaining ethical 
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practice and a caring school (p. 198). 
Noddings's caring frame of mind is an ethical approach to 
the other, founded on the relational, the interactions that 
exist between the self as teacher, and "the other," the 
child, the student. Mainly, Noddings gives importance to 
teachers, as they are the ones responsible for the ethical 
pedagogical practise. As ethical persons teachers operate in 
full realisation of the position that they hold, a position 
of influence and responsibility to the other, the student, 
and in full knowledge of the position of vulnerability that 
the child, the student, has. 
Van Manen and pedagogical tact 
Noddings's thinking about the asymmetrical relation between 
the teacher and the student is not unique in contemporary 
educational theory. Max van Manen, another contemporary 
educationalist, has also formulated a theoretical approach 
to teaching based on the relationship between the student 
and the teacher. At the heart of this relation is something 
van Manen calls pedagogical tact. Pedagogical tact is 
defined by van Manen as a multifaceted and complex 
mindfulness towards children (p.8). As with Noddings, van 
Manen's alternative approach integrates theory and practice 
and everyday experiences. Also, like Noddings, van Manen has 
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been influenced by thinkers in the field of existentialism. 
But van Manen places an emphasis on the phenomenological 
branch of existentialist thought. (In this regard van Manen 
specifically mentions the influence of educationalist 
Martinus Langeveld in the "Acknowledgement" in The Tact of 
Teaching.) We will see that van Manen is close to the 
thinking of Sartre and his understanding of authentic 
existence where the self is formulated in a play between the 
present and the future. Like Sartre, van Manen's approach 
does not subscribe to a formula or predefined method; rather 
it is an approach determined from within the ebb and flow of 
everyday experiences. It is the experiences of parenting and 
teaching that are the focus of van Manen's discourse. The 
term "pedagogy" has a special meaning for van Manen: it 
refers only to those types of actions and interactions that 
are intentionally engaged in by an adult and a child and 
that are aimed at the maturation and positive development of 
the child or student (p. 17). A pedagogical relation, van 
Manen determines, is grounded, ontologically, in a calling. 
It is an innate calling that is the pedagogical impulse that 
gives meaning to the lives of children as well as to one's 
own existence (p. 216). The parent is drawn/called to the 
vulnerability of the child, and in turn, the child, when he 
or she calls out for help, for support, expects to be heard 
by an adult. This "call and response" relation creates a 
connectedness, a oneness, between the adult and the child 
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(p. 25). What makes this relation a pedagogical one is that 
the adult must do something "right" for the child (p. 40). 
What is "right" is defined by van Manen as that which 
reflects concern for the well-being of the child and that 
which aids in bringing the child into maturity and 
independence (p. 28); pedagogy is being and living with the 
child in our presence in such a way as to provide direction 
and care for his of her life. Van Manen deems that this 
orientation to the child expresses as well as strengthens 
positive pedagogical intentions. In his definition of 
pedagogy van Manen reflects Heidegger's theory of the origin 
of human consciousness and move toward authenticity, that of 
"call and response" as an innate aspect of the human 
condition. 
The pedagogical relation between teacher and student must be 
a two-way intentional relationship. The teacher intends for 
the student to learn and to grow. In turn, the student needs 
to have a desire, a willingness, and a preparedness to learn 
(p.77). It is the construct of how the teacher effects his 
or her influence over the student that van Manen attempts to 
define as "pedagogical tact." Van Manen determines that the 
knowledge necessary for this pedagogical acting is a 
knowledge that is situation-specific and oriented to the 
particular child for whom the teacher is concerned (p. 47). 
Pedagogical knowledge and pedagogical practice are divided 
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into two kinds, action and reflection; that is, actively 
living through pedagogical experiences in our everyday 
routines and motions as teachers in a world with students, 
and reflectively talking and writing about the experiences, 
where an effort is made to understand the pedagogical 
significance and "goodness" of events and happenings in 
children's lives (p. 41). The knowledge necessary for 
pedagogical action is found within specific situations in 
which the adult and child are called together in a concrete 
way. It is such situations, van Manen deems, that cause us 
to reflect and to try to interpret and understand what is 
happening. Life itself, van Manen claims, provides the 
sources for reflection. He sees life as full of 
contradictions, tensions, and anomalies, and that these 
conflicts give life its dynamic impulse while playing a part 
in shaping and defining existence. For van Manen it is the 
anomalies experienced in our life with the child, the 
student, that cause us to reflect on the situation and the 
relation we have with children. It is in the realisation 
that such moments of discord define and shape the child and 
our relationship with the child and are a window for 
mediation. It is in such moments that one reflects and moves 
to take responsibility for oneself and responsibility for 
the other. According to van Manen conflicts and tensions not 
only challenge us in daily living with children, but also 
prompt us to question how we should act with children (p. 
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61). Pedagogical knowledge is gathered from within the 
ongoing practice of reflecting on and interpreting the world 
in which we live and act and is founded on a strong 
orientation and commitment to the well-being of the child. 
But, according to van Manen, pedagogical knowledge and 
pedagogical action also corne from a deep knowing of the 
life-world of the situation and existential structure in 
which parents and teachers find themselves in their relation 
with children. By the life-world of the situation van Manen 
means all those aspects that constitute and contribute to 
the situation. The following are some of the essential 
aspects of the life-world situation van Manen names from 
which knowledge can be gleaned and used to inform 
pedagogical action. 
In order for the relation to be pedagogical van Manen 
maintains that the adult must first and foremost be present 
to the child. The relation begins with being available and 
accessible for the child, being attentive to him or her (p. 
56). Van Manen deems that ~in providing a loving atmosphere 
of safety and security for children, parents give and teach 
the very young something without which growing up and living 
become quite impossible" (p. 57). To provide support to a 
child means that the adult is reliable and can be counted on 
to be there in a dependable and continual way (p. 60). Being 
. 
present to the child also means being open to receiving the 
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child (p. 86). 
In the relational situation, the person in the position of 
influence, the parent or the professional educator, must 
also know himself or herself pedagogically. One defines 
oneself pedagogically in terms of one's commitment to the 
positive growth of those for whom we are responsible (p. 
22) • 
In a pedagogical situation one must have a sensitive and 
deep knowledge of the child, his or her life history, 
background, his or her unique qualities, and the 
circumstances of his or her existence. This knowledge is 
gained over time and it is the kind of knowledge that is the 
result of a dedicated interest in children. The educator 
needs also to come to understand a child's learning and 
development in the context of the larger biography of the 
child (p. 53). 
The experience of pedagogy and that which informs 
pedagogical action is found in the everyday experiences of 
being with children. Van Manen divides this everyday 
pedagogical experience into what he sees as three 
fundamental aspects: the pedagogical relation, the 
pedagogical situation, and pedagogical action. These three 
aspects are significantly integrated. 
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The pedagogical relation consists of the interactive 
qualities that exist between the parent and the child, 
between the teacher and the student. Each pedagogical 
relation is unique in its interrelational qualities. 
Pedagogical situations occur frequently in the everyday life 
of parenting and teaching. A pedagogical situation is 
created through the intention of the parent or educator and 
the way that the adult is oriented to the child. (Van Manen 
uses the phrase ~through the way that the educator belongs 
to the child" (p. 72).) These are situations where the 
parent or the teacher feels concern for the child's welfare 
and is prompted to reflect on what meaning that particular 
life experience has for that child (p. 53). The adult or 
teacher must grasp, analyse, and understand the child's 
situation and how the child will benefit through the 
teacher's actions from within the circumstances as they 
exist. Pedagogical action is seen as mediating the 
influences of the world for the child. A pedagogical 
relation and a pedagogical situation come into being through 
pedagogical action (p. 78). The actions of the parent or the 
teacher are what mediate between the present and the future 
of the child or student for whom we (as parents and as 
teachers) have responsibility and to whom we are oriented 
pedagogically. 
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Van Manen focusses on pedagogical action and the pedagogical 
moment in defining what is the focal point of his theory, 
that which he calls pedagogical tact. The pedagogical moment 
is realised in pedagogical action. When the child calls the 
parent or the teacher to respond in a particular situation, 
the response action is what van Manen calls pedagogical 
tact. Pedagogical tact is acting in the fullness of 
pedagogical intent in a particular situation. It involves a 
great degree of sensitivity, coming out of a deep commitment 
to the child pedagogically; and entails an attuned knowing 
of when to hold back and when to act. Generally, pedagogical 
tact can be seen as the art of orchestrating the possible 
influences of the world of the child. In education, 
pedagogical tact happens when the child is constantly 
encouraged by the educator to assume more personal 
responsibility for learning and growth. The teacher uses the 
influences of the world as a resource for influencing and 
directing the child. Van Manen sees the influences as being 
mediated through many ways: speech, silence, the eyes, and 
gesture. Creating a certain atmosphere and presenting 
oneself as example are also ways of mediating the world for 
the child. Pedagogical tact aims to make a space for the 
child, protect the vulnerability of the child, strengthen 
what is good, enhance what is unique, and support personal 
growth and learning in the child (pp. 172-177). 
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Pedagogical tact, van Manen continues, is supported and 
guided by the interrelated aspects of thoughtfulness and 
understanding. Pedagogical thoughtfulness, according to van 
Manen, calls for thoughtful reflection. Van Manen goes into 
some detail defining the pedagogical significance of various 
forms of reflection: reflection before action, reflection in 
dialogue, reflection in action, and reflection on action 
(pp. 98-118). Pedagogical understanding is a kind of 
understanding that is directed towards the child that 
supports the child's growth and well-being. Pedagogical 
understanding is an openness to the child. While receiving 
the child, the interaction with the child is one of engaged 
analytical thought and dialogue which is intended to help 
the child overcome the obstacles that impede or block his or 
her positive growth and is intended to help a child form a 
stronger sense of self and to develop a sense of what van 
Manen calls "personal courage" (p. 91). Through pedagogical 
understanding the child comes to see how things can be 
thought through and how feelings such as defeat, fear, or 
shyness can be overcome (p. 92). 
Pedagogical understanding and thoughtfulness, according to 
van Manen, are encouraged by what van Manen calls sympathy 
(pp. 96-98). Sympathy is described by van Manen as an 
attunement to the inner life of the child (p. 96). It is a 
closeness to the child, but it is a closeness that still 
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retains an awareness of oneself, of one's own inner life, as 
parent or teacher. Sympathy is engaged understanding, 
whereby one attempts to reach a sense of the inner self of 
the other. 
For one to act in the fullness of pedagogical intention, to 
do what is best pedagogically, the teacher or adult needs to 
apply a high level of attentiveness to the pedagogical 
situation. Van Manen calls this level of attentiveness 
pedagogical fitness. Pedagogical fitness is conditioned 
thinking that is deeply aware of the significant components 
of the complex existential structure of the situation; it is 
a frame of mind that is sustained by a deep commitment to 
the welfare and growth of children. 
Pedagogical tact is an ongoing practice of thinking and 
acting in what van Manen calls pedagogical mindfulness. (Van 
Manen has written about the concept of mindfulness in 
teaching and education in another publication of his, The 
Tone of Teaching (1986).) To be mindful, van Manen says, is 
to reflect the highest order of pedagogy (p. 206). In 
teaching, embodied mindfulness reflects a strong and 
passionate interest in life and in the life of others, and 
an awareness of the immediate and the concrete. It reflects 
self-discipline as well as a deep knowledge of oneself and 
of one's limits and capabilities. Van Manen maintains that 
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"through mindfulness and tact the parent or teacher is able 
to act improvisationally in an always changing educational 
situation" (p. 102). 
Politics and pedagogical tact 
Van Manen acknowledges that there exist in modern society 
strong external influences which affect children negatively 
or, as van Manen says, "anti-pedagogically" (p. 211). He 
calls such influences false tact (pp. 134-137). False tact 
has a certain resonance with Sartre's Bad Faith. It is the 
negative influences on the life of individual such that 
one's life is defined or determined by others in ways that 
serve the others' interests and desires. Van Manen believes 
that external negative forces exist that can have the effect 
of condemning the child to a future of manipulation for the 
benefit of others. As persons in the position of influence 
and responsibility, adults, parents, and teachers need to 
take an active part in the world of children. Van Manen 
states that "the pedagogical is not political" (p. 212); yet 
at times, we as educators to our children, have to become 
involved politically in order "to create the space, 
conditions, and possibilities for children to grow up and 
create a world of their own making" (p. 212). To become 
political is an extension of our pedagogical being. "Thus," 
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van Manen states, "pedagogical tact requires of "us a certain 
worldliness, and the moral fibre to stand up for political 
views in which we believe" (p. 213). 
Van Manen, reflecting a Sartrean move to an awakened sense 
of individual existence, suggests that parents and teachers 
need to work to defuse the societal blocks that prevent 
children from realising their fullest potential. We need to 
guard against a focus on individuality that sees one person 
as superior or inferior to another, and prevent thoughtless 
acts by individuals in positions of assumed superiority or 
authority from intimidating children and repressing their 
potential being (p. 212). 
Alterity and approaches to teaching 
Van Manen, like Noddings, expands conventional notions of 
teaching in a focus on the relational in teaching. I would 
like to give critical debate to the theories of teaching of 
Noddings and van Manen explicated here and also discuss the 
value of each of their projects in terms of meaningful 
teaching in practice. For this I begin by comparing 
Noddings's approach to teaching to van Manen's, noting the 
differences in their underlying existential influences and 
the shortcomings and advantages of both positions. This 
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debate is aided by another ongoing debate held between two 
existential thinkers who differ in the orientation of their 
philosophies in a way which is analogous to the differences 
between the ideas of van Manen and Noddings. This is the 
debate held between Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. The 
critical debate between these two philosophical thinkers is 
relevant to the thinking of van Manen and Noddings as the 
relational aspect of alterity is the focus of all of their 
theories. Mainly, the substance of the debate between these 
two philosophers is found in the criticisms that Levinas 
brings to Martin Buber's "I-Thou" relational as he (Levinas) 
attempts to differentiate his own existential thinking on 
alterity from Buber's. (Buber's "I-Thou, I-It" relational is 
defined in his I and Thou (1937); Levinas's ethical and 
moral orientation is given in his Totality and Infinity 
(1969) .) (The criticism that Levinas brings to Buber's 
thinking is detailed by Robert Bernasconi in his article " 
'Failure of Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack 
of Dialogue between Buber and Levinas" (Bernasconi and 
Woods, 1988, pp. 100-135).) For the most part it is 
Bernasconi's insights that have been used here to inform my 
understanding of the main issues of the debate between 
Levinas and Buber. Behind the debate between Levinas and 
Buber is the existential argument which began with Sartre: 
Which is primary, existence or essence? However, here the 
argument is moved from a Sartrean focus on the self to a 
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focus on the relational of the self to "the other." Much 
could be made of the connections between the intellectual 
thought and critical dialogue held between Levinas and Buber 
and the similarities of their thinking to that found in 
Noddings's and van Manen's educational discourses. But here 
I discuss the value and the shortcomings of these two 
existential positions as they relate to the teaching 
situation and the position of teacher. 
Noddings's ethical caring is presented in formal terms in a 
receptive-response orientation which calls for a kind of 
back and forth movement. Initially the one-caring is deeply 
engrossed in the other to the point that she exists 
temporarily in the world of the one cared-for. Then there is 
a pulling back from the relation, the turning point, where 
the child and the relation are viewed objectively and 
rationally. In this "being with, then standing back" 
movement there is an element of abandonment of the child 
when one assumes the objective and rational mode of 
thinking. Is this what Levinas means when he accuses Buber 
in his ethical orientation of an I-Thou and I-It split of 
acts of violence against "the other" (Bernasconi, p.103)? 
The "turning to and turning away" movement in Noddings's 
ethical approach could be seen as a violent act. Noddings 
goes on to talk about a duality of being. The one-caring 
does not completely withdraw from the relation. The 
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objective and rational frame of mind occurs while still in 
engrossment. But there is a sense of cold, rational 
detachment occurring while in the presence of the other, the 
one cared-for. Van Manen, on the other hand, with his 
emphasis on integrated thinking and acting in pedagogical 
tact has the one in the position of influence as being 
always present to the other as a frame of mind. It is an 
orientation to the other, the child, the student, that is 
constant and unconditional, and therefore conveys stability. 
As van Manen points out, children need to have stability in 
order to trust and in order to grow (p. 59). 
Levinas's theoretical approach to "the other" holds that in 
order to act ethically and authentically one needs to 
welcome each person equally into his sphere of existence, 
and he is critical of Buber "for preferring preference, the 
'private relationship,' the 'clandestine nature' of the 
couple" in his 'I-Thou, I-It' relation" (Bernasconi, p. 
103). Van Manen, with his emphasis on pedagogical 
mindfulness and the focus on acting and thinking in the 
pedagogical moment, has a similar orientation to the one 
taken by Levinas. Van Manen's approach to the pupils begins 
first with a particular frame of mind held by the teacher. 
Van Manen says "the pedagogical love of the educator for 
these children becomes the precondition for the pedagogical 
relation to grow" (p. 66). The relation begins with a frame 
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of mind of the teacher that reflects love, concern, and 
hope. Instead of focussing on each child individually and 
welcoming the child into one's presence, as Noddings seems 
to do, van Manen's pedagogical tact begins with embracing 
all within a positive frame of mind. Conceptually, van 
Manen's orientation of being present to all children seems 
more appropriate in classroom situations, where many are 
before the teacher at one time, than does Noddings's one-to-
one approach. However, being present to the other, the child 
before you, is also problematic. In large institutions such 
as secondary schools and some universities where in one day 
there could be a hundred students, how would it be possible 
to be genuinely present to each student? Only a superficial 
presence and caring would be possible. 
Noddings bases her ethical approach on the intimate relation 
between mother and child. This maternal relation is what she 
sees as essential to her theoretical position. Although she 
transfers the focus on the relation to that of the one-
caring and the one cared-for, it is the mother-child 
relation that grounds her definition of the ethical 
relationship that needs to exist between teacher and 
student. In valuing the mother and child relation and the 
mothering role, Noddings shows the influence of Nancy 
Chodorow and her feminist object relation theory. Noddings 
acknowledges Chodorow's influence on her own feminist 
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perspective (p. 128). The feminist position is inadequate as 
it applies only to a particular definition of being female. 
In placing an emphasis on the relation of mothering, 
Noddings does not take into consideration the existence of 
females who cannot be mothers, or who choose not to be, in 
her defining of feminism. Noddings's feminist theory also 
creates a hostile and ambiguous orientation to the position 
of males and male teachers. What role is the male to play in 
Noddings's caring ethic? The masculine is defined in a 
negative way in Noddings's thinking, as reflecting dominance 
and oppression. In order to be acceptable in Noddings's 
ethical caring project men must take up the nurturing role. 
But when men assume the role of nurturing and care in 
Noddings's thinking they deny their masculinity. Buber 
presents a more inclusive grounding for authentic caring in 
his "I-Thou" relational theory than Noddings's feminist 
ideology. Buber says, "In the beginning was the relational" 
(cited in Bernasconi, p. 101). But Buber, in ontologically 
grounding his I-Thou, I-It relational, goes back behind the 
relational and what has been called "feminine alterity," 
(which is where Noddings's thinking is based) to the 
prenatal (Bernasconi, p. 101). He identifies the moment of 
"longing for relation" as the impetus of the relational 
(Bernasconi, p. 101). This seems closer to where van Manen 
locates his pedagogical approach ontologically. Van Manen 
sees the relational as beginning with a calling of the other 
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and a response to the vulnerability of the other. 
Although both Noddings and van Manen give value to a 
hierarchical structure in their approaches to teaching, that 
of the teacher being situated above the student, guiding and 
directing the student in a caring and knowing way, there 
seems to be, in both Noddings's and van Manen's approaches 
to the relational, a lack of universal connectedness, the 
value of a third party, a kind of wise external observer. 
Levinas says that a relation that is self-sufficient forgets 
the fact of the universal (Bernasconi, p. 105); the passage 
from the other to the Other; the passage from ethics to 
justice (Bernasconi, p. 104). Both Noddings and van Manen 
hold that one in a position of influence and assumed 
responsibility directs and guides the relational situation, 
which is an inherent part of teaching. In such relations 
what prevents the relation from going in an aberrant 
direction? The possibility of relational situations moving 
outside of socially acceptable norms seems greater with 
Noddings's one-to-one relation, where the bonding to the 
other is more intimate and longer in duration than van 
Manen's pedagogical tact approach where the teacher acts in 
the pedagogical moment. Numerous examples exist of 
relational situations where the leadership of the one in the 
position of influence and responsibility to others, while 
appearing to act in the best interest of those under his or 
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her influence, has resulted in horrific consequences. For 
example, Jim Jones and other cult leaders have led their 
followers to commit mass suicide. (Another such example 
occurred recently in Uganda where hundreds who belonged to 
the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments 
sect died through a supposed mass suicide act of 
redemption.) In terms of teaching, the novel The Prime of 
Miss Jean Brodie provides an example of how a teacher, in a 
position of responsibility and influence, while believing 
that she was acting in the best interests of her students, 
indoctrinated one of them to choose an action which resulted 
in her (the student's) death. There needs to be something 
above the frame of mind of the person in the position of 
influence of Noddings's and van Manen's thinking in order to 
ensure that such intimate and interdependent relationships 
will remain within some sense of social goodness. There 
seems to be a need for a broader definition of authentic 
existence than that which exists in a one to the other 
relational. 
Kierkegaard's influence can be seen in Noddings's ethical 
orientation and her structure for ethical existence which 
focusses on an ethical ideal. Kierkegaard maintained that 
the individual in the ethical stage of his journey to 
selfhood placed an ill-founded emphasis on an ideal image of 
oneself in the future. The ethical ideal assigns working 
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toward the ideal state as a task and assumes that man is in 
possession of the conditions required for achieving it, 
which, as Kierkegaard had determined, man clearly is not. 
Future social and environmental conditions are beyond one's 
control. (This was previously discussed as part of the 
critical analysis of Pinar's thinking in Chapter Two.) 
Potentially, striving for the ethical ideal state can result 
in what Kierkegaard called moral bankruptcy. Both the one-
caring and the one cared-for in Noddings's ethical project 
are led and driven by what Noddings calls the ethical ideal 
(p. 5). Noddings contends that everything depends upon the 
nature and the strength of this ideal (p. 105). The ethical 
ideal guides and shapes our moral and ethical actions. 
Kierkegaard points out that we cannot control or determine 
the future. The future is conditioned by factors that come 
into play outside of the individual's control. Leading the 
child and letting the self believe that an ethical ideal is 
achievable might well result in a sense of inner moral 
bankruptcy and a loss of faith in one's possibilities and 
abilities, and in one's will. Noddings sees God in a 
traditional way, as something abstracted from human 
existence, an entity that defines and determines human 
existence (p. 43). Her thinking, like that of Pinar, does 
not go beyond the ethical stage of Kierkegaard's thinking. 
She does not look at the triangular configuration for 
authentic being that exists in Kierkegaard's thinking and in 
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Buber's: that of self, other, and God. 
Noddings's ethical caring and her notion of the ethical 
ideal short-circuit Kierkegaard's attempt to give a 
universal dimension to selfhood and authentic being through 
the image of Jesus Christ and through God's Eternal 
Blessedness. Both Buber and Levinas, expanding on 
Kierkegaard's existentialist valuing of a Christian ethic, 
speak of something that might be called God, something that 
implies a universal connectedness. This universal 
"something" has the effect of influencing and shaping the 
relation between concrete things. For Buber it is the 
ambiguity of the Thou in the I-Thou relation, where "Thou" 
can be interpreted as referring to both a universal other 
and an immediate other (tu, in French). This is similar to 
Levinas's concept of the face in "the Face of the other" as 
described in his Infinity and Totality (1969). The universal 
other and the dual meaning of you (Thou/Face) suggest 
something which is the I and something above the I at the 
same time. The dual positioning of one in relation to the 
self and one in relation to many at the same time has the 
effect of keeping a relation where one is in a position of 
influence to the other from going off in a direction that is 
outside of society's norms. (In Chapter Six we will see in 
the thinking of Dwayne Huebner a valuing of universality in 
teaching through spirituality.) 
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As a further criticism of Noddings's and van Manen's 
alternative approaches to teaching, it appears that neither 
van Manen or Noddings adequately deals with ensuring the 
future of each of their projects. According to van Manen 
there exist external forces that rob children of their 
identity and uniqueness and their potential. However, the 
action that he suggests needs to be taken in order to combat 
this erosion of the individual's humanity seems 
underdeveloped. Very strong external forces exist both 
inside and outside schools that work against van Manen's 
pedagogical ethic. In schools, negative external forces can 
readily be seen with government increasingly taking over 
responsibility for schooling and implementing curricula 
largely limited to preparing individuals to serve the 
economy (examples of what van Manen calls false tact). Even 
stronger forces exist outside schools where business minds 
influence the child's mind in a way that serves the 
objectives of business. Van Manen suggests that parents and 
teachers who are concerned pedagogically need to become 
involved in political action in order to protect our 
children, meaning all children. However, actions taken 
individually on impulse do not seem sufficient to stop the 
negative effects of growing external forces that are deeply 
entrenched in everyday existence. 
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Noddings sketches out a more detailed and elaborate plan 
than van Manen does, in order to ensure that her ethical 
project will be realised. Essentially she calls for a 
reorganisation of schooling. However, Noddings wrote her 
text, Caring, in 1984. It is difficult to assess the effect 
of her approach to teaching on school practices, but 
external forces such as government (politics) and business 
(economics) appear to have had much more effect on teaching 
and education in the past fifteen years than any ethic of 
care. In addition, systems of schooling are deeply 
entrenched and any desired reorganisation of schooling is 
doomed to fail unless it addresses in detail what is needed 
for change and how that change can be realised. 
Conclusion 
Both Noddings and van Manen share a concern for the child, 
and their concern is directed toward the child's well-being 
and future. Each has stated the intentionality of the 
project is to act towards the other in a way that is "right" 
and "good" for the other and in such a way as to assist the 
other in completeness and connectedness to the world. 
Noddings's understanding of "good" is determined in her 
definition of what she calls the ethical ideal, which is an 
image of one's best self caring and being cared for, an 
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image that is realisable and possible in the concrete world. 
For van Manen, "good" and "right" and an understanding of 
what is best for the child are defined within the term 
pedagogical tact. The parent or teacher is oriented towards 
the child's well-being and acts with the intention of 
ensuring the child's authentic becoming and independence. 
This is the pedagogical moment fulfilled. 
There are also similarities in the way that Noddings and van 
Manen approach the "other." They both desire a closeness to 
the other in a deep and meaningful way, a way that is 
similar to the intent of such writers of fiction as Virginia 
Woolf. Such closeness requires an act of transcendence where 
one's frame of thinking moves to embrace the world view of 
the other. In terms of teaching, the person in the position 
of influence enters the world of the student, and sees the 
world from the student's perspective. Noddings calls this 
act of transcendence engrossment; van Manen calls it 
sympathy. This is a deep connectedness to the other. 
Noddings describes it this way: "There is invariably a 
displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality 
of the other ... to be touched, to have aroused in me 
something that will disturb my own ethical reality, I must 
see the other's reality as a possibility for my own" (p. 
14). Van Manen describes a similar mode of being in the act 
of what he calls sympathy: "We [not so much] vicariously 
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live in the other person but ... the other person"lives in 
us ... [W]e recognize the experience of the other as a 
possible human experience--and thus as a possible experience 
of our own selves" (pp. 97-98). With this movement of one's 
self into a world of the other, both Noddings and van Manen 
call for a splitting of one's conscious thinking processes, 
a kind of duality of being, where the teacher enters the 
world of the other while still retaining her or his own 
sense of self as a teacher. For both Noddings and van Manen 
there is the intention of completing oneself in the other in 
the act of teaching. 
Both Noddings and van Manen call on existential sources such 
as the human ability to reason, to engage in dialogue, to 
reflect, and to image to inform and fulfil the relational 
connectedness held between teacher and student. But each 
applies these sources in different ways in developing their 
approaches to the other, the child, the student, the one 
cared-for. For example, Noddings defines two kinds of 
dialogue: the internal dialogue of thinking and reflecting 
on actions, and the external dialogue of open exchange that 
is manifested in the relation. Van Manen emphasises other 
forms of dialogue such as the everyday conversations with 
parents and teachers that are associated with the relational 
situation, and anecdotal accounts detailing concrete 
situations. Noddings calls on specific forms of reflection, 
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reflection on one's past and reflection on one's engrossment 
with the one cared-for, to inform ethical actions. Van Manen 
cites a mUltiplicity of modes of reflection to inform 
pedagogical action and tact. 
Another. significant similarity between Noddings's and van 
Manen's approaches to teaching is that both see the person 
in the position of influence as a mediator. For Noddings the 
one-caring mediates between the child in the present and his 
or her ethical ideal and between this inner life of the 
child and the outside world as it exists in the present. Van 
Manen also focusses on the inner world of the child and sees 
the position of teacher as mediating between the inner and 
outer worlds as he or she brings the child into maturity and 
independence. 
In the concluding chapter of this research I give value to 
both theoretical approaches, Noddings's "ethical ideal" and 
van Manen's "pedagogical tact." At the same time I offer 
another approach to teaching which addresses the 
shortcomings of each of their theories that I have 
identified here. 
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Chapter Four 
Maxine Greene: Public Spaces, Openings, 
and Authenticity 
In a section of her autobiography, Moments of Being (1976), 
Virginia Woolf writes about becoming aware of an inner sense 
of self. She goes back into her remembered experiences and 
brings to light the moments when she first became aware of a 
self separate from that of everyday habits and routines. She 
writes, "As a child then, my days, just as they do now, 
contained a large proportion of this cotton wool, this non-
being [my italics] ... [T]hen there was a sudden violent 
shock . .. If (p. 79). Woolf then describes the nature of the 
"shock" she experienced by recounting a number of life-
shaping events that occurred in her childhood, and telling 
how each event contributed to a kind of self awakening in 
her. She names three events that had a particularly strong 
effect on the structure of her life. First, she tells of a 
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physical fight that she had had with her brother and her 
feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness during this 
encounter. She describes it as an experience that speaks to 
a sense of her becoming aware of her physical limitations. 
Next she recounts an experience of the mind that had 
happened while she was examining a flower and noticed within 
its construction "a ring enclosed ... " which, she exclaims, 
is "the real flower; part earth, part flower." Here Woolf is 
struck by her intellectual ability to form insights and make 
connections about how things relate to each other. The third 
"shock" experience Woolf recounts is that of being 
confronted with her feelings of "absolute despair" when she 
hears of the suicide of someone she had known. This incident 
awakened in her an awareness of life's finiteness and of the 
power of one's will in determining existence. These three 
events have the effect of bringing Woolf into conscious 
awareness of a self that exists separate from another form 
of self, a self lost in the "cotton wool" of everyday 
existence. For Woolf it was these "shock" experiences that 
caused the break into an emerging awareness of an inner 
self, a self that is defined by the possibilities that 
present themselves, by one's inherent limitations, and by 
one's ability to give understanding to the relation one has 
with the world. 
Maxine Greene values Woolf's insights into existence and a 
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sense of inner being. It is the inner emerging self that is 
found at the basis of Greene's proposed project for 
education. In her text, The Dialectic of Freedom (1988), 
Greene states that Woolf's named inner self, a self separate 
from the "cotton wool" of routine and mundane existence, has 
significance beyond the individual. Greene maintains that 
its importance lies in the broader cultural and political 
world of society in general (p.3). Greene's project is a 
moral one. She wishes to cultivate in individuals certain 
aspects of inwardness that will serve for the betterment of 
society as a whole and she sees education and teaching as 
the means to realising this (p. 3). 
This chapter is an examination of Greene's "education for 
freedom" project and how it furthers a definition of 
authentic teaching. In this exploration we begin with a 
close look at Greene's desired orientation to education and 
the theoretical foundation on which it is based. In the 
previous chapters we studied a form of authenticity that 
focussed on the self as teacher with the thinking of William 
Pinar. This understanding of authenticity was broadened to 
include "the other," the student and the immediate 
relational aspect of teaching through the theories of Nel 
Noddings and Max van Manen. What is considered here is how 
Greene expands the narrative of existential authenticity, 
drawing mainly on the thinking of Jean Paul Sartre, and how 
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she also expands meaningful teaching beyond the 'self and 
beyond immediate relational themes. What I argue here is 
that Greene's ideas and her desire for an emerging 
moralistic aspect in society are based on an opposing 
dualist orientation. In the ensuing critical discussion of 
Greene's thinking I note the significant shortcomings to 
Greene's proposed form of education. In the conclusion of 
this chapter I draw out of Greene's thinking what she offers 
to teachers in terms meaningful praxis. 
Greene's social-political project 
Greene sees society for the most part as living in the haze 
of non-being (a deliberate use of Woolf's language) (p. 3). 
She describes the actions of individuals in Woolfian 
language, as being ~embedded in a kind of nondescript 
cotton-wool" (p. 3). The individuals who make up society, 
Greene believes, are immersed in a kind of taken-for-granted 
relation to the world. Mostly their everyday actions are 
dominated by practices of habit and routine, performed in 
the thoughtlessness of non-being (p. 3). Interpreting 
society in this way (she is specifically referring to 
American society) Greene sees individuals as not having 
begun to reach out to define themselves as something more 
and separate from the everyday. They have not begun to reach 
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out for their freedom. What exists instead within society, 
Greene maintains, is a growing lassitude, disinterest, and 
an absence of care by individuals as they go about their 
everyday activities (p. 5). Mainly individuals have acceded 
to the dominant social order, as if it were fixed and 
somehow predetermined. Individuals, says Greene, have not 
developed ways of apprehending their freedom; they have not 
begun to reflect on their choices and on their 
possibilities. They have not begun, she states, to develop 
"consciously" (p. 3). Greene describes society's present 
mode of existence as a life of negative freedom (p. 16). 
(Greene's negative freedom can be compared to Sartre's 
definition of Bad Faith which is considered more closely 
later on.) 
For Greene, society's practices of negative freedom harbour 
within them what has come to be the commonly held 
understanding of freedom, where freedom means personal 
autonomy, that is a valuing of independence and self-
reliance. Greene maintains this understanding of freedom has 
the effect of reinforcing the somnolence of society, the 
lack of desire to awaken in consciousness and to take 
responsibility for one's part in shaping the structure and 
direction of society in which one lives. In her chapter 
entitled "American Quest. American Dream" (pp. 24-56) Greene 
traces how freedom as independence and self-reliance evolved 
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and became cemented in American thinking througn the major 
social and political events of that country's history, 
beginning with the American Revolution, through the Civil 
War, industrialisation, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the 
"counter culture" of the '60s. In recounting this history 
Greene also shows how the lived experiences of individuals, 
as depicted in American literature, biographies, and diaries 
reveal the inadequacies and shortcomings of a definition of 
freedom as autonomy. For example, she cites the trials and 
hardships to which Huckleberry Finn was subjected when he 
tried to realise his freedom by escaping the onslaught of 
industrialisation; the oppressive and dehumanising 
conditions of the "mill girls" in N. Cott's Root of 
Bitterness when they sought their freedom in becoming self-
sufficient through hard work; Hester in The Scarlet Letter 
who was pushed out of her community and for whom 
independence and self-sufficiency meant adjunct isolation; 
and the family in The Grapes of Wrath who sought to be 
independent and self-sufficient but whose thwarted efforts 
brought only further hardships. Such life stories of 
hardship, isolation, and oppression reflect another 
dimension of America's history and its evolution, the 
underside of a social order that believes itself to be built 
on freedom for all its citizens. 
Greene also cites various philosophical thinkers who 
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attempted to effect a broader and more democratic 
understanding of freedom in constitutional policies and in 
educational practices in America throughout its history. 
Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, and Dewey figure prominently. 
But, despite the insights of these thinkers, and their moral 
and democratic desires, Greene determines it was freedom as 
individual autonomy that evolved and is brandished as the 
true meaning of freedom in America today. Holding a critical 
perspective Greene sees this definition of freedom as best 
serving the interests of commerce and those in positions of 
control. It is a definition of freedom that, Greene 
maintains, has resulted in the social inequalities in 
America today and in what she sees as the moral failure of 
America (p. 10). Greene maintains that this understanding of 
freedom, freedom as self-regulating and self-determining, 
has had the effect of dislocating persons and of alienating 
persons from their own landscapes and from each other (p. 
22) • 
In order to address the ineffectiveness and inadequacies of 
what Greene calls negative freedom, Greene presents another 
understanding of freedom. It is a definition of freedom that 
intends that the preservation of humanity must be the most 
significant value. In her alternative definition of freedom 
Greene draws on the philosophical and moral political 
thoughts of other intellectuals, mainly Jean-Paul Sartre, 
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Merleau Ponty, John Dewey, and Hannah Arendt. The insights 
offered by each of these thinkers contributed to her 
formulating a definition of freedom that has authentic 
existence as the main objective for all individuals. The way 
to authentic freedom that Greene presents, in part, follows 
closely the existentialist thinking of Jean Paul Sartre. 
Sartre's theory saw individuals as initially being in a 
stage of non-being where one either accedes to the given, 
that is, the parameters that society sets for him (Sartre's 
usage), or he sees himself as fated, as if the direction of 
life could not be otherwise. Living in a mode of non-being 
is, for Sartre, living in Bad Faith. To break from living in 
Bad Faith is to experience one's freedom. When one confronts 
his non-being and begins to take responsibility for his 
choices then one is taking responsibility for and in turn 
determining his own existence. When this happens he is 
moving towards authentic freedom. Freedom is thus 
constituted by filling the gap between the self and one's 
relation to the world. It is a gap that is realised through 
the individual awakening to his inner being and then turning 
to act in ways that continue to define the self as separate 
from others as one attempts to bring oneself into a fullness 
of being. Greene has followed this existential narrative in 
establishing her political and moral project but her 
emphasis goes beyond the individual to the creation of an 
authentic structure of society as a whole. Greene, however, 
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sees that for a society to begin to move towards·what might 
be called a more genuine understanding of freedom it must 
start with the individual (p. 5). In this she locates the 
origin of her project where existential theories of 
authenticity begin. The individual must first see the blocks 
to his or her freedom before he or she can move beyond them. 
Quoting Sartre, Greene writes, "They do not reach out for 
fulfilment if they do not feel impeded somehow, and if they 
are not enabled to name the obstacles that stand in their 
way. At once, the very existence of obstacles depends on the 
desire to reach toward wider spaces for fulfilment, to 
expand options, to know alternatives" (p. 5). In order for 
society to begin to know authentic freedom, Greene states, 
individuals within society must reach beyond the established 
and taken-for-granted routines and habits that constitute 
the day-to-day life within the social order. 
Greene's way to freedom is environmentally located; that is, 
in the situational and in relational experiences of the 
everyday. Genuine freedom, what Greene calls authentic 
freedom, needs to include the environment in which one finds 
oneself. In this aspect of her thinking Greene acknowledges 
the influence of Merleau Ponty and his phenomenological 
emphasis on the body, the self, and one's relation to one's 
landscape, and the interplay between the self, the concrete, 
and lived world. According to Merleau Ponty there is a pre-
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existing, evolving landscape, the "primordial l~ndscape," 
laid down and patterned by perception in the early days of 
life. In emerging consciousness the maturing child takes in 
a variety of perspectives of the world so that the child's 
view of the world at any given time is always going to be 
partial and contingent on the outside forces that affect his 
or her inner perceptions (p. 21). Basing her thinking in the 
philosophical insights of Merleau Ponty. Greene sees 
authentic freedom as being realised in the dialogue that 
exists in one's emerging and changing relation to the world. 
Greene states that not to acknowledge one's connectedness to 
one's environment, to one's community, is to limit one's 
possibilities and therefore one's freedom (p. 22). 
In the thinking of both Sartre and Merleau Ponty, one 
constitutes oneself dialectically, through reflective 
thought on the relationality of the subject to object 
interplay. For Sartre, it is the reflective exchange between 
one's past and one's future. For Merleau Ponty, it is the 
dialogue sustained between the objective outside world and 
the self. Greene brings together both of these modes of 
reflective dialogue in her project. A self that looks 
objectively at its own history and future existence and a 
self that seeks to position itself to the outside world is 
constituting its freedom, where freedom is a conscious 
awareness of the self emerging in dialogue, the language of 
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the relational, of the self to the world (p. 7): Greene sees 
the dialectic nature of the relational as a way of mediating 
the world. By focussing on the relational a different 
orientation to the world is called for. The world and 
individuals in the world are not viewed as objects. Instead, 
in Greene's thinking, the self needs to be oriented to the 
world in such a way that the self is seen as continuously 
being reconstituted through thought, reflection, action, and 
choosing. 
It is when Greene turns to the insights of American 
philosopher John Dewey and American intellectual Hannah 
Arendt that her definition of freedom expands existential 
understandings of authenticity beyond the self to the domain 
of society. Both Dewey and Arendt developed critical and 
philosophical insights related to freedom, democracy, and 
society. Greene abstracts from Dewey's thinking a way for 
society to realise its freedom through a focus on the 
content of education. Dewey saw the human mind as the 
determinant of society's structure and society's norms and 
behaviours. The human mind, for Dewey, in its capacity to 
think and to choose, as well as its capacity to communicate 
and exchange ideas, can direct the course of future 
evolution. With social and moral imperatives in mind Dewey 
believed that individuals in society should be educated to 
develop their capacity to inquire, to reason, and to 
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exchange ideas, and opportunities should be given for 
experimentation and growth (Greene, pp. 42-43). It was 
Dewey's position that social change could be enacted through 
informed choosing within a social context (Greene, p. 7). 
Developing what he called an articulate public, Dewey 
thought, would increase the likelihood of achieving freedom 
for the broader public. It is these insights given by Dewey 
that Greene applies to her philosophy, and her emphasis on 
the need for open and informed minds and the fostering of 
engaged participation in a public forum. Greene, following 
Dewey, places education in the foreground, as the way to 
realise this desired societal order. Through educating the 
mind to think in reasoned ways with a sense of openness to 
listening to the perspectives of others and through the 
reasoned exchange of ideas society can change and grow in 
moral and democratic ways. 
Greene's moral project takes on a more political nature when 
she turns to the thinking of Hannah Arendt. Critical 
questions are posed later in this chapter regarding the 
political direction that Greene intends society and 
education to take in her proposed moral project. For Arendt, 
freedom could be realised in public spaces and in a coming 
together of persons who had a common purpose. The kind of 
public space that Arendt had in mind reflected what she 
called the in-between, meaning that which exists between 
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thought and action, between one's actualities and one's 
possibilities, between areas of resistance and "the not yet" 
(p. 21). Greene, reflecting Arendt's thinking, states 
individuals who come together, "who choose themselves as 
affected and involved" in areas of common conflict and 
similarity, create spaces of in-between (p. 17). Arendt's 
public space is as much about a part of social consciousness 
as it is an intended actuality in the social structure. It 
is a space that enables, makes room for, a coming together 
of those who see themselves as affected by, involved in, and 
mutually connected to a project (Greene, pp. 16-17). Greene 
calls such a space an opening, a space of unconcealedness (a 
deliberate use of Heidegger's term) in the present social 
order (p. 58). In such moments of coming together, Greene 
believes, the blocks and the obstacles to freedom become 
disclosed through exchange and discourse. It is here in 
public exchange and discourse that an awakening of social 
consciousness begins. Greene believes that it is here, in 
open public spaces, that society can awaken to its 
possibilities and authentic freedom can begin to be 
realised. 
We can see that the authentic public sphere, the mode of 
"in-between," of which Greene speaks, has a certain 
resonance with Heidegger's narrative of authenticity and the 
concept of Dasein. Dasein questions the world and the self's 
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relation to the world. For Greene the state of "in-between" 
realised in authentic spheres of freedom is a kind of 
societal Dasein, a kind of public space where people come 
together in awakened and informed democratic dialogue. 
In her text Greene gives examples of authentic freedom in 
practice. In the chapter entitled "Reaching from Private to 
Public: The Work of Women" (pp. 57-86) Greene gives special 
attention to particular individuals and groups who have 
acted to achieve social freedom (Greene's definition of 
authentic freedom) in the history and literature of America. 
These individuals and groups have been on the margins of 
dominant society and have acted to change and affect the 
environment in which they live. Greene states, "People at 
the margins make obvious the hegemonic inadequacies and 
deficiencies" (p. 9). It is in such stories that we "find 
challenges to our world-view" (p. 22). She notes that such 
examples of authentic freedom are numerous in the history of 
American society and politics. But she has focussed mainly 
on two groups of people who have moved toward authentic 
freedom: American women and American blacks. Her sources for 
this retelling are life stories collected from diaries, 
novels, and autobiographies by and about American women and 
American blacks spanning the last two hundred years. The 
examples she gives of some women and of some blacks in the 
history of America, who formed pockets of resistance and 
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enacted social and political action, are examples of what 
Greene calls spheres of freedom. 
She details the life experiences of certain women in 
American history who resisted the constraints of domesticity 
and who saw the limitations of domestic life as an obstacle 
to fulfilment and personal growth; women who, while still 
maintaining domestic roles, reached out from "the private 
sphere of domestic life to the public sphere" (p. 56). The 
"reaching out" took the form of bringing their plight into 
public dialogue, and had the effect of expanding the 
potentiality and possibilities of women "as fully actualised 
beings" (p. 55). Greene cites such American women as 
Elizabeth Stanton and Lucietta Mott who organised public 
meetings related to anti-slavery campaigns and who spoke out 
publicly about the suffrage of women in the mid-nineteenth 
century in America; Jane Addams, the renowned social 
activist who helped others organise their own public actions 
to achieve their freedom (pp. 73-76), and Daughters of St. 
Crispin, women shoe workers who forced their way into the 
Knights of Labor in order to ensure certain rights for women 
in the work force (p. 86). Greene notes that these women had 
to fight not only against the male opposition of that time, 
but also against their own personal feelings of 
responsibility to their families. But the realisation of the 
oppressiveness and marginalisation of their situations, or 
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the situations of others, had impacted on them so strongly 
that they moved to work towards another reality. Greene sees 
these women as having acted to realise a mode of authentic 
freedom. 
Greene cites similarities existing between the struggle for 
social freedom of women in American history and the history 
of slavery in America in the nineteenth century. She says 
the stories of blacks and black females in particular "shed 
many kinds of light on the meanings of freedom and the 
search for freedom" (p. 66). She recounts both real and 
fictional stories in which blacks struggled against dominant 
practices and oppression, and strove to retain or reclaim 
their own identity when they carne together collectively and 
confronted the hegemony of the American constitution. Civil 
rights activist Frederick Douglass, anti-slavery activist 
Harriet Tubman, and the renowned social activist Martin 
Luther King are a few named by Greene who resisted the 
violations and contempt lodged against them, who named the 
blocks to their freedom. 
In Greene's authentic freedom there is also the realisation 
that the world is always incomplete, which in turn leaves 
open the possibility of "the not yet." Freedom for Greene is 
a mode of existence that is constituted in the relational, 
the in-between found between oneself and "otherness," 
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between oneself and the world, oneself and one's 
environment, one's inner thinking processes and the concrete 
world. Authentic public space is a human enterprise intended 
to empower individuals to reach beyond the immediate sense 
of self to realise their freedom. 
Although Greene's notion of the authentic, like Sartre's, 
starts with the individual, she moves the responsibility of 
the individual in constructing his or her own authentic 
existence to a position where the individual now has a 
responsibility to effect the construction of the social 
structures in which he or she finds herself/himself 
existing. Individuals who make up society, Greene states, 
must awaken to their freedom; they must see the "cotton 
wool" of their unreflective, somnolent existence in a taken-
for-granted world and act to resist the dominant and 
oppressive forces that define social structures. 
Individuals, Greene believes, need to stand against the 
power of these institutionalised forces and move to claim 
their own individuality while at the same time moving 
towards their freedom (p. 15). In its political and social 
intent, Greene's definition of authentic freedom is realised 
within public forums, what Greene calls the authentic public 
spheres. Greene sees authentic public spheres as those 
spaces where individuals corne together in mutual concern, to 
claim their freedom. The public spheres are constituted by 
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an informed and articulate exchange between committed and 
engaged persons and by the inquiring minds of individuals 
who are open to seeing things from many perspectives. It is 
an arena of open debate and reasoned thoughtful exchange of 
ideas in the spirit of mediation and negotiation. Greene 
states, "It is a kind of space that will enable individuals 
to exercise one's ability to reflect, to think, to have 
vision, and to imagine and to engage critical 
understandings" (p. 17). 
In the above I have attempted to give some understanding of 
Greene's project both in terms of the philosophical 
provenance on which she founds her thinking and the 
actualities of how she sees her project enacted in society. 
Critical reflections on Greene's "spheres of freedom" 
What follows is a critical, reflective response to Greene's 
definition of authentic existence, and her spheres of 
freedom, noting the contradictions and shortcomings of her 
desired enterprise. It is argued here that Greene's form of 
authentic existence falls short of offering a way for 
individuals to realise a fullness of being. In this 
hermeneutic turn I question the political direction in which 
she takes authentic existence. Further on a closer look will 
be given to the educational aspects of Greene's thinking and 
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the way her thinking aids in defining meaningfui teaching. 
At the basis of Greene's thinking and her desired change in 
the social order is the position of a self defining itself 
by standing against the dominant and established structures 
of society and particularly the existing political 
structures that define and structure existence. It is a way 
of thinking about existence that is created on an opposing 
dualism. Instead of allowing existing political structures 
to determine one's day-to-day existence Greene wishes to 
subvert and undermine these structures by encouraging 
political groups of individuals to corne together and act for 
the good of the group as a whole. In structuring her 
thinking in this way Greene paints present established 
governmental and legal systems (institutions that are 
instruments of present political forms) as being without 
sympathy, and lacking the power to reason and consider 
different perspectives. This criticism of democratic systems 
is unfounded. Democratic governmental systems and supporting 
legal forms are made up of individuals and as such they can 
respond to the human condition. Governments are constructed 
on notions of democracy where the concerns of individuals 
and groups are made public. It is intended within the 
democratic structure that elected individuals make public 
the concerns of individuals and groups within their 
constituencies and that those elected individuals 
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participate in reasoned exchange within the greater 
governmental structures that effect change in society. Also, 
within the legal systems of democratic governments, a 
courtroom is a public forum where reasoned debate and 
exchange of ideas are presented within the established rule 
of law. The intention of the legal system is to enable fair 
and equal representation for individuals. It is an 
institution that is not without sympathy and compassion. 
Judges and jurors make decisions not only on the facts 
presented but also through considering the plights of 
individuals within the greater social structure. Greene 
overlooks this human aspect of existing societal structures 
and the fact that established democratic systems already 
contain individuals who are educated in the way Greene 
desires. 
Greene believes that a state can have fully actualised 
citizens only if there is allowance for groups of 
individuals to come together and act in supposed goodness 
and freedom. It is through the political actions of groups 
that society's grievances can be made public and social 
change realised. Such groups exist in various societies 
throughout the world today. And it appears that the number 
of public demonstrations by such groups is growing, as we 
hear in the media. We all know the degree of organization 
that some of these groups can mount in order to have their 
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voice heard and in order to effect social change; e.g., pro-
life groups, animal rights campaigners, environmentalists, 
various feminist groups. Public opinion is often swayed and 
public support and sympathy gained by the ways in which 
these groups present their situation through public 
demonstration and to the media. This raises the question: 
Should it be left to the most sophisticated campaigners to 
determine the morality of society? Other groups of 
marginalised individuals such as pregnant teenagers, the 
homeless, those living in poverty, who do not have the 
resources to be organised or media-wise cannot be equally 
represented in Greene's proposed social structure. How can 
these groups of individuals realise their freedom from 
oppression when there is no one to voice their position? 
Their marginalisation also needs to be represented in a 
democratic society which purports to offer freedom for all. 
Underlying this critical exploration of Greene's proposed 
emergence of independent and self-determining groups of 
individuals who coalesce together to realise their freedom 
is a concern for the degree of power that Greene gives the 
strata of balkanised groups she wishes to become established 
in the social structure. Other critical questions can be 
raised when thinking further of the consequences of Greene's 
proposed restructuring of the social order. When people corne 
together for the mutual purpose of acting in their freedom, 
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and their actions are supposedly democratically agreed upon 
by the other members of the community in the way Greene 
suggests, are whatever actions committed by members of the 
group considered justifiable, or are certain acts of 
violence acceptable in the name of authentic freedom? What 
would happen when there is a clash of opposing purposes of 
different groups of individuals, where both groups have 
founded their desired purposes on the realisation of 
authentic freedom? Is Greene's proposed emergence of spheres 
of individuals in the strata of society really fertile 
ground for anarchy and violence? 
Further concerns about Greene's political project surface 
when considering the dynamics of groups that come together 
spontaneously. For this deeper critical exploration of the 
inner workings of groups I compare Greene's proposed social 
structure with the underlying themes of a novel by A. s. 
Byatt entitled Babel Tower. The content of Babel Tower 
expresses the same philosophical concerns as Greene's 
dialectic of freedom. It is a novel about oppression and 
understandings of freedom, about lived experiences of 
certain characters in the novel who collide within dominant 
political and social understandings of rights and freedom. 
Both Greene's thinking and the origins of Babel Tower can be 
seen to have been formulated on similar philosophical and 
ideological ideas expressed by the counter-culture movement 
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of the '60s and '70s which happened both in Engiand and in 
North America, as well as other places. There are several 
scenes in the novel which recount the interactions and 
actions of the members of the Community in the open public 
theatre, the place where all members gather together to 
discuss and debate issues relevant to the continuation of 
their being together in freedom. In the open public arena 
everyone is invited and encouraged to contribute to these 
discussions; openness and good will are to be extended to 
each participant. What the novel reveals is that the actual 
contributions made by individuals to the public debate are 
often deeply influenced by personal biases, prejudices, and 
self-serving desires. Many of the decisions and actions 
taken, while seemingly consented to by all the members, 
really are determined by certain individuals and serve the 
desires and interests of the most articulate, the most 
intelligent, and/or the most dynamic personality. Often, in 
Babel Tower, it is the personal desires of Culvert, the main 
character in the novel, that determine the content and 
direction of the public debate. The discussions served 
Culvert's ego and his own desires, which at times verged on 
the perverse, and favoured his love of spectacle and 
voyeurism. This brings me to question whether Greene's 
proposed forums of open debate and discussion between people 
with a common purpose held in the "public space" could 
realise their democratic intent, considering the inner 
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dynamics of groups of individuals corning together. Even 
though individuals have been educated to be meaningful 
contributors to public discourse, do the deep inherent self-
serving intentions (one's sinfulness) held by individuals 
threaten the democratic process and undermine any stated 
intention of corning together and making changes for the 
benefit of all of society? In this theoretical proposal 
Greene seems to be blind to the realities of group dynamics. 
Some individuals are more articulate than others. Some are 
more interested in political debate than others. Some are 
better able to understand complex concepts than others. 
Individuals who corne together with a mutual purpose also 
bring with them their own prejudices and biases as well as 
the self-serving aspects of human nature. How do we know 
that what is offered and presented for discussion and debate 
is not intended to serve the desires and egos of certain 
individuals, rather than to further the moral intent of the 
group as a whole? What this comparison between Byatt's novel 
and Greene's thinking points out is that Greene's authentic 
public spheres are not equal in opportunity, and rather than 
offering a voice for each person, the voice of the group is 
really the voice of one or two powerful individuals in the 
group. 
What appears to be lacking in Greene's thinking is a 
commonly held position among citizens, a higher overarching 
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frame unifying social existence. In this way Greene's 
thinking has not gone far enough. She has not given society 
as a whole a needed focus beyond the realisation of 
politically active groups of individuals. 
There is also a contradictory element in the method Greene 
uses to present her proposed project. The discourse of her 
project is decidedly didactic: this is what society must do 
to realise its freedom. It places the discourse of the 
didactic before the discourse of dialogue. In presenting her 
project in this way Greene does not encourage discussion 
about her proposed ideas nor does she present herself as a 
model for what she espouses. (Other educationalists in this 
inquiry seem to live their ideology, for example Max van 
Manen, William Pinar, and Dwayne Huebner.) Greene's 
discourse lacks the conviction of her theoretical thinking. 
It is this didactic position that Greene wishes teachers in 
general to take in their practice. She desires teachers to 
become advocates of political action in their students. A 
discussion of the position of teachers in Greene's education 
in freedom is given further on. 
I would like now to return to how Greene's thinking furthers 
meaningful teaching. In the following I contend that, 
despite the criticisms levelled above, Greene's thinking has 
value in furthering meaningful teaching. 
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Greene's education for authentic freedom 
Greene sees education as the way to realise her 
existentialist ideal of "authentic public spheres." She 
believes that education can cultivate the kinds of thinking 
and orientation necessary for individuals to accept 
responsibility for what is happening to them and to move to 
claim their freedom in public action. Through a particular 
form of education individuals can become informed 
contributors and active participants in authentic public 
spheres. Education is a way of preparing people to think 
about the world in which they live. Greene says, "Through 
education individuals can be provoked to reach beyond 
themselves in their intersubjective space. It is through and 
by means of education that they become empowered to think 
about what they are doing, to become mindful, to show 
meaning, to conceptualise, to make varied sense of their 
lived worlds" (p. 12). 
Greene directs her education for freedom mainly at 
curriculum design and teaching practices. She wishes to fill 
the gap between the unchallenged, dehumanised, objectifying 
curriculum that she sees as presently existing in schools 
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with a curriculum that ~reawaken[s] the consciousness to 
possibilities" (p. 10). The emphasis, she maintains, should 
be on enabling self-actualisation and on creating thoughtful 
contributors in democratic public spaces. Greene desires 
education to focus on developing the ability to recognise 
the obstacles, the areas of conflict and oppression, that 
prevent both the individual and society as a whole from 
moving towards authentic freedom and to be thoughtful 
contributors to the social order. 
In short, in her education for freedom, Greene wishes to 
create an environment of empowerment to individuals to act 
to enable social transformation while at the same time 
enabling individual fulfilment. Greene sees her project as 
realisable for and incumbent on every citizen. In her 
democratic enterprise Greene desires each person to both 
recognise and exercise the contribution the individual makes 
to the social and political order and she desires every 
person to be in a better position to exercise his or her 
contribution through awakened and informed minds. 
Greene gives an example of education for freedom in the 
content of the subject of history. History, she suggests, 
needs to focus on getting close to the lived experience of 
events, through reading diaries and other narratives. Also, 
varied perspectives on past experiences need to be 
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considered. She feels that this call for a multiplicity of 
perspectives and engaged imagination would bring forward 
voices previously silenced, lost or forgotten perspectives 
and realities. In such a study of history students would be 
encouraged to reflect on and talk about what happened and 
make connections with other events in the present as well as 
the past. The students would then have an informed range of 
viewpoints from which to challenge the taken-for-granted 
interpretation of history as well as ways to broaden 
understanding of human interactions that shape histories 
over time (p. 127). 
Greene places an emphasis on the reflective, the critical, 
and the imaginative, as this orientation to thinking 
presents the possibility of opening up new ways of looking 
at things. In this she gives a primary position to the arts 
in curriculum design. Greene states that "the arts ought to 
be, if transformative teaching is our concern, a central 
part of curriculum" (p. 133). Focussing mainly on the 
literary arts Greene sees the arts as offering examples of 
multiplicity, alternatives, and models of individuals who 
have effected freedom. The arts offer alternatives in their 
representation of the way others lead their lives and 
provide a way for knowing others as well knowing oneself. 
She sees "imaginative fiction" as offering ways to make 
sense of the world; through engagement with the arts 
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critical awareness and thoughtfulness can be developed as 
"literature is where the free flow of the imagination is 
controlled by criticism and criticisms are transformed into 
a way of looking at things" (p. 113). 
Teaching, education, for authentic freedom 
Greene's education for freedom as it would exist in practice 
is only briefly sketched out in her text. She gives examples 
of changes in subject content that reflect her desired 
social reform. She mainly wishes to shift the present 
emphasis in school curriculum away from the cognitive skills 
and an emphasis on reasoning (a model of liberal education) 
to one which places an emphasis on communication, 
intelligence, reflection, critical debate, and imagination. 
Greene gives little specific direction to teachers in her 
proposed education for freedom. She sees that teachers would 
need to reorient themselves to education in order to be part 
of the intention of social and political change. Teachers, 
she holds, need to embody authentic practice. She contends 
that the ones (teachers) who see the obstacles of their own 
practice yet remain committed to their vocation have value 
as exemplars; for, she maintains, "a teacher in search of 
his/her freedom may be the only kind of teacher who can 
cause young persons to go in search of their own" (p. 9). 
When teachers embody authentic teaching they establish a 
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praxis in teaching. Greene states, "It is also important for 
an education for freedom to find a way to develop a praxis 
of educational consequences that opens up spaces necessary 
for the remaking of a democratic community" (p. 126). She 
suggests some ways of implementing praxis in schools, mainly 
by allowing time and space in the school curriculum for 
discussion, interpretation, and the presentation of multiple 
perspectives. It is a form of praxis in which one embodies 
one's incompleteness, and in turn, it is this incompleteness 
that leaves open the engagement of one's imagination and the 
realisation of possibilities (p. 122). Such practices 
support Greene's thought that "there [should always be] a 
laying open of possibility that suspends the final 
completion, if any" (p. 10). 
Teachers would need to reorient themselves to education in 
order to be part of the intention of social and political 
change. This is where Greene transfers her own didactic 
orientation of the position of teaching to other teachers. 
In Greene's "teaching for freedom" teachers are to play an 
active role in encouraging students to become involved 
politically. The problem in placing the profession of 
teaching in this political direction is made apparent in the 
novel, The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie. The teacher, Miss 
Brodie, who is admired and worshipped by "her girls," 
encourages one of "her girls," who was the most innocent and 
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credulous of Miss Brodie's select students, to become 
actively involved in the Spanish Civil War. The girl in her 
naivety does as Miss Brodie suggests and as a consequence 
she is killed. In the end Miss Brodie's brightest student 
turns on her and calls her a fascist. The story highlights 
the effect of teachers on students and the potential 
negative consequences when teachers are oriented politically 
and encourage their students to be. Greene's call for 
teachers to orient themselves to a desired political 
structure of society has the danger of moving the position 
of teacher from that of mediator to that of self-appointed 
authoritarian. 
Though the criticism given previously shows Greene's 
proposed way to society's freedom as having didactic and 
exclusionary aspects, there is value in Greene's thinking in 
considering the fulfilment of teaching. The value is found 
not in the political nature of her project but in its 
dialectic nature. In this regard Greene offers a way for 
teachers to position themselves in teaching that moves 
authentic teaching beyond that realised in self exploration 
(Pinar) or that realised in the development of the teacher-
student relationship (Noddings and van Manen). Within her 
political moral project is a way to reach individuals and to 
affect society as a whole that both broadens authentic 
existence and opens the possibility for authentic existence 
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to become a part of everyday life, which, in turn, can do 
battle with the growing influences and practices of what 
Sartre calls "Bad Faith." 
What is important to the theme of the fulfilment of teaching 
is that the dialectical nature of Greene's project offers a 
way of making authentic practices become established as part 
of the teaching profession. This can be actualised by 
teachers cultivating in practice dialogical aspects. 
Teachers can find spaces and places during the timetable of 
the teaching day to foster critical thought, imagination, 
reflection, informed minds, and an openness to listening to 
others. Teachers can encourage open debate among their 
students, and offer ways for students to develop listening, 
reasoning, and speaking skills. They can also find ways in 
the curriculum to encourage their students to explore the 
self and "the other" more deeply. They can encourage their 
students to make connections between their own lived 
experiences and those of others in order to make sense of 
their existence and to give value and meaning to the lived 
experiences of others. The arts, English literature, drama, 
and the visual arts (often marginalised areas of study in 
current and conventional forms of curricula) become 
important as places in the curriculum to encourage and 
foster critical dialogue, an openness to exchanging ideas 
and making lived experiences public. The arts offer 
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opportunities to value human imagination (in existential 
terms). In this way the arts can bring challenge to the 
taken-for-granted and traditionally valued understandings of 
history as well as giving alternative perspectives on the 
human condition. These ideas, which are the suggestions of 
Greene in her Dialectic for Freedom, are ways for teachers 
to further the idea of meaningful existence of individuals 
and in turn to effect social change as students become part 
of the established structure of society. 
But the value I give to Greene's thinking stops before the 
more political action that Greene suggests, that of 
individuals educated to becoming awakened to the inner sense 
of self and coalescing in groups with a common intention of 
political action. Instead, what can be abstracted from 
Greene's project is a way to change society and social 
structures from within. As educated individuals (that is, 
educated to a form of existential awakening) move from 
schools into the social structure a kind of "opening of 
possibilities" occurs. It becomes possible for such 
individuals to affect the social structure in the everyday 
situations in which they live as societal beings both within 
institutionalised social systems and outside of them. 
Students will become lawyers, politicians, teachers, 
individuals who will work in social and political systems. 
With educated minds, educated in the way that Greene 
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suggests, they will be prepared to act in the "~olitical 
moment" to realise individual and social freedom. They will 
find places where they can act to challenge the taken-for-
granted practices that limit individual freedom. Educated 
students will become citizens in general and within everyday 
human existence they can act to challenge oppressive and 
unjust practices when such situations present themselves. 
Therefore it becomes possible to foster and give value to 
individual freedom and one's place in the sphere of human 
existence as a whole. Through this form of education, 
individuals can emerge into society who will become 
mediators of authentic human existence acting in the spirit 
of an ongoing dialogue. 
It is this aspect of Greene's thinking, the dialogical 
nature of her authentic freedom, to which I give value as a 
way of broadening meaningful teaching in the theoretical 
frame for authentic teaching that I offer in the 
"Conclusion" of the research. 
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Chapter Five 
Authenticity, Spirituality, and Education 
Generally in her writing Virginia Woolf does not concern 
herself in any significant way with spiritual or religious 
thoughts. Her writing is mainly secular in nature. However, 
there are certain passages found in her writing which show 
her to have a profound curiosity and insight into spiritual 
ideas and the constitution of the nature of spirituality 
when her thinking wanders into such areas. 
For example, in Moments of Being she writes: 
Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It 
is the rapture I get when in writing I seem to be 
discovering what belongs to what; making a scene come 
right; making a character come together. From this I 
reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it 
is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton 
wool is hidden a pattern; that we--I mean all human 
beings--are connected with this; that the whole world 
is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of 
art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about 
this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no 
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Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven quartet;" certainly 
and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we 
are the music, we are the thing itself. (p. 81) 
Here, Woolf reflects on the connection between her art and a 
certain way of understanding the world. Woolf's vision of a 
higher order world view is that of a piece of artwork, where 
completeness and beauty come together. Hamlet and a 
Beethoven quartet, metaphors for her vision, reflect an 
aesthetic unity and it is a kind of aesthetic unity that she 
sees as the basis of human existence. Individuals, for 
Woolf, are as a note of music in a musical composition, or a 
line in a play; each a part of the composition of the whole, 
and each connected to the cosmos. For Woolf all human 
existence has connectedness and that connectedness as 
aesthetic form holds the truth of existence. This is where 
philosophy can look to define the meaning of existence. 
Another glimpse that Woolf offers into the nature of 
spirituality can be gleaned from an often-cited passage in 
To The Lighthouse. A long description of a family gathering 
leads up to what might be called a spiritual moment. The 
focus of the narration is mainly on Mrs Ramsay. She is 
seated amongst the rest of the Ramsay family and friends who 
are gathered together for Sunday dinner, a dinner which Mrs 
Ramsay has taken great pains to prepare and organise. 
Reflectively gazing over the activities, the conversations, 
and interactions of the others at the dinner table, Mrs 
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Ramsay thinks to herself: 
Everything seemed possible. Everything seemed right. 
Just now (but this cannot last, she thought, 
dissociating herself from the moment while they were 
all talking about boots) just now she had reached 
security; she hovered like a hawk, suspended; like a 
flag floated in an element of joy which filled every 
nerve of her body fully and sweetly, not noisily, 
solemnly rather, for it arose, she thought, looking at 
them all eating there, from husband and children and 
friends; all of which rising in this profound 
stillness, seemed now for no special reason to stay 
there like a smoke, like a fume rising upwards, 
holding them safe together. Nothing need be said; 
nothing could be said. There it was, all around them. 
It partook, she felt, of eternity; as she had already 
felt about something different once before that 
afternoon; there is a coherence in things, a 
stability; something, she meant, is immune from 
change, and shines out ... in the face of the flowing, 
the fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby; so that again 
tonight she had the feeling she had had once today 
already, of peace, of rest. Of such moments, she 
thought, the thing is made that remains ever after. 
This would remain. (pp. 141-142) 
In this reflective passage there is an interplay between the 
temporal and the eternal, and for Mrs Ramsay it is a moment 
of transcendence as she reaches the state of a self in 
harmony with the world. Mrs Ramsay has a kind of 
transcendental experience as she speaks of going beyond 
(outside of) the immediate self and, with a kind of 
epiphanic insight, she rests for a moment in contentment and 
peace. Thoughts of transcendence, of going to a higher level 
or plane of thought and going beyond earthly time, are a 
fundamental part of spiritual discourse. Woolf has captured 
here a moment of spiritual experience. 
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In these thoughts on spirituality Woolf connects with the 
thinking of the educationalist (and theologist) Dwayne 
Huebner. Huebner values concepts of a self connected to the 
wholeness of the world and moments of transcendence to a 
state of completeness and peace. These aspects of 
spirituality are mainstays of Huebner's definition of 
spirituality. However, where Woolf's writing most strongly 
resonates with the thinking of Huebner is in a passage by 
Woolf where spiritual existence is connected to an awareness 
of an inner sense of self. We find this insight in a passage 
extracted from one of Woolf's short stories, "The Unwritten 
Novel" (From Virginia Woolf: Selected Short Stories, 1993, 
pp. 25-38). 
But when the self speaks to the self, who is 
speaking?--the entombed soul, the spirit driven in, 
in, in to the central catacomb; the self that took the 
veil and left the world--a coward perhaps, yet somehow 
beautiful, as it flits with its lantern restlessly up 
and down the dark corridors (p.34). 
The soul, the inner self, that Woolf is referring to in this 
passage is an ambiguous, yet to be defined, entity. It seems 
to be something above the common and the mundane, above an 
unreflective self (what Woolf might call a "cotton wool" 
existence). The terms "soul" and "spirit" refer to an aspect 
of inner thinking, a consciousness of self that desires 
expression. For Dwayne Huebner, it is an awareness of this 
inner aspect of the self that makes it possible for the self 
191 
to become shaped into a spiritual being, an inner self on 
the journey of self-expression while consciously striving 
for a spiritual existence, union with the Absolute. For 
Huebner, having an awareness of the inner self is essential 
in travelling the path of spiritual existence. In this way 
Huebner follows the thinking of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard 
also saw the way to authentic being as a form of journeying 
to a higher level of existence. Huebner's project of an 
education in spirituality intends to draw on the dynamics of 
an inner self and move individuals towards a form of 
spirituality where a sense of completeness realised through 
transcendence and universal connectedness can be realised. 
In this final exploration into various theories of education 
and authenticity it is Huebner's thinking about the concept 
of an inner self directed towards wholeness and fullness of 
being that I see as offering a way to complete meaningful 
teaching. 
In his article "Education and Spirituality," first published 
in the Journal for Curriculum Theory (1993, vol. 3, pp. 13-
34), Huebner does not elaborate on his meaning of 
spirituality by explicating the influences and philosophical 
thinking behind his definition as we have found with the 
other educationalists explored in this inquiry. Instead he 
appears to take the position of someone acting and living 
within his own spiritual convictions; his actions, his 
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writing, reflect his spiritual orientation. From this 
article it can be discerned that Huebner's definition of 
spirituality is mainly formulated in four interrelated 
elements: the relation one has with the world, human 
imagination, human expression, and aspects of transcendence. 
The subject to object relation 
Spirituality, for Huebner, is constituted in the relational, 
the relation held between the self and the "other." That 
"other" is multi-dimensional and multi-facetted and connects 
the self to the world. Huebner distinguishes between two 
understandings of "the other," although the difference 
between them is somewhat blurred. He says, "[W]e forget, our 
relationship with and indebtedness to that 'Other' often 
manifested through the neighbour and the strange" (p. 23). 
This reference to the "other" is the other of our immediate 
encounters with other human beings, those individuals with 
whom we interact every day. But there is another "other" 
that is more universal in Huebner's thinking. Huebner says, 
"Hovering is always the absolute 'other' Spirit, that 
overwhelms us in moments of awe, terror, tragedy, beauty, 
and peace" (p. 22). This "other" is that which seems to 
exist above the immediate other. Both relations, the 
relation that one has with other human beings and the one of 
a connectedness to some entity beyond the immediate self, 
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with a higher cosmic existence, are apprehended'by the 
individual and known and embodied inwardly. Huebner states 
that to enter into a mode of spirituality one must first be 
open to knowing and seeing the spirituality of both forms of 
otherness. To live in spirituality means always being open 
to possibilities and growth in one's encounters with "the 
other." 
Human expression and imagination 
Huebner remains conscious of and close to language in 
defining spirituality. He states critically, "We depend upon 
the language, practices and materials as if they were the 
givens with which we have to work" (p. 13). "Our languages, 
our practices, and the resources we use," Huebner says 
further, "are merely the embodied or materialized images in 
which we choose to dwell." He continues, "Other images, in 
which we could dwell, are currently unembodied in worldly 
structures and abandoned" (p. 13). Huebner believes that 
individuals who have not begun to move towards a kind of 
inner self-expression live in the world as if its structures 
are immoveable. He contends that we have forgotten or 
suppressed the actuality that imagination is the source of 
our so-called "givens." Our freedom lies in choosing to 
acknowledge and engage in those other imagined worlds. He 
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feels that through language and by calling on hUman 
imagination and the individual's ability to re-imagine and 
articulate another reality, one based in spirituality, a 
spiritual life-world can be realised (p. 14). Action for 
Huebner is a form of dialogue which in turn, he sees, is all 
human expression. Dialogue itself becomes part of the 
spiritual journeying. A dialogue of the spiritual is both 
critical of limiting and restrictive forms and open to 
alternatives and possibilities. It is a state of being open 
to change and transcendence. Huebner puts it this way: it is 
"a dialectic of criticism and creation" (p.31). Found in 
Huebner's emphasis on imagination is the thinking of Sartre. 
For Sartre authentic existence occurs when one moves into 
one's possibilities which are formulated in one's 
imagination. These possibilities are open and yet to be 
defined. Huebner can be seen to expand on Sartre's 
definition of imagination and openness by framing one's 
possibilities in the Ultimate, that of absolute goodness and 
absolute knowledge. 
Transcendence 
Huebner states, "The human being dwells in the transcendent, 
or more appropriately, the transcendent dwells in the human 
being ... the spirit dwells in us" (p. 18). (This resonates 
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with Virginia Woolf's notion, quoted above, of the spirit in 
conscious thought that "flits with its lantern restlessly 
searching and peering up and down the dark corridors.") It 
is in the mode of transcendence that Huebner locates 
knowledge and knowing. Huebner sees transcendence as a state 
of being in which we call upon "our ability to orient 
ourselves to and through action and dialogue enter into the 
vastness and moreness of knowing" (p. 19); it is in the 
state of transcendence that we go beyond what we are at 
present. Huebner sees knowledge as being ever-expanding: 
"There is always more to know ... We are in front of a 
vastness . .. " (p.19). The perspective taken here is that of a 
self standing on the verge of a vast sea of knowledge and 
one poised to direct the self through that vastness. 
Spiritual life is a journey in the course of which one is 
directed to a sense of completeness, to self-fulfilment. It 
is a journeying, in spiritual terms, to God; it is a journey 
sustained by faith and the individual's desire to go beyond, 
to become more (greater, better, fuller) than what one is 
now. But the journey's end can never be consummated. There 
is always more to know. Through dwelling in knowing, through 
orienting ourselves to an image of the Absolute Other, and 
seeing life as a journey to that Absolute Other, the self is 
shaped into a spiritual being. It is a journey sustained and 
constituted by the individual through critical reflection, 
imagination, and dialogue (action). In this spiritual 
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existence one is continually reconstituting oneself, 
continually transforming. 
Huebner and narratives of authenticity 
The inter-related aspects that constitute the nature of 
spirituality in Huebner's thinking can be found in the 
definitions of authentic existence in existential terms. 
Huebner connects with the thinking of Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre. Kierkegaard's definition of selfhood 
is realised within a religious (Christian) context and as 
such within some understanding of spirituality. Both 
Kierkegaard and Huebner value the sense of an overarching 
universal other, a higher sense of being. Like Kierkegaard, 
Huebner employs the idea of God to signify this higher order 
of existence. Kierkegaard and Huebner understand God as 
created in the mind and imagination of the self, the 
conscious mind. Just as Kierkegaard believes religious life 
to be embodied in thoughts and actions of the individual, 
Huebner sees spirituality to be embodied in the thoughts and 
actions of the individual in everyday life. Like 
Kierkegaard, Huebner reflects that embodiment. 
But Huebner's spirituality has closer ties to Heidegger's 
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and Sartre's modes of authenticity than to Kierkegaard's. 
Huebner is similar to Heidegger in the way Heidegger defines 
authenticity, where the self is shaped through reflection 
and action on one's relation to the already existing world. 
But Huebner sees one's ever-evolving mode of being as a 
journey directed toward the Absolute Other, and knowledge of 
the Absolute Other is constructed in experiences with ~the 
other(s)" we meet in our journeying. In Heidegger's thinking 
each moment is lived with a kind of intensity; each act is 
committed in the full awareness of that which constitutes 
Dasein. In authentic being the individual is engaged in a 
sense of knowing and the actions of authenticity are poised 
to reflect the truth of one's existence. Huebner's spiritual 
existence reflects Heidegger's thinking of Dasein here. Just 
as there is no predetermined definition for Dasein, 
Huebner's meaning of spirituality has no predetermined 
definition. Indeed, a conclusive definition would be 
contrary to his intended valuing of spirituality. A full 
spiritual existence for Huebner, like Dasein, is a process, 
a mode of consciousness, and is constituted in aspects of 
human existence and the ability of human beings to inquire, 
to reflect, to reason, and to imagine. Huebner's 
spirituality, like Heidegger's Dasein, is embodied, ever-
evolving and open to its possibilities, its ~not yet." Every 
human being is perpetually oriented towards his own 
possibilities. 
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Despite Huebner's affinity with the thinking of Heidegger it 
is really Sartre's dualist thinking that underlies Huebner's 
definition of spiritual existence. For Sartre as for Huebner 
there is an emphasis on the relational. For Sartre the 
relational is between oneself and one's freedom. For Huebner 
the relational is between oneself in the present and the 
Absolute Other. For Sartre and for Huebner the relational is 
constructed in the consciousness of the self, through 
engaged imagination, through a critical orientation to the 
world, through the relation of one's self to the outside 
world, and through one's ability to make choices and to act 
on those choices. Huebner reflects Sartre's move to 
authentic being in stating that our actions are a result of 
our ability to make choices, our ability to choose what to 
do and what not to do, and to imagine our existence in the 
future. In this way both Sartre and Huebner place an 
emphasis on human agency as being able to move towards 
fulfilment. For Sartre, as for Huebner, imagination and 
freedom are closely linked. One has the ability to imagine 
other ways of being that don't presently exist and through 
human agency move towards an alternative form of existence. 
For Huebner that alternative form is spirituality and life 
with God where the concept of God and human imagination are 
intertwined. One constructs a kind of image of God in the 
mind and through one's will one directs one's actions 
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towards this divine image. 
The following explication of Huebner's education for 
spirituality emphasises the Sartrean dualism underlying 
Huebner's project. 
Critical thinking and religious belief 
In the foregoing I have attempted to give some understanding 
of Huebner's spirituality by highlighting the interrelated 
aspects that constitute spirituality and its connection to 
authentic existence. Huebner sees education as the way for 
individuals to move towards existential spirituality. The 
alternative form for education that Huebner offers, one that 
is based on Sartrean dualism, begins by being critical of 
the presently established form of education. Huebner sees 
that a critical orientation is the first step toward 
embodied spirituality. Donald Cupitt (Sea of Faith, 1984), 
another existentialist theologian, holds a similar 
perspective to Huebner's. Cupitt has also given importance 
to critical thinking as an essential aspect of spiritual 
embodiment. He uses the word "critical-spirituality" 
(Cupitt, 1984, p. 252) to describe this orientation. Such an 
orientation has the effect of undermining dominant 
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structures while at the same time opening the way for an 
alternative order. It is the dominant structures and 
practices within education that Huebner wishes to undermine. 
Huebner applies his "deconstructing while reconstructing" 
way of thinking in a systematic attack on the present mode 
of education. While being positioned critically to current 
practices the "blocks" to spiritual existence become 
visible. Huebner names the blocks, what he calls "the 
established pillars of education" (p. 32). At the same time 
he offers his alternative approach to education which holds 
spiritual existence as the focus. 
Huebner's critical overview of current educational practices 
For Huebner language is the telos. It is through language 
that we can enter into a spiritual world. Huebner begins 
with the significance of language in thinking critically 
about educational practices. In his article he states, "How 
can one talk about education ... [and] also talk about 
spirituality" (p. 13). He sees the language of education and 
the language of spirituality to be at opposite poles; as 
education presently exists, the two languages are 
incongruent. From the perspective of his own spiritual 
project Huebner criticises the language that guides present 
educational decision-making. He states that the "language 
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orientation" of education as it presently exists is 
"strongly established, embodied in educational architecture, 
materials, methods, organizations, and teacher education" 
(p. 13). To talk about education, even critically, is 
limited because "our very locations and practices are framed 
by the language tools and images we would like to overcome" 
(p. 13). Huebner believes that the present practices of 
education are not only limited but also oppressive, and 
devaluing to human existence, because human existence is 
defined within narrow terms. "The journey of the self is 
short circuited or derailed," he says, "by those who define 
the ends of life and education in less than ultimate terms. 
We are always caught in our primate goals (our idols) or in 
the limitations imposed by others (our enslavements)" (p. 
19). He goes on to state that knowledge is restricted by the 
ruling "principalities and powers" that bring us into their 
spheres of interest, where we serve their ends (p. 20). 
Huebner maintains that it is fundamental to an education 
based in spirituality to be critical of these dominant and 
oppressive practices. A critical language needs to be 
adopted and developed, Huebner believes, so that we "notice 
our traps, our limits, our idols, our slaveries" (p. 23). 
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Blocks to Spirituality 
Huebner most emphatically reflects Sartre's thinking when he 
maintains that in order for the individual to move towards 
freedom one needs to note and address the blocks to freedom. 
Being in a mode of critical consciousness was for Sartre a 
way of naming the blocks to freedom and one's authentic 
being. Huebner, also, sees critical reflection as a way of 
naming the blocks to authentic being, but for Huebner it is 
important to hold the ability to see the blocks to one's 
spiritual growth and journeying. Looking more closely at the 
structures of present-day education, Huebner determines four 
main "pillars" (Huebner's word) supporting current 
educational practices. They are the goal of present 
education, the social/political structure of education, the 
content of education, and the methods of teaching. Huebner 
sees the need to undermine these four main pillars of 
education in order for education to change its present 
focus. The focus of education should be, he states, "a way 
of attending to and caring for a great journey--the journey 
of the self or soul" (p. 18). He critically addresses each 
of these pillars, revealing their oppressiveness to 
individual freedom and showing how they are blocks to 
spiritual journeying. As he does this he also gives another 
direction for education. 
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The present goal of education 
Huebner states that those who guide educational practice and 
decision-making are themselves "in the grip of the language 
of psychology and behavioural sciences," and "a language of 
ends and objectives" (p. 17). Operating from a positivist 
orientation and a determinist perspective, those leading 
education perceive learning in very narrow terms which, 
Huebner says, hide the fact "that we dwell in a near 
infinite world, that our possibilities are always more than 
we realize, and that life is movement, change or journey" 
(p. 17). The intention of an education based in spirituality 
would be to embrace the world as a "vastness" and knowledge 
and knowing as infinite. 
The social/political structure of education 
Huebner contends that the present social/political structure 
of education blocks the development of an educational 
practice that focusses on the journey of the soul. He says, 
"[T]he journey and the corresponding commitment to God, is 
restrained, redirected, and derailed by the principalities 
and powers--the forces that no longer serve God but serve 
false gods and human beings" (p. 20). He states that the 
"principalities and powers bring us into their spheres of 
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interest, where we serve their ends, rather than the 
ultimate end" (p. 20). 
The content of education 
It is in the content of education that Huebner reflects the 
complement to Sartre's Bad Faith and that is in an imagined 
world of freedom and possibilities. Huebner states that, as 
content, other people are primary as they are sources of 
criticism and possibilities. Huebner believes the content of 
what is taught in schools should be about otherness. An 
education, meaning the content of curriculum, that focusses 
on spiritual journeying would be "always a consequence of 
encountering something that is strange and different, 
something that is not me" (p. 22). 
Huebner states: 
Others see the world differently, talk differently, 
act differently. Therefore they are possibilities for 
me ... They point to a different future for me ... By 
being different they bring my particular self under 
criticism ... Other people call 
attention to a future that is not just a continuation 
of me, but a possible transformation for me. Through 
the presence of the "other" my participation in the 
transcendent becomes visible--the future is open if I 
will give up the self 
that is the current me and become other than I am (pp 
23-24) . 
In addition, Huebner contends that "the 'other' as content 
provides an opportunity to listen and speak with a stranger" 
(p. 24). He expounds further on the importance of "the 
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other" to spiritual journeying, showing a certain multi-
dimensionality to the evolving self on his or her spiritual 
journey: 
Strangers become neighbours. I have others to listen 
me into consciousness of self and the world. I have 
from others the gift of other stories of the great 
journey ... Through the caring act of listening and 
speaking, I have a chance to participate in the 
mystery of language. In listening and speaking the 
transcendent is present as newness comes forth, as 
forgiveness is given and received, and as 
the poetic shaping of the world happens (p. 24). 
He talks of the value of others' creativity and actions in 
terms of bodies of knowledge, works of art, technologies, 
products, and human actions. He suggests posing questions as 
to the relevance of the creations of others in terms of our 
own meaning and value; questions such as: "What new 
possibilities does this offer me? How can my life be 
different because of it? What new paths, maps, scouts, and 
co-journeyers are available?" (p. 24). 
Spirituality and teaching 
Huebner sees that teaching has been restricted to skills and 
predefined actions. He maintains that teaching should 
instead be grounded in life, the life of the teacher and the 
life of the culture and community in which we teach. He 
states that "[t]he spiritual dimensions of teaching are 
recognized by acknowledging that teaching is a vocation"; a 
calling, an inward compulsion. "The teacher is called to a 
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particular way of living ... [He or she is called by] the 
students, by the content and its communities, and by the 
institution within which the teacher lives ... Each of these 
calls places demands or obligations on the one who would 
live the life of a teacher" (pp. 27-28). Huebner believes 
that this calling by individuals, communities, and 
institutions is answered by the teacher through a dedication 
to and love of students and knowing, through stewardship, 
and through doing the work of justice. "An education based 
in spirituality must be an affirmation of life," he states, 
"built on faith and hope and a belief in the possibility of 
there being a world filled with truth and beauty, joy and 
suffering, mystery and grace" (p. 28). The teacher mediates 
the environment for the student and does this in a way that 
guides the student toward a self-directed fullness of 
existence, meaning a life in spirituality and a life 
directed toward the Absolute Other. (It is here, in this 
aspect of Huebner's thinking about education and the 
position of teachers in education and spirituality, that I 
see a way of completing meaningful teaching, which I discuss 
further on.) 
Further aspects to Huebner's educational practices 
Huebner holds a very cynical view of evaluation practices 
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that are presently used in schools, stating that at present 
" [e]valuation is the act of those already in power to 
determine the effectiveness of their power" (p. 31). Another 
essential part in the deconstruction of education as a 
result of a critical position of present practices is a need 
for a reconstruction of practices of evaluation. Huebner 
states that a different approach to evaluation is needed (p. 
29). Currently evaluation in education is designed by 
others, not by the ones being evaluated. Huebner points out 
that it is mainly the students and teachers who are 
evaluated by the other "because they are the weakest 
politically, and most at the mercy of the principalities and 
powers" (p. 30). An evaluation that reflects his orientation 
to spirituality would be an integral part of curriculum 
design. He suggests that curriculum should embrace a 
"dialectic of creation and criticism" (p. 31). Curriculum 
should be designed to keep spirituality alive, "filled with 
the possibilities of transcendence and the promise of life" 
(p. 31). In order for this to be achieved, Huebner believes, 
education would have to have as its focus human existence 
and other human beings. For Huebner evaluation in 
spirituality would emphasise self-reflection and critical 
thinking. Concurrently the path of learning would be seen as 
an evolving self-determined process. 
As an additional outcome of a re-orientation to education 
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where an education in spirituality is the focus Huebner 
places on the concept of rebirth. Sartre determines that in 
order to undergo a conversion into one's freedom one must 
negate the past and free oneself from the past. This in turn 
is a way for grasping one's freedom and taking 
responsibility for one's own existence. To transcend one's 
past it is necessary to be free of one's past. Huebner 
interprets this Sartrean idea of negating one's past and 
starting again as a form of rebirth. According to Sartre, 
one must recognise that at every moment he is called upon to 
transcend his past and make himself anew through his future 
and the possibilities offered to him. This is similar to 
Huebner's thoughts on reincarnation when he says ~[W]e are 
always open to a 'turning,' to forgiveness, redemption and 
the new being which results. The future is before us as open 
if we are willing to turn away from what we are and have, if 
we are willing to let the past in us (the self) die. Life is 
a journey of constantly encountering the moreness and 
constantly letting aspects of us die so that the new may be 
born within us" (p. 18). Huebner gives importance to the 
concept of the continuity of life and he does this through 
placing an emphasis on the deeply interconnected concepts of 
life, death, and reincarnation (p. 18). We move into the 
transcendent, he says, ~by letting go of the personal past 
so that we become somehow different. The act of letting go 
signifies the necessity for a faith in the future." In this 
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sense life is an ever-renewing process. 
Huebner's spirituality is a re-orientation to the world that 
calls for an on-going critical dialogue, engaged 
imagination, and active human expression that is directed 
towards the Absolute Other. It is a mode of being that seeks 
to deconstruct present taken-for-granted structures that 
determine individual existence while at the same time 
striving to nurture and sustain a spiritual life. Underlying 
Huebner's outline for education in spirituality, whereby 
present-day education is deconstructed and redirected toward 
one that is based in spirituality, is Sartre's dualist 
orientation. But Huebner takes Sartre's thinking beyond a 
focus on the individual to a reorientation for all of 
society and he does this through his project for education. 
It is through the present structure of education that 
Huebner extends Sartre's thinking beyond an emphasis on the 
self to one that is intends to change society as a whole. 
A Hermeneutic Turn 
It should be pointed out that Huebner is not unique in his 
approach to spirituality and his existentialist orientation 
to spirituality. Aspects of existentialist thinking lend 
themselves to spiritual and religious thought (Friedman, pp. 
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239-362). Huebner's orientation to spirituality has strong 
connections with others who have explored spirituality 
through existentialist thought, such as Donald Cupitt, Paul 
Tillich, Nicholas Berdyaev, and Martin Buber. Although these 
theologians exhibit significant similarities in each of 
their existentialist positions there are also sometimes 
subtle, even contradicting differences in their 
understandings of what spirituality means. Huebner's 
spirituality, although similar to those mentioned above, is 
unique. The main difference in Huebner's thinking is the 
emphasis that Huebner places on education and the way 
education parallels spiritual existence. 
Huebner's mode of education has much appeal to those in 
education who find themselves overburdened with conflict and 
confusion. It offers clarity and direction to a profession 
that is fractured, and demoralising and disempowering to 
those who are engaged in the application of education, 
mainly to teachers. (I am thinking mainly of the position of 
elementary teachers today both in North America and in 
England.) Huebner's mode of education seems to offer a way 
of being, a direction for teaching that promises to be 
individually satisfying while at the same time paving the 
way for a universal direction realised in a higher order of 
existence. It is open to, indeed, welcomes the other: 
people, things, as well as ideas. It addresses the 
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criticisms of teaching as a demoralising profession, and of 
teachers having a lack of a sense of connectedness to their 
profession. Huebner's educational project is one of 
liberation, personal empowerment, and a deep engagement in 
educational life. It is intended to free individuals, 
students and teachers, from limitations imposed upon their 
understanding and knowing. It is intended to overthrow what 
Huebner sees as the oppressiveness of current education and 
its practices of enslavement of individuals to serve others 
who are in positions of power, to an education that is 
empowering to all individuals, where everyone plays a part. 
While Huebner's project of education for spirituality holds 
great appeal, I have to question its practicability. 
Although Huebner does speak about the entrenched thinking 
regarding present practices (further entrenched through 
language) which would make a move to spirituality difficult, 
I think a spiritual education is more difficult to realise, 
at least on any grand scale, than Huebner acknowledges. 
Mainly the difficulties, as I see them, rest with the term 
spirituality and not solely in the language of education, 
which is where Huebner directs his criticisms. Huebner's 
project requires the conscious thought of individuals and 
society collectively to accept Huebner's understanding of 
spirituality before it can begin to effect social action. 
There exists today a multitude of understandings of 
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spirituality. The meaning of spirituality in many 
established and active religious orthodoxies is quite 
different from Huebner's understanding of spirituality. To 
expect various religious groups to endorse an understanding 
of spirituality which differs substantially from their own 
creeds and dogmas is not, I think, realistic. In addition, 
within Western culture there has been a significant and 
growing loss of faith and commitment to established and 
traditional religions. To overcome the negativity that 
currently exists towards Christianity (and therefore 
spirituality) and to have individuals return to another form 
of spirituality would be difficult in the present growing 
anti-religious, mainly anti-Christian, climate. Although 
conceptually Huebner's project has much merit, the 
divergences of thought about what spirituality means and, in 
some cases, hostile understanding of spirituality lead me to 
believe that it is very unlikely that Huebner's spirituality 
in education would start to take hold in the minds of a 
significant number of individuals where it needs to be 
initiated to be effective in changing society's present 
orientation. 
Dwayne Huebner and Maxine Greene 
Maxine Greene's project of education for freedom and Dwayne 
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Huebner's spiritual education have significant areas of 
thought in common: the aim of each of their projects is to 
awaken an engaged sense of consciousness. Both Huebner and 
Greene desire to undermine some form of cultural dominance. 
For Greene this dominance is the uncritical, unreflective 
way of being that she sees as presently existing in society 
as a whole and what she describes as people living under the 
guise of negative freedom. For Huebner the dominant 
determining forces are the ruling principalities and powers 
that society has come to take for granted. Both Greene and 
Huebner call on somewhat subversive means in order to 
accomplish an undermining of the dominant. They both suggest 
critical and reflective dialogue. Both Greene and Huebner 
recognise the power and ability found in human agency, that 
of individual initiative and engaged imagination and 
creativity, to bring about change and to affect the 
direction of one's life, moving one away from the 
oppressiveness of others, from being manipulated and 
controlled by others. For both Greene and Huebner 
consciousness is constituted in an individual's ability to 
think critically, to reason, to communicate with others, and 
to imagine. Both see the necessity of a critical orientation 
in order to see the blocks and walls that impede individual 
freedom and possibilities. Greene, however, places an 
emphasis on fostering an informed as well as critical mind, 
which is intended to result in an informed and aware 
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individual. Huebner's emphasis is on imagination as a 
necessary tool for a reorientation to education and to life. 
Huebner maintains that it is necessary to imagine oneself in 
a spiritual world in order to move into and exist in that 
world. Greene sees her education in freedom as an education 
which ensures that individuals become meaningful 
contributors to the public sphere and therefore play an 
active part in the construct of society. Huebner's form of 
authentic existence differs from this. For Huebner it is an 
education in aspects of spiritual life that is essential in 
order to ensure individual freedom. Greene is more didactic 
then Huebner as she demands an aggressive approach to 
overcome the blocks to freedom. Huebner, on the other hand, 
writes as someone on the inside, a kind of spiritual being 
rather than a forceful advocate. What is important to this 
dissertation is that Huebner's project of an education in 
spirituality has something Greene's approach to freedom 
seems to lack, that being an overarching mode of existence, 
a "something" above. For Huebner that overarching aspect is 
the symbol of God, the Absolute Other. This gives a 
universal aspect to authentic existence. 
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Completing authentic teaching 
In the above critical discourse on Huebner's thinking 
reasons were given as to why Huebner's project may not be 
realisable in a significant way in educational practice. 
However, Huebner's thinking does offer a way for teachers to 
complete authenticity in teaching. He does this mainly 
through the notion of an imagined concept of universal 
goodness and absolute knowledge. This is where authenticity 
can be completed. In order to combat the demoralising aspect 
of overwhelming outside negative influences, the teacher can 
maintain a sense of direction and self-empowerment by 
remaining committed to an image of universal goodness and 
absolute knowledge. Through an openness of being more or 
other than one is presently, an individual, a teacher, in 
authentic practice, directs his or her actions and thoughts 
to this higher order of existence. Through aspects of 
engaged consciousness, that of critical dialogue, 
imagination, reflection and envisioning an image of 
universal goodness and connectedness the teacher moves the 
self and others towards a better, fuller, and more engaged 
being. Mainly this is done through language, the language of 
spirituality. The teacher is as mediator in this vision of 
the world. One's position as teacher, one's relation to 
one's students, to other teachers, to parents, is framed in 
a positive mode as one mediates the encounters of one's life 
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in education toward some form of goodness and possibilities 
for the other. As well, the teacher looks for opportunities 
for growth for the self as teacher. It is in this way that 
Huebner offers a way to complete authenticity in teaching. 
How Huebner's theory of education completes teaching is 
detailed in the following concluding chapter, as is the way 
Huebner connects with the ideas of the other educationalists 
in this inquiry in defining meaningfulness in teaching. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
A Synopsis of Theories of Authentic 
and Meaningful Teaching 
In the preceding chapters I have explicated and given 
critical discussion of the theories of six contemporary 
educationalists each of whom has developed an existentialist 
approach to teaching. In the explication of each of their 
theories I have concentrated on the themes of authenticity 
and aspects of inwardness, and how these themes relate to 
the practice of teaching and to being a teacher. The meaning 
of authenticity was derived from existentialist 
philosophies, specifically the writings of Soren 
Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Jean Paul Sartre. It was 
shown how the theories of educationalists William Pinar, 
Mary Warnock, Nel Noddings, Max van Manen, Maxine Greene, 
and Dwayne Huebner built on this existentialist definition 
of authenticity in formulating their theories of education 
and how these theorists, in their proposed educational 
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projects, also challenged and expanded on that definition. 
Through critical discourse both the value and the 
shortcomings of the theories of these educationalists and 
their definitions of meaningful forms of education and 
teaching were discussed. This conclusion is a kind of 
synthesis of their ideas. It is also here that I offer 
another approach to meaningful teaching. Similar to the 
projects of the theorists we have been studying, it is an 
approach that is intended to give shape and direction to 
teaching in everyday practice. It is intended for those 
teachers who have acknowledged the complexity and morass of 
the structure within which they teach and who feel lost and 
confused in their profession. As well as providing a basis 
for practice I offer here a way for teachers to position 
themselves in teaching and education. It is a kind of way to 
be in teaching constructed from the varying forms of 
authentic practices we have been discussing. Mainly, it 
calls for an elevated way of thinking about teaching and for 
an expansion of one's understanding of education and 
teaching. It is a stratified form that is a simplification 
and amalgamation of the ideas presented by the 
educationalists we have been exploring. What is presented in 
the following is an outline of an alternative perspective to 
being a teacher. It is the basis for further discussion of 
authentic teaching and is intended to be filled out through 
practice and reflection. The approach that I offer has three 
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main steps. 
Steps to heightened pedagogical awareness and the narrative 
to authentic existence 
In the interviews I held with the teachers in Coventry on 
the changes in their teaching of the National Curriculum 
mentioned in the "Introduction," it was pointed out that 
elements of their conversations revealed that teachers allow 
others to define what being a teacher means. Teachers do 
this either through acceptance of predesigned methods of 
teaching and content of what is taught, or by seeing 
teaching by its nature to be that which is defined by 
others. In existentialist terms this way of looking at 
teaching places teaching in a state of fallenness 
(Kierkegaard's term). In a state of fallenness one has not 
begun to move towards one's possibilities; one has not begun 
to define oneself as teacher. Existentialist philosophy 
offers a way to move towards personal fulfilment and 
meaningful teaching through a definition of authenticity. 
In Chapter One I argued that the theories of authenticity 
given by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre follow a common 
narrative. These modes of authentic being aim to give 
definition and direction to one's existence as they call for 
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a transformation of being. First one must come to desire to 
see the world differently. Once one chooses to reconstruct 
one's world view one also takes responsibility for one's 
existence. At this juncture in one's life story the 
individual must commit to defining, creating, and expressing 
a sense of one's own uniqueness. This is done through a 
heightened sense of awareness of oneself and one's place in 
the world and through the conscious mind of the individual 
mediating between the self and the outside world. Existence 
in all three narratives of authenticity, those of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, calls for an intense 
engagement of certain aspects of conscious thought. Mainly 
it is the human abilities to reflect, to inquire, to 
imagine, and to reason which are used to understand, 
interpret, direct, and shape one's existence, one's relation 
with the self and the world. Authentic existence in 
existentialist philosophies is a call to awaken to the power 
of one's thinking, to define one's view of the world, and to 
remain committed to an awakened state of consciousness and a 
higher sense of being. The stratified form for authentic 
teaching that I present follows a similar narrative. 
In the explication and inquiry into the varying theories of 
contemporary education we saw that the theoretical 
foundation behind each of the projects we explored varied 
and each of the educationalists provided varying reasons for 
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why teachers might desire to come to an alternative form of 
practice. Pinar sees present practices of education and 
teaching as mainly dehumanising and alienating. He proposes 
a way of viewing teaching that is aimed at evoking in the 
individual a form of teaching that is intended to be 
personally satisfying and fulfilling. In order for authentic 
practice to take place, according to Pinar, one's conscious 
thoughts need to be focussed on the self as an individual 
and on the engagement of aspects of one's thinking. It is 
how one chooses to define his or her world view that leads 
to authentic practice. In Pinar's thinking the teacher sees 
himself or herself as being in the position of mediating 
between one's inner existence and the outside world of 
teaching and education while shaping and directing a sense 
of self. 
Nel Noddings, in her feminist ethic of caring, argues 
against what she sees as a masculine ethic presently 
dominating the construction and implementation of education. 
The focus of her thinking is on the intimate relational 
experiences of human encounter and response. For Noddings it 
is the caring frame of mind expressed in the mother-child 
relation that grounds an orientation for thinking about 
education and determines teaching practices. 
Maxine Greene looks at education in broader terms than the 
222 
individual and the teacher-student relation. She holds that 
at present the dominant thinking and actions of individuals, 
both teachers and students, and of education as a whole lack 
an awareness and attention to the dynamics of existence and 
conscious thought, and calls for an orientation to teaching 
and education that focusses on the metaphysical aspects of 
freedom and possibilities to be embodied in society through 
individuals becoming social activists. She sees education as 
a way of awakening the mind of the individual into conscious 
awareness, so that he or she becomes a thoughtful, informed, 
and active participant in the structuring of the society in 
which he or she lives. 
Dwayne Huebner, who bases his thinking on spirituality, is 
also critical of the dominant forms of education, seeing 
present systems of education as mainly serving the egos and 
desires of those in positions of power and authority. He 
desires a form of education that directly aims to undermine 
this oppressive structure of education while at the same 
time reorienting the focus of education and teaching to that 
of a spiritual journey, where the end of the journey is 
fulfilment of life through connectedness to the Absolute 
Other. 
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The first step 
What becomes apparent in these varying forms of authentic 
teaching and education is that no matter whether one comes 
from an acknowledgement of disaffectedness in teaching, or 
from feelings of isolation, or from an awareness of the 
structure of education as serving others' egos, needs, and 
desires, or whether one feels a loss of autonomy, or a lack 
of or a loss of meaning and direction in one's teaching, in 
order to determine a life in teaching which is meaningful, 
self-fulfilling, and satisfying one first needs to 
acknowledge that something is missing in one's present 
practices. Essential to the different ideologies we 
discussed is the aspect of being open to realising one's 
desire for a personally satisfying and meaningful practice 
of teaching. What is necessary here, in this first step to 
authentic practice, is the conscious decision to change 
one's thinking about teaching and to be open and ready to 
change. In order to move to authentic practice in teaching 
and education one must start with a particular frame of 
mind. It is a frame of mind that reflects an essential 
aspect of Husserl's phenomenological thinking, epoche (found 
in cartesian Meditations, 1960), where one suspends 
judgement of how things are. In the realm of teaching and 
education, in order to move to authentic practice, one must 
give up one's formerly held understanding of the importance 
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and value of teaching. This is what the theorists we have 
explored hold in common. The first step in moving towards 
authentic practice is to acknowledge that authenticity 
begins with a conscious decision to see teaching differently 
and to set aside all other understandings of teaching. 
But the call to authentic teaching can start even further 
back than what the theorists we have studied have stated. It 
really starts with what Heidegger calls "a thrownness." When 
one first becomes a teacher the individual is "thrown" into 
the world of teaching as it presently exists. The field of 
education into which a teacher in "thrown" is full of 
complexity, confusion, and general "muddledness." This is 
where teaching begins, and where the beginning of becoming 
an authentic teacher can be seen to begin. 
The second step 
Common to each of the projects of the theorists we studied 
is what I see as the second step in moving toward self-
fulfilment in teaching. This step calls for a deep 
engagement in and commitment to one's pedagogical practice. 
In order to do this one needs to be purposefully directed 
towards a higher level of existence in education. What one 
needs always to keep in mind is that one's orientation is 
directed through an attitude of journeying, of moving 
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towards another level or plane of thought. What this 
involves is an ongoing commitment to refining and improving 
one's teaching. It is a journey that is self-directed and 
self-determined. For each of the six theorists in this study 
the commitment to self-directedness with a vision of some 
higher state of being is essential to the realisation of 
each of their projects. In Pinar's project self-
actualisation is a commitment to move towards an image of an 
ideal self in the future. For Noddings the image of an ideal 
self in the future also forms the basis of her project. One 
holds this image of the "best self" up as a spectre and 
remains committed to that image through one's actions and 
language. It is an image that one holds not only for oneself 
as teacher but also for one's students. In the thinking of 
Max van Manen and his pedagogy of tact the ideal state that 
one needs to reach is a kind of deeply informed sense of 
knowing where one's thinking is conditioned to be in a state 
of readiness to act effectively in the pedagogical moment. 
Maxine Greene and Mary Warnock also desire the individual to 
develop a kind of informed knowing. Both of their theories 
give attention to the content of education and the need to 
bring society as a whole into a higher level of existence. 
Huebner's authentic existence is realised through a form of 
education that focusses on aspects of the spiritual life of 
the individual and on individual self-fulfilment in the 
image of the Absolute Other. The higher level of existence 
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to which Huebner wishes the individual to be coIDrnitted and 
to move towards is that of the Absolute Other. Each of these 
projects holds some vision of teaching or teachers in the 
future. It is a vision to which one must commit and which 
one must hold firmly in one's mind at all times. The vision 
is then reflected in one's thoughts and actions. While 
journeying to a higher level of existence the authentic 
teacher is always working to be the best teacher one can be, 
however one might define "best." 
The third step 
After taking the first step of freeing one's thoughts so 
that one is open to seeing education and teaching as 
something more or other than that into which one is thrown, 
and the second step of committing to being the best one can 
be as teacher, then one advances to what I see as the third 
step to authentic practice. Here we enter a complex area of 
thought. Each of the theories we have studied has 
contributed to the composition of this aspect of authentic 
teaching. It is in this area of thought that substance is 
given to one's thinking in practice while in a mode of self-
directedness. This is where autonomy is realised, and one's 
desire and commitment to change and grow as a teacher are 
fulfilled. This area of thinking about teaching is best 
defined as having three interconnected layers. Underlying 
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each of these three layers is the existential notion of 
freedom, where freedom is connected to such interrelated 
themes as personal autonomy, independence, and an allowance 
for growth. Along with this form of freedom is a conscious 
acknowledgement of personal and social responsibility for 
the human condition. To enter into this third phase of 
authentic teaching requires an engagement of the dynamic 
aspects of conscious thinking, reflection, and imagination. 
The first layer of engaged consciousness is focussed on the 
inner self as teacher. The second layer is concentrated on 
the connectedness of the individual (the teacher) to the 
immediate other in teaching, the student. The third layer of 
thought focusses on the preservation of some form of 
societal and universal existence. These three aspects are 
interconnected, but they are not to be seen as consecutive 
stages that one passes through in order to realise 
authenticity, as is the case in Kierkegaard's thinking and 
his stages to selfhood. Rather they each need to be attended 
to at the same time and on an ongoing basis. What is really 
necessary here is a splitting of one's thinking where as an 
authentic teacher one considers the self, the other, and 
society in one's actions and thoughts, simultaneously. 
collectively the six theorists convey a concern for teaching 
and education that reflects each of these three layers of 
thought. But what has been revealed in the exploration of 
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their projects in the preceding chapters is the "question of 
which is more important: the individual, society, or 
universal existence. For Huebner and Warnock the universal 
and eternal are primary. For Greene, it is society that is 
given importance; for van Manen and Noddings the immediate 
other, the student, is reified, and for Pinar it is the 
individual. In the critical analysis of each of these 
theories none of the theories gives value and importance to 
all three aspects of human existence. In the critical 
analysis of their ideologies this is often cited as a 
shortcoming of their projects. My proposed approach to 
thinking about teaching and authentic life in teaching 
addresses this shortcoming. It calls for a particular 
orientation of the teacher in its realisation. It is an 
approach which I call ~the multifaceted Janus face of 
authenticity." The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English (p. 727) defines Janus as ~the guardian god of doors 
and beginnings." The Janus face is a moral face of concern 
and care. It is one that holds vigilance over the human 
condition and one that not only looks backwards and forwards 
but also looks in many directions at once. The approach that 
I suggest calls for teachers to frame their teaching in this 
way in order to become authentic in their teaching. 
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The first layer of authentic teaching: knowing the self 
We will begin with the first layer of thought, that of the 
self, and how this initial way of thinking about teaching 
and being a teacher can be constructed. For this defining of 
the self I turn to the thinking of William Pinar and his 
currere method. The most important aspect of Pinar's 
thinking is that he underlines the existence of a separate 
aspect of the self, a self that exists outside of the 
concreteness of time and space, where one reflects on one's 
position in the world. It is a kind of inner self that is 
affected and constituted by reflection. It is a self that 
knows about one's being and that values the individual's 
capacity to imagine, to reflect, to form intentions, and to 
act on those intentions. Pinar presents the idea that 
through engaging these aspects of conscious thought one can 
free oneself from being defined by others (administrators, 
teachers, parents, government inspectors, students). It has 
the existentialist attribute of being able to name an inner 
self and of taking responsibility for one's existence while 
attempting to remain above the Crowd Man (Kierkegaard) or a 
self defined by others. In order to achieve this 
understanding of an inner self, Pinar suggests four steps. 
He calls the four steps: the regressive step, the 
progressive, the analytical, and the synthesis. Through this 
method the teacher attempts to grasp an understanding of 
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one's past which is then applied to realising a vision of 
one's "ideal self" as teacher in the future. These two 
aspects of the self, a self in the past and a self in the 
future, are brought together through reflection and are 
synthesised in one's actions in the present. Pinar's method 
gives to the self a sense of autonomy and wholeness, where 
the past, present, and future are brought together through 
the self's inner voice and through reflective dialogue. As 
one reflects and acts on a vision of a self in the future, 
the self mediates between the individual and the world. What 
is important in Pinar's project is that in order to move 
toward authentic existence one needs, at various times in 
one's life, to focus on engaging the dynamics of thought, 
that is, reflection, imagination, and inner dialogue, and 
come to an understanding of an inner self and to giving 
substantial consideration to how that inner self plays a 
part in defining the self as teacher. 
With his project Pinar offers teachers a way of directing 
and shaping their own destiny while at the same time acting 
in an existential awareness of self. However, in my 
criticism of Pinar's method I mentioned that reflecting on 
the self solely through the eyes of the self gives only a 
limited understanding of the self and how one exists. I 
suggested that being viewed through the eyes of others as 
teacher could offer a more expanded understanding of the 
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self. In an expanded understanding of the self as teacher, a 
teacher could ask for critical comments from students on his 
or her teaching, and could ask a fellow teacher, a kind of 
"critical friend," to give an evaluation of his or her 
teaching practices. Pinar believes that intentionally 
thinking about the self in existence, the inner dialogue 
that one holds, needs to be manifest in writing and suggests 
various forms of writing in this enterprise such as 
reflective, critical, analytical, and a form of stream of 
conscious articulation. These forms of language also exist 
in the visual arts. Virginia Woolf knew this. She knew of 
the close relation between the visual arts and literary 
writing through her sister, Vanessa, and her involvement 
with the artist and art critic Roger Frye, as well as other 
members of the Bloomsbury Group. In To the Lighthouse, Lily 
Briscoe is painting an impression of Mrs. Ramsey. Lily's 
reflective, critical, and analytical thoughts are interwoven 
with the way she applies paint to the canvas. In this 
section Woolf shows that the acts of writing and of painting 
can blend in articulation. A kind of stream of consciousness 
portrait painting, either done by the self or by an artist, 
is also a way of exploring the self. Another resource for 
further discovering of the inner self is to talk to an 
objective but sympathetic friend or other professional 
person or simply record one's thoughts and play it back. All 
of these suggestions are intended to have the effect of 
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distancing the self, of standing back, in order to pullout 
an inner self. These are all ways of opening up and 
broadening an understanding of the inner aspects of being. 
What is important to realise here is the acknowledgement of 
the existence of an inner self and of coming to a deep 
understanding of that inner self. This is essential to 
realising authentic being. 
The second layer of authentic teaching: knowing the "other" 
A further criticism that I gave to Pinar's project is that 
he overlooks an essential part of teaching; that is, one's 
relationship with the immediate other, the student. To 
address the second shortcoming of Pinar's method we look to 
the thinking of Nel Noddings and Max van Manen who each have 
formulated theoretical projects that move beyond the focus 
of Pinar's thinking on the self. Here we enter the second 
layer of engaged consciousness. Both Noddings and van Manen 
call for an expanded vision which includes the immediate 
"other, " in teaching, the student or child who is before us. 
Noddings's thinking is formulated on an ethic of caring. Her 
concern is for the future of the child, the student, and in 
bringing that child to grasp a vision of his or her ideal 
self in the future. Van Manen also expresses concern for the 
child before us and for those for whom we have 
responsibility as parents and as teachers. But his focus is 
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for the life of the student/child in general. Van Manen's 
project is concerned with what it means to be a parent or a 
teacher. Through engaging aspects of conscious thinking van 
Manen shows that one can bring self-awareness into the 
practice of teaching where one acts in the best way possible 
when the pedagogical moment presents itself. For both 
Noddings and van Manen the teacher or the parent must know 
himself or herself. This sense of personal selfhood must be 
realised and acknowledged. But one must also try to know the 
inner life of the immediate other, the child/student. For 
Noddings one must know the child, the student, deeply in 
order to direct that child towards a realisable and 
attainable goal, an image of an ideal self. For van Manen, 
one must know the inner child in order to act in the best 
way possible in the pedagogical moment. Both Noddings and 
van Manen hold that an essential step to authentic teaching 
is to be open and welcoming to the other, the student, the 
child. It is a state of mind that begins in the physical. 
Through a smile, a look, a gesture, the child is brought 
into the inner world of the teacher. With the child securely 
in one's immediate vision the teacher, the parent, then 
moves toward the inner life of the child. This is done 
through a kind of intentional splitting of one's thoughts 
between the self and the other. This sense of splitting of 
thinking differs slightly between Noddings and van Manen. 
For Noddings one thinks about oneself and has some image of 
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the self in the future towards which one works. 'But through 
engaged imagination and through a kind of sympathy one also 
places oneself in the mind of the student/child and tries to 
see the world through his or her eyes. Noddings suggests 
that thinking about the self and about the other is achieved 
through a kind of back and forth movement. There is a time 
to be fully with the other and see the world through the 
other's eyes, but there is also a time to pull back and turn 
to one's sense of self as teacher and consider the 
relational experience and what best to do to guide and 
direct the student. For van Manen the splitting is more 
continuous and engaged than in Noddings's approach. The 
teacher/parent must always be in a state of readiness, a 
kind of intensely conditioned pedagogical state of mind, so 
that one will act in the fullness of the pedagogical moment. 
What is common to both Noddings and van Manen and their 
approach to the child/student, is that the teacher mediates 
between inner and outer worlds, between the world of the 
self and the world of the child. Whether holding up the 
image of an ideal self or acting in the fullness of the 
teachable moment the authentic teacher is always engaged in 
reflection and always ready to ask himself or herself: "Will 
this action bring the child closer to developing an 
understanding of his or her inner self and his or her 
responsibilities as a maturing person in the world?" So the 
second layer of thought in the approach to authentic 
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teaching that I offer here is that along with formulating an 
understanding of an inner self, one moves beyond the self 
into the world view of the other, the student. This is done 
through transcendence, through experiencing the world from 
the other's point of view. This splitting of one's thinking 
between the self and the other reflects a notion of self 
that is fluid, a self that exists between one and the other 
and moves from past to present and between present and 
future. The complexity and dynamics of holding a position of 
intimacy with the other, with one's students, is detailed in 
the chapter on Noddings and van Manen. One needs to take 
time to rest in one's own inner thoughts and seek to 
maintain a healthy inner sense of self and at the same time 
is ready and willing to move into the inner world of the 
other, the student. 
The third layer of authentic teaching: positioning the self 
to society 
Another criticism that I gave to Pinar's thinking was that a 
theory which does not address the fact that one cannot 
control one's future is inadequate. The future is 
conditioned by many forces beyond the control of the 
individual. Therefore, to operate with a vision of an ideal 
self in the future has the possible consequence of one 
becoming "morally bankrupt" (Kierkegaard's term). Van Manen 
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and Noddings expand the narrative of authenticity given by 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre, moving it beyond a focus 
on the self to that of embracing "the other" either through 
tact (van Manen) or through engrossment (Noddings). But as 
in Pinar's thinking, Noddings's and van Manen's projects are 
limited forms of authentic practice. In my criticism of 
their thinking I pointed out that theories that focus only 
on the immediate other and the relational experience one has 
with the immediate other are only isolated enclaves of 
authentic existence and authentic practice. They have little 
impact on society as a whole and are vulnerable to being 
short-circuited by the "principalities and powers" of 
negative outside forces. To address the shortcomings of the 
thinking of Pinar, Noddings, and van Manen, I find answers 
in the thinking of Maxine Greene, Mary Warnock, and Dwayne 
Huebner. Their theories of education and teaching, although 
possibly idealistic, offer a way to position thoughts of 
teaching and education where the notion of authentic teacher 
moves beyond a focus on the individual to one that is 
concerned with society's responsibility in relation to 
authentic existence. It is with the thinking of Warnock and 
Greene that we enter the third layer of expanded 
consciousness. The basis on which Warnock and Greene 
formulate their theories of what education should be is not 
on the teacher as such as it was with Pinar, Noddings, and 
van Manen. But rather, Greene and Warnock are both concerned 
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with epistemology and the content of the curriculum, what 
one teaches. For Greene, the content of what is to be 
studied in schools, of what counts as valuable knowledge, 
and what connects authentic existence to education, should 
be those things that are related to realising one's freedom, 
one's possibilities. Education not only needs to focus on 
informing minds, according to Greene, but it also needs to 
be about awakening one to aspects of conscious thought and 
how conscious thoughts affect existence. Through engaging 
aspects of human thinking processes, it is Greene's belief, 
individuals will not only become awakened to their own 
possibilities and freedom but will also become effective and 
contributing members in the shaping and construction of 
society. She believes that the content of education should 
focus on fostering aspects of conscious thought, that of 
self-reflection, of engaged imagination, of critical 
discourse, of attentive and thoughtful response, and of 
moving into the world-view of others. In this way knowledge 
for Greene is mainly that which leads individuals to become 
valuable contributors to the organisation of a moral and 
just society. In order to ensure that education is about 
doing what is best for human existence, Greene believes 
education needs to focus on getting close to the lived 
experience of others, mainly the lived experiences of past 
events. She suggests this could be done through reading 
diaries and narratives of the individuals who lived during 
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previous times and experiences of conflict. Greene also sees 
a need for multiple perspectives on what happened in the 
past, so as to bring out voices previously silenced, lost, 
or forgotten which hold other perspectives of the world and 
other forms of reality. In such a study of history, students 
would be encouraged to reflect on and talk about what 
happened and make connections with other events in the 
present as well as the past. The students would then have an 
informed range of viewpoints from which to challenge the 
taken-for-granted interpretation of history as well as ways 
to broaden their understanding of human interactions that 
shape histories over time. This knowledge, Greene contends, 
would provide individuals with a broader sense of one's 
place in the world and better equip individuals to hold a 
meaningful role in public discourses. Maxine Greene brings 
together a self that looks objectively at its own history 
and future and a self that seeks to position itself to the 
outside world in constituting its freedom, where freedom is 
a conscious awareness of the self emerging in dialogue, the 
language of the relational, of the self to the world. She 
sees the dialectic nature of the connectedness held between 
persons as a way of mediating and at the same time affecting 
how the world is constructed. In Greene's thinking the 
individual is oriented to the world in such a way that the 
self is seen as continuously being reconstituted through 
thought, reflection, action, and choosing. I maintain that 
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the value of Greene's thinking is found in the dialectical 
aspects of teaching that she named. Through focussing on the 
dialectal and the relational aspects of a self in a world 
inhabited by others teaching can preserve its meaningfulness 
as it filters through educational systems into societal 
behaviours and attitudes. 
In Mary Warnock's educational project the main aspects of 
what counts as meaningful curriculum content are similar to 
those of Maxine Greene. She also focusses on fostering an 
awakening and engaging aspects of conscious thought: 
imagination, reflection, critical response, and 
transcendence. However, the intent of her educational 
project is different. Mainly Warnock sees education as a way 
of addressing the effect that human consciousness now holds 
in determining the future of the individual and the future 
of human existence in general. Warnock desires a form of 
education that puts the responsibility of the future of 
human existence in the hands of the individual. She wishes 
to effect a form of education that would bring about an 
awareness of this responsibility. Warnock, like Greene, 
gives value to studies of history. Histories, Warnock 
contends, are concerned with actions, and actions are the 
outcome of human thought and intentions. She sees that those 
past lived experiences which effected change and brought us 
to where we are today need to be known. History, she 
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maintains, should be the study of the past lived· experiences 
of individuals. In Warnock's form of education historical 
events should be discussed in a forum of open dialogue in 
terms of their moral and ethical consequences. It is through 
this articulated valuing eXChange with others that 
individuals will come to see their influence and effect. 
Warnock extends her approach to history to other subjects 
that have traditionally made up curricula. She believes that 
education needs to present a historical understanding of 
areas of study such as science, mathematics, literature, 
music, the visual arts, and even history itself. She also 
gives value to personal histories in her desired content for 
education. Warnock relates personal histories to 
storytelling. She contends that the child should learn to 
tell himself the story of his (Warnock's usage) own life in 
order to give his life a self-determined shape. Like Greene, 
Warnock offers ways to preserve authenticity in teaching by 
suggesting things teachers can do in their teaching which 
affect the consciousness of one's students, who will become 
the individuals who make up society. They suggest ways that 
teachers through their practice can bring individuals into a 
kind of existential awakening and concern for society as a 
whole. 
Literary writing is also valued in the curriculum forms 
desired by both Greene and Warnock. For Greene literary 
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writing provides material for further reflective and 
critical dialogue as well as offering other points of view 
on lived events. Studies in social histories and studies in 
forms of imaginative writing (literary texts) are, for 
Warnock, the sources necessary for dialogue on universal 
values. We must search for stories that we hold in common 
with other cultures, explore those stories for their value 
and how they might lead to common values that can unite 
society and give value to, while at the same time 
preserving, our future existence. Important to the thinking 
of both Greene and Warnock is a desire to move society as a 
whole to a higher sense of existence and to bring to 
conscious awareness the role that individuals play in this 
move. They both see this project realised through a form of 
curriculum that challenges taken-for-granted understandings 
of history and the past and the way that we have 
traditionally valued the past, and through giving importance 
to fostering articulate individuals skilled in critical and 
analytical thought. 
I criticised Greene and Warnock in their proposed projects 
of meaningful teaching and forms of education for not 
addressing the obvious shortcomings of their projects. 
Greene and Warnock do not address how one is to overcome the 
enormous blocks that prevent a society as a whole from 
moving to authentic existence. Education in the European and 
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Anglo-American worlds at present is deeply systematised and 
entrenched, mainly through tradition, and most forms of 
education are government-led and determined. Although the 
degree of government influence varies in different 
countries, states, and provinces, what passes for content in 
schools is affected more by people in positions of power and 
influence than by educational theorists. The content of 
curricula is focussed more on financial and economic 
concerns than on concern for the human condition. The 
alternative forms of education offered by Greene and Warnock 
have little potential to be realised in practice in any kind 
of fullness. Only a few alternative forms of education have 
been able to succeed outside the mainstream. Those developed 
by Maria Montessori and Rudolf Steiner are two that come to 
mind. But even these forms of education are very 
marginalised and the original theories behind these 
approaches to teaching and education have been compromised 
over time because of external pressures and the desire to 
remain in existence in some form. Neither Warnock nor Greene 
gives significant attention to how their forms of education 
could move education in the direction that is necessary for 
the realisation of authentic existence in the consciousness 
of society. Instead their projects place the teacher and 
authentic education as existing outside mainstream 
practices. I also criticised their theories for not offering 
an overarching direction that would more clearly direct 
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teachers in their practice. This is not to say that teachers 
should not persist in developing a societal consciousness in 
the ways Warnock and Greene suggest. Even within the 
strictures of education today teachers are in a position to 
broaden authentic practice to effect social consciousness. 
Teachers can find ways in mainstream schooling and teaching 
to effect conscious responsibility. They can find time in 
the daily timetable to cultivate critical debate, and 
articulation and listening skills in their students. In 
order to further authentic existence teachers need to see 
and act on opportunities to explore personal and social 
histories, offer varying perspectives on social history, and 
encourage critical debate on issues of moral and ethical 
concern within the curriculum as it is given and by making 
time outside of the given curricula. 
The final stage to authentic teaching 
In the above we have looked at the value and way for 
authentic practice in terms of the self, in terms of the 
immediate other of the student, and in terms of society as a 
whole. It was shown why and how each of these aspects to 
teaching and education can be brought into everyday 
practice. Developing a sense of a self was the focus of 
Pinar's thinking. Based in Pinar's currere I offered a 
practical way to construct a sense of self as teacher. 
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Noddings and van Manen detailed how the concept of authentic 
teacher could be furthered through the focus that each gives 
to "the other" in teaching, the student, and the teacher-
student relational. I have shown that authenticity and 
inwardness can be developed and fostered beyond a 
concentration on the self and the other to a practice of 
society with the thinking of Mary Warnock and Maxine Greene. 
But I criticised Warnock's and Greene's thinking for not 
moving beyond groups of individuals taking on the role of 
determining future existence and for not providing a way to 
position oneself comfortably to mainstream and dominant 
practice. To address these shortcomings in their thinking I 
look to Dwayne Huebner. Huebner presents a way to remain 
authentic while teaching in mainstream systems of education 
and he offers an overarching form to teaching. Also, Huebner 
offers a way to complete meaningfulness in teaching. 
Huebner's project of authentic practice is mainly 
constructed around three interrelated aspects of thinking: 
the individual needs to work subversively in undermining 
present practices; the individual needs to focus on a higher 
world of existence; the individual needs to work in faith 
and hope. Huebner's concern is for the future of the 
universe as well as the future of the individual. He 
believes that at present we are existentially enslaved by 
" ' 'l't' d powers" whl'ch prevent us from realising prlnclpa l les an 
a life in goodness. In order to move out of oppressiveness 
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and a degraded level of existence, Huebner maintains, we 
need to move towards an imagined spiritual world, a world of 
absolute good, wholeness, and completeness, and absolute 
knowledge and knowing. This is an image of existence that is 
above the image one has for oneself in the future as an 
ideal self. It is also above the image that a teacher has 
for "the other," the student. This is where the highest 
level of existence can be found. It is the realm of ultimate 
truth. In Huebner's thinking the individual, the teacher, 
needs to have faith in one's good intentions and in the way 
one mediates the world of the other through good intentions. 
The other theorists we studied placed an emphasis on the 
past, on personal and social histories, but in Huebner's 
thinking our histories are something we acknowledge but 
don't embody. The past is something we need to let go of so 
that we can become somehow different. For Huebner life is a 
journey of constantly encountering what he calls "the 
moreness" of existence and constantly letting aspects of us 
die so that the self may be born within us. In this way 
Huebner places an emphasis on the eternal and attends to the 
wholeness of life. He perceives life as an ever-renewing 
process. What Huebner offers mainly is an overarching image, 
a universal vision which can direct our actions and thoughts 
as teachers. This is an awareness of a higher sense of being 
that is connected to the inner self. One sees oneself as 
mediating between the outer world and one's connectedness 
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with the Absolute Other, a kind of holy goodness and 
absolute knowledge. Teachers need to consciously direct 
their everyday actions toward the image of the Absolute 
Other in order to stay beyond and above the "principalities 
and powers" of a secular world view that constantly threaten 
to suppress authentic existence. By offering an overarching 
orientation to existence Huebner brings together the valued 
thoughts of each of the theories of the educationalists we 
have been exploring in terms of meaningful teaching. 
In the above I have attempted to sketch out an approach 
whereby teachers can reflect on their teaching while shaping 
and directing their profession into meaningful practice. I 
have suggested that there are four steps to securing 
authenticity in teaching. First one needs to step out of 
one's present perceptions and the definition of teaching 
into which one has been thrown, and pass one's gaze over the 
field of teaching and education in an objective frame of 
mind. Next, one must commit to directing one's thoughts and 
actions to a fuller sense of teaching and a higher level of 
existence. One then moves into constituting what that fuller 
sense of self might be. I suggested that at this point in 
becoming an authentic teacher three aspects of thinking 
about existence and one's place in the world need to be 
cultivated. One must split one's conscious thinking 
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processes into three areas. There is an awakening and 
shaping of an inner sense of self through the interwoven 
aspects of reflection, dialogue, imagination, and vision. 
There is a shaping and directing of oneself with the 
immediate other in pedagogical situations bringing the 
other, the student, and the self into a fuller sense of 
being. Imagination, transcendence, and critical reflective 
dialogue are essential here. The third aspect is to consider 
the "other" in broader terms where the "other" also becomes 
a societal other. This third aspect requires acting to alter 
the content of education so that engaged imagination, 
dialogue, and critical reflection become part of the 
curriculum. All three layers of consciousness of human 
existence need to be attended to and balanced in authentic 
pedagogical practice. These are the kind of questions one 
needs to ask oneself in order to maintain authenticity: 
"Does this situation call for an action that will bring the 
child into independence and maturity?" "Is there a balance 
between self and others?" "Am I in touch with my inner 
self?" "How will this action affect society as a whole?" The 
self as teacher, the world of the immediate other, and the 
future well-being of society as a whole, all need to be 
considered in order for authentic teaching to be realised. 
One's actions throughout the teaching day should reflect 
these inner concerns. There is a need to find spaces and 
places in the teaching day, in the curriculum, to reinforce 
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and to support one's journey to heightened pedagogical 
awareness. There is also a need to step outside the 
pedagogical experience and allow for insights and reflection 
through periods of isolation and meditation. But mainly the 
authentic teacher needs to believe in one's own inner self 
and continually strive for authentic existence. The final 
stage in authentic practice is a focus on universality, 
where one acts in the faith and hope in universal goodness 
and absolute knowledge and one's actions and thoughts 
reflect a commitment to that highest level of human 
existence. 
The significance of language in pedagogical practice 
Language is just as important to authentic practice as the 
theoretical structure in which it is based. It is through 
language that the inner self is revealed and known; it is 
through language that we can transcend time; it is through 
language that we know the phenomenological world in which we 
exist; it is language that tells stories and gives existence 
form. Each of the six educationalists whose ideas we have 
explored gives significance to the part language plays in 
the reconstructing of present understandings and practices 
of teaching and education. Pinar places importance on the 
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reflective inner dialogue of the self which consists of a 
kind of stream of consciousness thinking in his currere 
method. Pinar's focus is mainly on written language. 
Language is that which brings the self into existence and it 
is through language that one mediates between one's past and 
one's future in present existence. Nel Noddings emphasises 
the language of the feminine, specifically the dialogue 
between the mother and child, which is seen as the dialogue 
of caring and nurturing. This is for Noddings the expression 
of care and concern for "the other" where the other is the 
child, the student, or the person or persons for whom we 
feel responsibility. Max van Manen places an emphasis on the 
language found in the everyday, mainly the language that 
attempts to articulate the experiences of everyday 
situations in our interactions and relations with children. 
He values anecdotal descriptions and informal conversations 
about what he calls "pedagogical life," that is the life of 
teaching. These dialogues and conversations reflect the 
actualities of one's life with children. Van Manen suggests 
that through interrogating this language insights can be 
revealed as to what best to do in one's relations with 
children, when one as teacher is called upon by the child to 
advance his or her well-being, independence, and 
development. Maxine Greene desires to establish a language 
of a critical and thoughtful public in order for individuals 
to become valuable and contributing members to the moral 
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fibre of society. Mary Warnock places importance on a kind 
of phenomenological language, meaning mainly the language of 
literature, the language of what she terms "imaginative 
writing." She sees language as a way to transcend time and 
holds that "imaginative language" is a way to speak to all. 
It is a form of language that is accessible to all, which in 
its descriptive nature evokes a kind of sympathy into which 
one can move. Through discussion and dialogue of what is 
valuable in the imaginative writing of human experiences we 
can work towards establishing eternal and universal values. 
Dwayne Huebner desires individuals to live in the language 
of spirituality. Part of the language of spirituality is 
critical reflectiveness. Huebner believes that the language 
of spirituality would have the effect of undermining the 
present dominant language of education and teaching which he 
sees as being oppressive. He contends that we have forgotten 
or suppressed the actuality that imagination is the source 
of our so-called "givens" and our languages and practices, 
and that the resources we use are merely the embodied or 
materialised images in which we choose to dwell. He sees 
that freedom of the individual is to be gained through 
acknowledging and engaging in those other sources. Through 
language and imagination individuals can live and move in a 
different reality. As well as being self-determining and 
self-directing, the language of the spiritual is critical of 
limiting and restricting forms that block one's spiritual 
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journeying. 
What is important here, derived from the thinking of all the 
educationalists collectively, is the need to be sensitive to 
forms of language in one's teaching. Authentic orientation 
to education and teaching needs to be formulated within a 
certain grammar. There is a need to question the language of 
teaching and education in its often taken-for-granted form. 
Also we need to try to stand above the language of idle 
conversation and mindlessness, which is a language that is 
unreflective and uncritical. In order for authentic teaching 
to take place a language that is expansive and fluid, a 
language that is closer to the inner life of human 
existence, needs to be developed. The vocabulary for 
authentic teaching is constructed in the language of 
mediation, critical thought, inner reflection, openness to 
"the other," and a language that accommodates imagination. 
It is a form of conversing that allows for such non-rational 
concepts such as hope and faith. The language of 
authenticity casts a positive light on the self and others 
with the conscious intention of moving the self, others, and 
society as a whole towards an image of one's best self. 
As I have tried to demonstrate in my analysis of the six 
theorists, the aesthetic language of Virginia Woolf 
possesses the attributes of authenticity. Woolf's language 
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connects with the thinking of each of the educational 
theories we have explored. Woolf's form of writing connects 
with the autobiographical aspects of the theories of William 
Pinar and Mary Warnock. In her stream-of-consciousness style 
she reveals the inner and lived world of the individual. 
Woolf's writing is also a form of "imaginative literature" 
which is the kind of writing that Warnock values in her 
theory of "education for stewardship" as it is a form of 
writing that transcends time and gives an eternal aspect to 
lived experiences. Woolf's language also connects with the 
thinking of Noddings and van Manen in the emphasis that she 
places on bringing together minds in order to move into the 
world of the other. This position of intimacy is what is at 
the basis of Noddings's and van Manen's forms of teaching. 
The reflective nature of Woolf's form of writing 
interrogates the "cotton wool" of the everyday and at the 
same time seeks to make existence meaningful. This is an 
important aspect of Maxine Greene's thinking and her 
"education for freedom" enterprise. Finally, Woolf's writing 
is expansive enough to embrace spiritual concerns and ideas 
and in this way she connects with Dwayne Huebner and his 
project of "education for spirituality." Engaging the 
language of poetry and aesthetics in the dynamic forms 
suggested by the various educationists is an integral part 
of authentic teaching. 
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Authenticity and embodiment 
Another aspect of authentic existence needs to be considered 
in authentic teaching. It can be called the fifth stage of 
authentic teaching, the highest form of teaching. It is a 
way of being in practice that brings together practice and 
theory. This is a way of being as teacher that reflects an 
embodiment of all the elements of authenticity we have thus 
far discussed. In addition to offering ways of thinking and 
ways of acting as authentic educators, two of the theorists, 
Dwayne Huebner and Max van Manen, reflect this embodiment in 
their writing. They are as models of individuals who in the 
way that they write reflect the ideology that they espouse. 
They reflect a coming together of thought and action. This 
is the ultimate in one's search for self-actualisation. When 
authenticity is embodied it is a way of being that is 
reflected in one's voice, bodily movements, gestures, facial 
expressions, eyes. It is a reflection of a deep knowing of 
oneself and a confident purposefulness in one's position as 
teacher. When one reaches this state of existence one is as 
close as one can come to authentic existence. 
What I have presented in this conclusion are the structure 
and attributes of an alternative approach to education and 
teaching. It is a skeletal frame for authentic practice and 
should be used as a basis for further discussion. It is an 
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approach that is constructed out of the thinking of certain 
contemporary educational theorists. It is a structure on 
which to focus one's thoughts and actions as teacher. What 
is important to acknowledge in this outline is that coming 
to terms with one's practice starts inwardly, with the way 
one thinks about teaching, and moves to effect the 
environment in which one teaches. It demands an awakening 
and an engagement of the elements of conscious thought: 
imagination, self reflection, response and exchange, and 
intentionality. It resists passivity and complacency. It 
values the self as an individual and seeks to preserve this 
aspect of being through a focus on the particular, on the 
immediate other, on one's value and place in society, on the 
universal, and on the eternal. This is a way of looking at 
teaching and of being in teaching that makes teaching 
meaningful and personally satisfying. What I have tried to 
present here is a way of "being at home in teaching." 
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